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ABSTRACT 
 
The thesis examines the intricacies of the global AML/CFT framework 
focusing largely on the three jurisdictions of United Kingdom, Uganda and 
South Africa. These jurisdictions were selected to test the hypothetical model 
on which this study was undertaken. While appreciating the importance for 
states to embrace global prohibition regimes to deal with overlapping 
interstate issues such as money laundering, these regimes often tend to 
overlook practical realities in member countries they are implemented. Since 
the global AML framework is implemented through the compliance of 
individual states, its efficacy would depend on the propensity of individual 
states to harness it. 
 
There is anecdotal evidence to corroborate the thesis that the current global 
AML/CFT framework is not compatible with the regulatory environment across 
the majority of LDCs. Thus, this presupposes that it cannot be applicable 
globally. LDCs are saddled by general systemic failure, lack of economic and 
social infrastructure; lack of physical and human resources, corruption and its 
corruptive effective on regulatory institutions and national governments. Even 
with the best intent, in the foregoing precarious environment, desired AML 
laws cannot effectively work as expected. Also, by design or default, soft law 
instruments (for example the FATF forty plus nine recommendations are not 
easy apply, let alone enforce globally.  
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The study proposes the need for countries to undertake desired reform 
programmes before they can countenance the adoption of the global 
AML/CFT framework. Since money laundering crimes are jurisdictional 
problematic—not amenable within the realm of individual states, it is 
imperative to introduce a global AML court. It is also imperative for states to 
consider adopting hybrid measures such as mutual recognition paradigm in 
Europe to ease their co-existence on overlapping global regulatory 
challenges. States should also explore the possibility of harnessing norms of 
CIL as opposed to prescribing regulatory regimes every time there is a crisis. 
However, it needs to be noted that the envisaged global AML/CFT regimes 
cannot crystallize into norms of CIL, unless they are willingly embraced by 
countries and not imposed.  
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CHAPTER ONE: THE FRAMEWORK ANALYSIS OF THE STUDY                  
   
1.1 introduction 
 
The study examines the dynamics of the global AML framework with a view to 
evaluate the ease of adapting it across different jurisdictions. The thrust of the 
thesis is that desirable as it is, the efficacy of the global AML/CFT framework 
is dictated by the local regulatory environment in individual jurisdictions where 
it is implemented. Thus, my submission is that the global AML regulatory 
framework should be designed with an ethos of flexibility so that is easily 
adaptable in different jurisdictions. The thesis has been undertaken by 
assessing the potential for countries to harness the UN, AML treaties, FATF 
forty plus nine recommendations and other AML regimes. United Nations AML 
treaties and the FATF recommendations are critical components of the global 
AML framework because they constitute a framework of rules, principles, 
procedures, norms and regulatory guidelines for states to adopt in regulation 
of money laundering and its predicate crimes. However, desirable as it is, the 
thesis posits that uniform regulatory regimes are not easy to harness across 
countries because they tend to be incompatible with the dynamics of 
development in individual states. For instance, the majority of LDCs are 
saddled with multiple challenges, predisposing them to capacity deprivation in 
harnessing global AML regimes.  Secondly, the global AML framework 
operates in the realm of international law; and it is not immune from the 
failures of the international legal system. The thematic focus of the thesis has 
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been to fill the gap in the current global AML/CFT framework and its 
adaptability across different jurisdictions. The global regulatory system and 
the AML framework specifically are driven by requisite information. Thus, the 
applicability of the global AML framework depends on the individual state’s 
capacity to generate and harness requisite information. LDCs such as 
Uganda are deficient in the capacity to generate and process requisite 
information. Information is a prerequisite for AML agencies such as Financial 
Intelligence Units (FIUs) and the police to function effectively. Without 
requisite information, law enforcement agencies cannot secure a successful 
prosecution against arraigned money laundering/terrorist culprits.1 This is 
because the envisaged global AML regimes, such as the “KYC” are difficult to 
apply, let alone enforce in some countries, given that the ease of 
implementing them depend on availability of requisite information on bank 
clients.  The majority of LDCs are either deficient in robust centralized data 
registries to generate data on the magnitude of crime typologies or the little 
data generated is too patchy to inform the adoption of normative policy 
choices. 
 
1.2 The liberal market economy and incidences of ML in Uganda 
 
The transition to the market economy in Uganda presented opportunities for 
those who had criminal inclinations to establish their presence into the 
country. Prior to liberalisation of current and capital accounts, it was only the 
                                                          
1
 Ian Carrington and Heba Shams, ‘The Elements of Effective AML/CFT Framework: Legal, 
regulatory, and Best Institutional Practices to Prevent Threats to Financial stability and 
Integrity’, Seminar on ‘Current Development in Monetary and Financial Law’, Washington, 
D.C., October 23-27, 2006. 
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central bank of Uganda that would approve and effect payments for goods 
and services to and from foreign countries.  With liberalisation of foreign 
exchange controls; exporters were allowed to operate foreign currency 
denominated accounts within the country.  This was after a series of 
stabilisation and reform programmes, which had been undertaken since 
1987.2 This allowed freer entry of institutions into the system, which was 
characterized by the fast expansion of banking and non-banking sectors after 
1994.3 The transition to the market economy in Uganda also precipitated an 
environment where national institutions were sidelined from providing effective 
regulatory oversight, information gathering and the enforcement of prudential 
norms because they did not want to be seen undermining the liberal market 
philosophy.4 The relaxation of foreign exchange controls by the bank of 
Uganda created an environment where businesses could operate without 
being properly supervised.5 There was the proliferation of financial and non-
financial business enterprises offering financial services in the major cities 
such as Kampala. This environment coupled by lack of effective supervision 
of financial and designated non-financial businesses enabled criminals to 
exploit the system by, for instance, introducing counterfeit currencies into the 
0financial economy. Counterfeit currencies would be co-mingled with clean 
money and introduced into the financial system, through shopping in foreign 
countries6, where liberal business attitude, lack of sophisticated technology 
                                                          
2
 L. A. Kasekende, “Capital Account Liberalisation in Uganda: the Ugandan Experience”, 
Paper Presented at the Overseas Development Institute (London) 21, June 2000. 
3
 Kasekende, (n 2). 
4
 Benu Schneider at the Overseas Development Institute, “Capital Account Liberalisation: A 
Developing country’s Perspective”, 21 June, (2000). 
5
 Schneider, (n 4). 
6
 Some businessmen in Kampala (Ugandan Capital City) were at ease to discuss the issue of 
currency counterfeits; and how it infested the economy. 
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and fragmented AML laws7 enhanced the possibility of absorption of dirty 
money into the financial system. Foreign countries were targeted literally as 
‘washing machines’ to cleanse “tainted funds” and to reintroduce it into the 
financial system as clean money.8 Therefore uniform global frameworks such 
as the Basle 111 capital adequacy framework are necessary to foster 
interstate co-operation but they need to be pragmatically implemented to 
apply across the board. 
 
1.3 The Basle 111 Capital Adequacy Regulatory Framework 
 
It has become distinctly clear that the Basle Committee principles on banking 
supervision and the FATF forty plus nine recommendations are not sufficient 
to caution countries against exigencies in the global financial markets.9 In my 
view prescribing new regimes cannot offer a lasting solution to the failures of 
earlier ones unless engendered regimes are imbued with a measure of 
flexibility to apply across countries. It has become a custom for oversight 
institutions to evolve new regimes often in response to global crises to caution 
economies against similar crises in future. While the practice of evolving 
regimes in response to global crises is acceptably necessary, it also 
underscores the failure of global regulatory regimes to caution countries 
against global exigencies. It is time states have become more proactive to 
ensure that crises do not happen, which justifies the adoption of a more 
                                                          
7
 I was also able to learn that countries with tenuous infrastructure were targeted to introduce 
comingled money into the system. In some countries such as Malaysia, the absence of 
sophisticated technology manifested by hand count of money, enhanced placement of tainted 
money into the system.  
8
 Schneider, (n 4). 
9
 The Financial Times, 26 June 2010. 
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robust Basle 111 regulatory framework.  The Basle 111 regulatory framework 
could suffer the fate of its predecessors unless it is imbued with mechanisms 
to harmonise regulatory differences across jurisdictions. The adoption of 
global regulatory regimes cannot be sufficient in the absence of a clear 
direction on how to implement and enforce them in all participating member 
countries. This has prompted the twenty seven central bank governors from 
different countries to propose the adoption of Basle 111 regulatory framework. 
This proposed framework is to compel banks to hold more capital reserve as 
a caution for future financial crises. Basle 111 as a regulatory model will 
include a minimum core “Tier 1” of somewhere between 7 and 9 percent of 
their risk bearing assets, including “capital conservation buffer.” Tier one 
refers to bank’s capital reserve, which is intended to absorb shocks more 
robustly, as opposed to the core level of 2 percent under existing rules. The 
core level of 2 percent was deemed too inadequate to caution economies 
against financial shocks in the event of a financial crisis. Basle 111 will include 
a minimum Tier 1 ratio of 4.5 to 6 percent with the additional capital 
reservation buffer of 2 to 3 percent. The anticipated outcome of Basle 111 
regulatory framework is that any bank that fails to keep above that buffer 
would have to curb payouts such as bonuses and dividends.10 However, it 
would seem that the highly capitalized banks will receive a disproportionate 
advantage over less capitalized ones and this is likely to become a potential 
area of contention for the proposed regulatory measures to work across the 
board. Less capitalized banks could face a long road to recovery and an 
increase in capital—both Tier 1 and capital conservation buffer would 
                                                          
10
 The Financial Times, (n 9). 
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undercut the amount of money which banks can lend out to businesses. 
Banks might also be constrained from trading freely in innovative financial 
products such syndicated loans since they will have their operational capital 
substantially reduced. Thus, less capitalized Banks will be less inclined to 
support the proposed Basle 111 as necessary as it is. While I appreciate the 
need for a more robust framework attuned to overlapping regulatory 
challenges, it might not be easy to implement it due inequalities that 
characterise the global financial system. Poorly capitalised banks are most 
likely to be less inclined to implement Basle 111. In my contention, the 
proposed Basle 111 capital framework cannot be an effective global 
framework because it is inclined to favour banks in developed financial 
centres (which are highly capitalised as opposed to those in LDCs). Although 
Basle 111 regulatory framework is still a proposal, I hope that when it is finally 
adopted the mistakes of its predecessors will not be repeated.11  The 
proposed high liquidity ratio has also been criticised that it is likely to damage 
the financial sector and the wider economy. High capital and liquidity 
requirements are proposed to ensure that banks are better prepared to deal 
with crises than they have been through lately.  Regulators are pressuring 
banks to build up buffers, well in advance of the 2019 Basle 111 regulatory 
framework deadline in the hope of making them safer in good time.12 While 
central banks are pumping money into the economy in form of liquidity easing 
so that banks can start lending to small businesses, banks are withholding 
that money to build their regulatory buffers before the deadlines kicks in. 
Small businesses are important for the economy in terms of jobs and 
                                                          
11
 The detailed reading about Basle 111 can be found from the consultative paper of the Bank 
for International Settlement, available at: www.bis.org (last visited at 8
th
 April 2011. 
12
 The Daily Mail, 12
th
 June 2012. 
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providing sales outlets for big industries. This means that when small 
businesses are constrained due to lack of credit facilities such as loans, it can 
potentially inflict damage on the well being of the wider economy. Basle 111 
regulatory framework is not sustainable because it is puts pressure on banks 
and could the economy in the long run. Banks should have the flexibility to 
draw on their liquidity buffers to absorb current pressures as they may be 
encountered from time to time. In my view, the one size fits all approach 
overlooks important practical realities and it might not work and if it does, it 
has the potential to perpetuate inequalities—some banks may be 
outcompeted by well resourced ones and are likely to burst. 
 
In my view, the responsibility for global governance of financial markets 
should be vested in countries which have competitive advantage in financial 
markets. Since the G-12 countries have a high competitive advantage in 
financial markets, they have every right to spearhead measures to protect 
their markets. While acknowledging the need for robust reforms at an 
individual state level, the engendered regimes should be implemented 
pragmatically in different countries. It my view, unless less developed 
countries are given some concessions in implementation of desired regimes, 
they are likely to remain predisposed to conditions of regulatory failures. It is 
necessary for international financial institutions such as the World Bank and 
IMF to continue providing leadership of global economy. For globalisation of 
markets to work better, there is no country that can afford to posture because 
it can be misinterpreted to mean that “globalisation is good for you and not for 
me.”  
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In view of the foregoing analysis, this thesis addresses the following novel 
questions: Can the global AML framework or any global prohibition regimes 
be effectively implemented in total disregard of the underlying development 
dynamics in a respective country? What are the prerequisites for the 
successful implementation of a regulatory regime; and what factors inhibit its 
successful implementation? Can there be such a thing as ‘a global law’, what 
are its discerning features? By answering these questions will provide insights 
into the ease and complexities of harnessing a global AML framework in an 
asymmetric global landscape. 
 
1.4 Suggested measures to ease adoption of the global AML framework 
across states  
 
The current global AML/CFT framework is oriented to the regulatory 
environments in DCs as opposed to LDCs. Thus, there is a possibility for 
disparities in its application across countries. These disparities can be 
alleviated by the introduction of a global AML court, the principle of mutual 
recognition (used in integration of European Markets) as an AML paradigm 
and other necessary measures globally. 
 
1.5 Mutual Recognition Paradigm 
 
As this study has already elucidated, the global prohibition regimes generally; 
and the AML/CFT regimes specifically should be implemented pragmatically 
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to suit varied regulatory environments across different jurisdictions. A robust 
global AML regulatory model, capable of being adopted globally, should be 
predicated on the principle of “mutual recognition” operated in integration of 
financial markets in Europe.13 Mutual recognition is a regulatory system based 
on the recognition and harmonisation of a managed regulatory system, as 
opposed to issuing hundreds of directives to foster uniformity in all EU 
member states. Mutual recognition is a central plank of the Second Banking 
Directive,14 based on the fact that rather than emphasising convergence of the 
system (which would not be possible given different legal systems and cultural 
backgrounds across EU member states), supervisory authorities should 
instead recognise systems operated by other European member states 
provided they fulfil certain basic conditions.15 The principle of mutual 
recognition was enunciated by their Lordships decision in the case of Cassis 
de Dijon.16 The case concerned a French Liqueur with an alcoholic level of 
15% to 20% instead of 25% prescribed for liqueur by Germany alcohol 
content requirements. The court denied the admissibility of such a limitation 
and upheld the principle of mutual recognition (known as Cassis de Dijon 
principle) signifying that a product manufactured according to regulations and 
                                                          
13
 This was designed to foster a single market doctrine in banking and financial services, with 
no internal barriers to EC banks establishing branches in other parts of the EC or in providing 
cross-border services. A bank licensed in one EU member State had a passport to establish 
branches or to provide services in other EC Member States. A single licence is required 
rather than licensing in each member state. However, the licence does not apply to a branch 
of a bank established outside of the EU; the third bank must incorporate a subsidiary in the 
community and be licensed in at least one jurisdiction there. 
14
 Council Directive: 89/646/EEC. 
15
 Council Directive: 89/646/EEC. 
16
 The principles enunciated by their Lordships in Cassis de Dijon doctrine has also expanded 
geographically, beyond EU borders. Through the conclusion of the EEA (European Economic 
Area) Agreement and the EC-Turkey customs union, the principle of mutual recognition has, 
with some variations, now been extended to goods coming from Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein (as EEA members) and Turkey. In order to implement this principle, the 
European Commission has insisted that EU member states insert a mutual recognition clause 
into all commercial agreements. 
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permitted in one EU member state must be permitted in other EU member 
states. The exception can only be made to serve public interest (e.g. 
protection of health, the environment or consumers). Mutual recognition is 
used in the commercial sphere to overcome the hindrance of international 
movement of natural and juristical persons, goods and services inherent in 
different EU member countries.17  
 
It should be noted that the global market system is not monolithic.18 Far from 
it, it is made up of multiple jurisdictions, different legal systems and traditions, 
different customs and cultures, regions and varying development dynamics. 
The thesis explores the varying regulatory environments across states to 
evaluate their effect on the implementation of desired AML regimes. Different 
regulatory environments across states have far reaching implications for 
states with regard to their preparedness to harness AML regimes. There is a 
need for harmonisation of interstate laws based on the principle of mutual 
recognition in Europe. This principle was introduced by the Second Banking 
Directive in 1989 fronted on the premise that the integration of financial 
markets in Europe did not necessarily mean ‘a one-size-fits-all’ approach, but 
to forge unity in diversity. Harmonisation of laws is necessary to avoid the 
adverse effects of the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’, in which each participant is unsure 
of whether others will cooperate, or engage in behaviour detrimental to the 
stability of the global economy. Different global AML regimes (by different 
market domains) can potentially complement each other in safeguarding 
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 Case 120/78 (1979) ECR 1-64. 
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 A single unitary system characterized by uniform laws, rules and customs and approach. 
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against regulatory arbitrage19 or regulatory failures.20 Regulatory arbitrage 
and regulatory failures are characteristics of an uncoordinated global market 
system. In order for aspects of a large-scale regulation of transnational 
challenges to be effective, it must be coordinated and formulated on a global 
wide basis.21  
 
Mutual recognition was adopted as recognition that since EU member states 
are characterised by different internal legal systems (contract laws and 
employment laws, different regulatory environments co-existing within EU 
law), it would not be practically feasible to subject them to a rigorous EU 
regulatory system uniformly. Without ‘mutual recognition’ fostered through the 
EU member states willingness to surrender part of their sovereignty, an 
integrated single European market would never have been a reality. Mutual 
recognition emphasises the equivalence of the objective of national legislation 
and the existence of similar public interest goals.22 Mutual recognition also 
implies and requires mutual trust. Mutual trust in turn is fostered through the 
adoption of common rules. Mutual recognition and minimum harmonisation in 
the European Union are accompanied by other pillars: home country control 
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and a single banking licence.23 With regard to the principle of home country 
control, the home country undertakes to control and supervise its financial 
institutions as a substitute for host country supervision.24  
 
In order for mutual recognition paradigm to work effectively, EU member 
states are required to adopt the legal systems of other countries alongside 
their national legal systems. In practice, however, ‘mutual recognition’ would 
be difficult to implement in a situation where desired laws have not been 
internalised by individual countries into their national legal systems. In the 
absence of an operative law, law enforcement authorities cannot clamp down 
on potential money launderers. Banks also face the risk of law suit if they 
freeze customers’ accounts of potential money launderers or disclose 
information relating to their accounts to AML agencies. For laws to regulate 
undesired conduct, they need to have been enacted and in existence.25 It 
needs to be noted that laws cannot be implemented in a vacuum. Thus, the 
absence of specific AML laws in some countries underscores their inability to 
harness desired AML regimes. Some states operate in secrecy—disguising 
definitions of certain crimes, presumably for fear of generating an anti-
investment climate at home.26 As already noted, Uganda has not adopted an 
AML law in accordance with its international obligations. It adopted an AML, 
Bill in (2009) and three years on, it has not yet operationalised it into law.27 In 
my view, the failure to implement AML laws in Uganda does not only 
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undermine its economy but also the concerted efforts of the international 
community towards fighting money laundering and its predicate threats. 
Similarly, without requisite laws in place, banks are vulnerable to criminal 
exploitation, risks of lawsuits and loss of trust if they breach confidentiality by 
reporting customers whose identities are then revealed.28 In view of the 
foregoing analysis, there is a need for states to transpose their international 
AML/CFT obligations so that there is a harmonised approach on overlapping 
matters of money laundering across countries.  
 
1.6 The need for a global Court 
 
There is a need to introduce a global AML court fronted on the equivalent of 
the Dispute Settlement Mechanism (DSA) in the WTO. The proposed court 
could play a facilitative role in streamlining how engendered AML/CFT 
standards are internalised into individual national jurisdictions. Before the 
adoption of the DSA in 1995, the world trade system (under the GATT 1947) 
lacked transparency and credibility and it was at the verge of collapsing. This 
trend would later change after the adoption of DSA at Marrakesh in Morocco 
in 1995. The WTO dispute settlement panel has adjudicated cases submitted 
to it by disputant parties, delivered judgments, streamlined application of rules 
and introduced a dosage of sanity into the world trade system. The use of 
DSA has minimised the challenge of dynamics of power dynamic in the WTO. 
For instance, in the dispute between the US and EC over the importation, sale 
and distribution of Bananas, brought two major global players before the 
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 See Ross Cranston, Principles of Banking Law, (Oxford University Press 2003) 168; see 
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WTO, Dispute Settlement Panel.29 This would have been hard to achieve 
before the advent of the DSA (the big players would ally against small ones 
ones); but it can also be used as a precedence to highlight that the evolved 
rules need to be enforced, if they are to foster desired behaviour in the 
society. The importance of the court can also be reinforced by the role played 
by the ECJ in the integration of European Markets. Through its preliminary 
reference procedure, the ECJ adjudicates matters concerning state and state; 
and its state citizens on the consumption of EU law by streamlining its 
application in a member state. The decisions of ECJ must be respected Pacta 
Sunt Servanda (in the goodwill spirit to uphold norms of international law). In 
so doing the court has helped to diffuse tensions between member states and 
to streamline how the EU law is to be internalised into a member state. The 
ECJ has therefore provided a platform for harmonisation of diverse laws and 
systems to regulate behaviour that is not in conformity with EU law. It’s high 
time the AML court was introduced to enhance the implementation of 
AML/CFT laws across jurisdictions. The role of courts in fostering the stability 
of financial markets cannot be underestimated. 
 
Owing to lack of robust AML laws and policies in some African countries, 
foreign financial institutions have resorted to the adoption of internal or 
sectoral measures to fill the vacuum in their internal AML control measures.30 
This has been facilitated by the use of macro-economic linkages with their 
parent home country institutions, whereby financial institutions domiciled in a 
foreign country are governed by the policies of parent authorities. Other 
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 See, the WTO Document WT/DS27/R/ECUB (22May 1997) available on its website at 
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financial institutions have developed tailored policies to regulate money 
laundering (such as Barclays bank, ‘Africa policy (2001) for the prevention of 
money laundering’).31 These ‘hybrid’ measures are based on AML legislation 
of UK32 and the AML Directives of the EU.33These two instruments are used 
as model policy frameworks to fill gaps in the Ugandan legal system and 
enable financial institutions to operate harmoniously. 
 
In the absence of a specific AML/CFT legislation in some countries, money 
laundering crimes can only be prosecuted on the grounds of customary 
international law.34 Customary international law means that if the international 
practice of states does not condone money laundering as a legitimate activity 
because of its adverse effects on societies, then it cannot be condoned in any 
society. Customary international law generates obligations on the state 
regardless of whether it has enacted a law on an issue or not.35 State practice 
is manifested differently according to different individual states. Some states 
have transposed the envisaged regulatory norms in a way that constricts or 
narrows the scope of the grounds of jurisdiction laid down in international 
treaties.36 Others have employed delaying tactics, literally ‘dragging their feet’ 
for many years before they take action to implement desired laws. For 
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example, in Uganda, while crimes which generate illicit proceeds of crime 
such as drug trafficking are proscribed under the Ugandan law, money 
laundering is still treated as a derivative offence.37 But the use of customary 
international law in regulation of markets would also presuppose that there is 
consensus of the international community not to condone money laundering 
as legitimate activity in any jurisdiction where it is committed. To fully examine 
the dynamics of the global AML/CFT framework, the study was undertaken on 
the basis of the following objectives, hypotheses and methodology: 
 
1.7 Aims and objectives of the study 
 
(a) To examine the effectiveness of the global AML framework in cautioning 
states against fighting money laundering globally.  
(b) To assess the ease and challenges of harnessing, a robust global AML 
framework across countries.  
(c) To assess the impact of economic disparities on the effectiveness of 
normative AML regimes in some countries. 
(d) To propose ways how the envisaged global AML/CFT framework can be 
harnessed across different jurisdictions. 
 
1.8 Hypotheses of the study 
 
HI: Globalisation has created an environment for criminal exploitation 
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H2: Global AML regulations cannot be assumed to work across jurisdictions 
without a requisite environment through which to implement them. 
 H3: Corruption has a tactile potential to erode the efficacy of AML institutions 
H4: Global regimes cannot work without states first positioning themselves 
properly to global regulatory changes and challenges. 
H5: Inter-state cooperation on overlapping global issues through institutions 
such as FATF, WTO, the World Bank and IMF is necessary despite its 
inherent challenges. 
 
1.9 Methodology 
The methodology of undertaking this study was both theoretical and analytical 
of primary and secondary data resources and synthesizing them in the light of 
the objectives of the thesis. The purpose was to evaluate the credibility of 
source materials and the relevance to the study given that different regions 
are characterized by different development dynamics.  
 34 
The theoretical analysis of primary and secondary data sources was geared 
to establish the dynamics and weaknesses of the current global AML/CFT 
framework. The global AML/CFT framework is a patch work of measures 
based on UN, AML/CFT treaties, the EU AML laws such as Directives and 
Regulations, the FATF forty plus recommendations and the Basle Committee 
supervisory guidelines, the World Bank bank/IMF and other AML oversight 
organisations. These organisations have pioneered guidelines for states to 
adopt in creating domestic AML/CFT counter-measures. Secondary data 
sources were analysed from data in academic text books, journal papers, 
electronic sources (websites of AML agencies), policy and research papers 
from specialist institutions such as the World Bank/IMF, the Institute of 
security Studies (ISS) in South Africa and others. I also utilised decided cases 
(especially on United Kingdom) to delineate how the global AML regimes are 
utilised to facilitate prosecution of money laundering offences. The role of 
national institutions and administrative frameworks (in the rubric of chapter six 
of this thesis) remains a critical component of the current global AML 
framework. States are required to create appropriate institutional and 
administrative frameworks (Courts, NGOs CSOs), laws and other measures 
to provide competent authorities with the necessary duties, powers and 
sanctions. The analysis of primary and secondary data sources therefore 
provided significant insights into the ease and challenges of harnessing the 
global AML/CFT framework across states. 
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Cognizant of the fact that money laundering is a clandestine crime—it is 
manifested by the commission of a wide range of crime activities such as 
corruption, drug trafficking, motor vehicle trafficking and extra. Therefore the 
study utilised (what has been coined by United Nations) as an “indirect 
approach methodology” which expands the scope of money offences to cover 
a wide range of crime activities which generate proceeds of crime.38 
 
Undertaking a scoping review of primary and secondary data sources helped 
to delineate the dynamics, gaps, contradictions and weaknesses of the 
current global AML/CFT framework. It was also useful in providing insights 
into the challenges states face in harnessing the global AML/CFT framework. 
 
1.10 Timescales and Research Tools 
 
The study was undertaken in three phases: the first phase was to review the 
literature in order delineate work already undertaken on the subject of money 
laundering in the context of this study. To appraise the adaptability of local 
jurisdictions to the AML framework, we carried out a review of the literature in 
LDCs focusing on Uganda. Then, the Ugandan AML regulatory experiences 
were analyzed on the assumption that it would reflect experiences of LDCs 
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holding other factors constant.39 To ensure additional peer review of the 
literature I published papers focusing on the major themes of this study.40  
 
The second phase focused on evaluating the suitability of the global AML 
framework using both primary and secondary data sources on United 
Kingdom, South and Uganda. This was necessary to assess the credibility 
and relevance of secondary data generated by AML/CFT agencies such as 
FATF, the World Bank and Transparency International (TI) and many other 
agencies.  
 
 The last phase of the study was the office based data analysis which was 
dedicated to knitting the project together. This phase entailed transcribing 
data, reports, documents collected; and internalizing them into the study. In 
conventional terms this phase is known as “writing up”. The latter part of this 
phase was dedicated to tidying up the thesis and to internalize any changes 
as and when they became apparent (new information from conferences 
presentations and meetings with my supervisors).   
 
The following framework sums up the model of analysis of the study. 
 
1.11 Model of Analysis  
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 The research is undertaken on the following model framework. 
 
 
 
 
1.18 The conceptual design of the study 
 
Globalisation is a broad field of enquiry in which to undertake a study. Bearing 
this challenge in mind, the study focused its analysis on three countries to 
evaluate the adaptability of the global AML framework.41 The rationale for 
adopting this approach was that since DCs and LDCs are characterised by 
distinctive features—these features are likely to be mirrored across countries 
in the same cohort. It can be inferred that since the majority of LDCs are 
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 The “Generalisation approach” has been utilised by the World Bank and IMF in 
implementation of Financial Sector Reform Programmes across LDCs. This approach works 
in such a way that similar benchmarks are used in introducing desired reforms in borrowing 
member countries irrespective of their varied dynamics of development. 
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characterised by a harsh regulatory environment, they are likely to be 
deficient in requisite capacity to harness the global AML/CFT framework. The 
findings of the study have revealed that United Kingdom and Uganda cannot 
be assumed to have the same level of effectiveness in harnessing the global 
AML framework. This is because countries which are subject to different 
predispositions and development dynamics cannot be assumed to respond in 
a similar way to their novel challenges. For example, the United Kingdom is 
endowed with a requisite infrastructure, institutions, laws and systems to 
implement the global AML/CFT framework nationally, unlike LDCs (such as 
Uganda) which lack this leverage.  
 
The thesis is defined by two dimensions: the analysis of the global AML 
regimes; and the ease with which they are harnessed across individual 
jurisdictions. In undertaking this study, we have analysed a dichotomy of 
variables—the global regulatory climate (an independent variable); and the 
prevailing local climate (a dependent variable) in order to tease out their 
varied implications for states. In my contention, unless the discrepancies 
between the global and the local regulatory environments are harmonised, the 
envisaged global AML/CFT framework will remain elusive for some 
jurisdictions. The study contends that the narrower the disparity gap between 
the local and global regulatory domains (highlighted by the case of United 
Kingdom), the higher the possibility for that jurisdiction to harness normative 
AML/CFT regimes than it is when the disparity gap is wider (highlighted by the 
case of Uganda).  
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In order to evaluate the effectiveness of the global AML framework and the 
ease of its adaptability across jurisdictions, we deconstructed it in Uganda and 
in other jurisdictions. The findings yielded were compelling in supporting the 
thesis that the propensity of a state to harness global AML/CFT regimes 
depends on its regulatory environment locally and not what has been agreed 
at a global level. It can also be inferred that countries which are deficient in 
the requisite regulatory systems would find it harder to domesticate the global 
AML/CFT framework. Does this mean that countries which are endowed with 
an effective regulatory system such as DCs have transposed the global AML 
framework? This remains a moot point. However, it is possible that since the 
majority of DCs are endowed with a palatable regulatory environment, they 
would have corresponding capacity to harness the global AML framework. 
The efficacy of the global AML framework could also be dictated by factors 
such as the prevailing domestic political climate, the cost-benefit analysis and 
the willingness of a respective state to implement it. 
 
1.12 The fundamentals of a robust AML/CFT framework 
 
The FATF AML/CFT guidelines require states to adopt the following 
framework. Therefore, the structure for an effective AML/CFT system 
should focus on developing a legal and institutional framework to achieve 
the following: 
 40 
(i) Laws that create money laundering and terrorist financing offences 
and providing for freezing, seizing and confiscation of the proceeds 
from a crime and terrorist funding;42 
(ii) Laws, regulations or in certain circumstances other enforcement 
measures that impose the required obligations in financial 
institutions and designated non-financial businesses and 
professions;43 
(iii) An appropriate institutional or administrative framework, laws and 
other measures that provide competent authorities with the 
necessary duties, powers and sanctions; 
(iv) Laws and other measures that give a country the ability to provide 
the widest range of international co-operation. This is essential to 
ensure that the system is effectively implemented. 
 
The FATF, AML/CFT regulatory measures (2004) highlights the need for 
states to adopt the following further measures:44 
(a) The respectability of principles such as transparency and good 
governance; 
(b) A proper culture of AML/CFT compliance shared and reinforced by 
governments, financial institutions, designated non-financial businesses 
and professions, industry trade groups, and self-regulatory organisations 
(SROs); 
(c) Appropriate measures to prevent and combat corruption, including where 
information is available, laws and relevant measures, jurisdictions, 
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participation in regional or international anti-corruption initiatives (such as 
the UN Convention against corruption).  
(d) There should be a reasonably efficient court system that ensures that 
judicial decisions are properly enforced; 
(e) The need for high ethical and professional requirements for police officers, 
prosecutors, judges, accountants etc, measures and mechanisms to 
ensure these ethics are observed; 
(f) The availability of a system for ensuring ethical and professional behaviour 
on the part of the professionals such as accountants and auditors. 
 
1.13 The statement of research problem 
 
The thesis highlights the need for a coordinated and a robust approach on 
money laundering and its predicate crimes on a proactive basis.45 However, 
while there is international consensus for states to work in concert to prevent 
criminal organisations from abusing the financial system, a robust global 
regulatory framework should have an ethos which reflects the varying 
development conditions across different jurisdictions. It is necessary for states 
to enact uniform AML laws so that they are not exploited as conduits for 
money laundering.46  However, since desired laws cannot be harnessed in 
abstract, the ease with which normative regimes are implemented should vary 
according to each individual state’s capacity. Thus, the effectiveness of the 
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global AML/CFT framework cannot be adopted based on assumptions but the 
country’s capacity to harness requisite laws, to create institutions and a 
palatable policy and regulatory environment. While, we agree with the 
philosophy that states need to think globally, the reality remains that they 
need to act locally in pursuing their interstate relations. Therefore this study 
explores the interplay between the local and global factors and how they play 
out in the implementation of the global AML framework across jurisdictions.  
 
It needs to be noted that the global system generally is not monolithic. Far 
from it, it has come to be associated with a variety of specific trends: an 
increasing reliance upon the market, a significant growth of institutions in 
determining the viability of national priorities, a diminution in the role of the 
state, the privatisation of various functions previously considered to be the 
exclusive domain of the state, the deregulation of a range of activities and the 
increased role of civil society organisations.47 The foregoing trends have 
become ubiquitous in almost every state or region. It has also become 
increasingly apparent that criminal organisations tend to exploit loopholes in 
the global system to launder the proceeds of crime using legitimate 
international trade. This has been facilitated by the use of innovative financial 
products such as letters of credit, electronic money transfers and the list goes 
on.48 The advent of cyber-crimes, offshore financial centres and increased 
investment vehicles are ruthlessly exploited to evade AML/CFT regulations 
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and other risk management models.49 Globalisation has created 
instrumentalities for criminal exploitation (such as the Internet) and enhanced 
the means of transferring money from one place to another; making it 
increasingly easy to move the proceeds of crime around. In the words of a US 
treasury official, “once the funds go abroad either through our financial 
systems or having been physically smuggled, there is virtually a smorgasbord 
of business structures, supported by laws of dozens of countries, which serve 
to obscure ownership, and frustrate the government’s ability to unravel 
schemes.”50 Funds can be moved among corporate entities and financial 
institutions in many countries in a split second using telegraphic funds 
transfer, which makes untangling more and more difficult at every stage.51 
  
Criminals have also gained access to new markets by exploiting 
discrepancies between legal systems of countries in different parts of the 
world.52 The emergence of new markets oriented economies has enabled 
criminals to develop the capacity to operate on a world-wide scale.53The large 
volume of legitimate capital moving into the global financial economy at any 
one particular point, coupled by the reduced regulatory controls on capital 
movement, has made it possible for large amount of money to enter the world 
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financial markets unnoticed.54 The diverse use of international money 
transfers has facilitated criminals; in the same way it has facilitated legitimate 
businesses to move funds internationally in a disguised fashion.55 This can 
potentially disrupt audit trails as law enforcement is stymied by jurisdictional 
and legal boundaries. Indeed, the foregoing challenge is also compounded by 
the growing diversification of international financial instruments, and 
fragmentation of AML laws between countries.56  
 
The lightly regulated financial centres are targeted by criminals to cleanse 
illegally acquired assets; and to then reintroduce them into developed 
financial centres, after it has been cleansed. It is common for developed 
countries to be targeted by criminals to integrate illicit proceeds of crime into 
their economies.57 The transition to the market economy has facilitated 
criminals with opportunities to invest illicit proceeds into the newly privatised 
enterprises. Firstly, the market economy has created opportunities for 
criminals to invest their dirty money into economies where opportunities 
abound.58 Secondly, the increasing integration of financial markets has 
induced a dramatic increase in the number of jurisdictions offering financial 
services without appropriate controls or regulation while banking secrecy laws 
                                                          
54
 Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Asia Secretariat, “Disposal of Proceeds of Crime 
Money Laundering Methods Workshop Report of the Expert Group in Hong Kong 14 
November 1996. 
55
 The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was closed down in 1991, following 
the discovery of massive fraud and money laundering by US regulators. The BCCI had grown 
to become the world seventh largest private bank with assets of US$23 billion and with 
operation in 72 countries. The chief victim of the bank malpractices were depositors and 
governments in developing economies. See, George A. Walker, International Banking 
Regulation, Law, Policy and Practice (Kluwer Law, 2000), 10-59. 
56
 Walker (n 55). 
57
 Walker, (n 55). 
58
 Louise Shelley, Transnational Organised crimes: A new Authoritarianism in Richard Friman 
and Peter Andreas, Illicit Global Economy & State Power, (Rowman &Little Field Publishers,, 
1998), 25-40. 
 45 
is still an uphill challenge in many jurisdictions. For example in South Africa, 
illicit proceeds from ‘daga trade’ is said to be invested in the SA stock 
exchange, real estate and currency trading on the open market.59 The 
growing complexity of money laundering schemes underscores the reason 
why it cannot be overcome using national law enforcement measures 
alone.60The issue of criminal law underpins national sovereignty—which 
regarded as an exclusive domain of individual states and is jealously 
protected.61 This is why states need to forge common initiatives to respond 
appropriately to overlapping global issues such as money laundering. 
 
The weak regulatory environment coupled with laxity in enforcement of AML 
regimes in some jurisdictions explains why they are susceptible to 
sophisticated money laundering schemes.62 The foregoing environment has 
made it easy for drug traffickers and other criminal organizations to move illicit 
proceeds about and establish in pariah states.63 Through the ubiquitous global 
market system, risks generated from one part of the global are able to 
navigate to other jurisdictions with ease. The inherent challenges of poor 
oversight of financial institutions across LDCs have translated into failure of 
law and policy on many interstate issues including regulation of money 
laundering.64 In some countries across Africa, there is no comprehensive 
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framework on money laundering in relation to identification, seizure and 
forfeiture of the instrumentalities of money laundering crimes. Therefore this 
study investigates the dynamics of the global AML/CFT framework with the 
view to assess its suitability across different jurisdictions. 
 
1.14 Major findings of the Study 
The findings of the study have confirmed the assumptions/hypotheses on 
which it was undertaken as credible. Firstly, there is a uniform AML framework 
applicable globally but by default or design, it has not been apply across 
jurisdictions.  Despite its inherent challenges, the global AML framework 
proved useful for states in dealing with money laundering and its predicate 
crimes globally. Using the global AML/CFT framework, the FATF has been 
able to admonish non-complying member countries and getting them to 
change their laws in line with expected global AML/CFT standards. This was 
highlighted by the cases of Austria and Turkey with regard to anonymous 
bank accounts; and the case of Seychelles regarding the investment law, 
which it was asked to retract because of its potential to encourage money 
laundering. FATF was able to pressure the above countries to change their 
laws in accordance with the global AML/CFT standards. There is also a 
framework at a United Nations level to counter not only money laundering and 
its predicate offences but also financing of terrorism. There is a uniform global 
framework on money laundering encompassing criminalisation, confiscation, 
mutual legal assistances, extradition and other aspects of money laundering 
and financing of terrorism. By bringing financing of terrorism within the 
purview of the United Nations Charter (1945), technically means that if the 
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acts of an obdurate state are seen to constitute a threat to international peace 
and security (Art. 39,) sanctions could be invoked on that State pursuant to 
chapter seven: in particular, articles, 41 & 42 of the charter.65 This is 
highlighted by the military intervention of NATO forces in Afghanistan—
launched in the aftermath of September 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA. 
NATO operates on the principle that an attack on one of its members 
constitutes an attack on all other NATO member countries.66 Therefore an 
attack on the United States of America by terrorists in 2001 was construed to 
constitute an attack on all NATO member states, which justified the use of 
force under Article 42 of the UN Charter (1945). The UN also operates other 
AML/CFT mechanisms such as freezing of assets. These are underscored by 
the UN Resolution 1267 (1998)67, which were adopted under chapter VII of 
the UN Charter (1945). By virtue of the foregoing Resolution, states are 
required to take the following measures (in connection with any individual or 
entity associated with Al-Qaeda, as designated by the UN 1267 Committee): 
 freeze without delay the funds and other financial assets or economic 
resources of designated individuals and entities [assets freeze],68 
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 prevent the entry into or transit through their territories by designated 
individuals [travel ban], and 
 prevent the direct or indirect supply, sale and transfer from their 
territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag 
vessels or aircraft, of arms and related material of all types, spare 
parts, and technical advice, assistance, or training related to military 
activities, to designated individuals and entities [arms embargo].69 
Primarily, the majority of the judicial decisions (reported cases) consulted in 
undertaking this study were based on United Kingdom and United States. 
While, data on money laundering in United Kingdom and United States was 
almost overwhelming, there was no sufficient data on money laundering on 
Uganda. This was used to infer from the foregoing disparities that United 
Kingdom (as a DC) has garnered the capacity to harness the global AML/CFT 
framework as opposed to Uganda (LDCs). The high prevalence of reported 
cases on money laundering in UK could also signify that it is highly targeted 
for illicit criminal activities. Thus, the foregoing analysis can be used to 
support the hypothesis that while LDCs are targeted by criminals to cleanse 
illicit proceeds of crime, developed economies are targeted to integrate the 
same proceeds into the economy.70 There was scanty data on money 
laundering and its predicate crimes on Uganda. However, this does not mean 
that there are no incidences of money laundering and its related predicate 
offences in Uganda. One can therefore deduce from the foregoing analysis 
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that the legal system in Uganda is not robust enough to adapt a global 
AML/CFT system based on FATF international standards. The absence of 
data (reported cases) on money laundering in Uganda and South Africa 
underscores the weaknesses of these countries to fight money laundering and 
its predicate crimes. Countries operate different legal systems and procedural 
rules, which potentially impacts on their systems differently. For instance, in 
some jurisdictions such as France, the duty to the client is absolute and 
trumps the duty to the court. In others such as Germany, the duty to 
institutions or corporate entities trumps the duty to the client. 
 
The disparities in prosecution of money laundering and its predicate offences 
in Uganda and United Kingdom confirm the inability of some states to harness 
the global AML/CFT framework. It can also be inferred that the Ugandan legal 
system is not robust enough to caution countries against the exigencies of the 
dynamic global market system.71 By contrast in UK and by virtue of its 
demonstrated ability to investigate and prosecute money laundering offences 
corroborates that its institutions of law such as courts are effectively working.  
 
The findings yielded by this study on Uganda and South Africa have 
corroborated that poverty and its attendant environment undermines the 
capacity of countries to harness the global AML/CFT framework. There is 
evidence as highlighted in chapter four that the majority of LDCs in Africa 
cannot easily implement the global AML/CFT safeguards such as “KYC” in an 
environment of general systemic failure.  In the majority of LDCs, either the 
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reporting mechanisms are slack, none-existent or antiquated. The foregoing 
regulatory challenges have translated into an environment for regulatory 
failure. It is this same environment why AML institutions in Uganda are not 
able to function effectively.72 
 
Secondly, the global AML framework is riddled with gaps and saddled by 
challenges. These are manifested by the absence and fragmentation of 
national AML laws in different countries and across regions. This can be used 
to corroborate the fact that the current global AML/CFT framework is not 
robust enough to stem or regulate the threat of money laundering and its 
attendant threats across jurisdictions. I have demonstrated that there are so 
many countries which are deficient in the requisite capacity to harness the 
global AML/CFT framework. For instance, Uganda is deficient in a requisite 
infrastructure and fares poorly on many requirements prescribed by FATF as 
the prerequisite to harness the global AML framework. This also confirms the 
viewpoint that the normative AML/CFT system, based on FATF standards 
evolved without consulting individual member countries might not be 
compatible with the economic environment in LDCs. In South Africa, in 
transposing its AML/CFT obligations, the government negotiated exemptions 
from the wholesale application of the FATF, AML/CFT framework. The 
wholesale application of the desired AML regimes would have excluded many 
nationals from accessing financial services and products due to lack of 
verifiable residential addresses and other identification requirements such as 
passports and driving licences. In the majority of all developed economies, 
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every citizen has a verifiable residential address essential to ease 
identification of potential bank clients as opposed to LDCs—where they are 
unavailable. The findings yielded on Uganda can be used to corroborate the 
fact that the majority of LDCs lack the capacity to harness the global 
AML/CFT framework. Uganda is deficient in almost every benchmark 
(prescribed by FATF, 2004) countries need to have as a prerequisite of 
harnessing an effective AML system. Uganda does not have a law 
transposing its AML/CFT obligations. By contrast, the United Kingdom as a 
developed economy can apply a global AML/CFT framework with ease unlike 
Uganda and South Africa. The United Kingdom has garnered the capacity 
(manifested by its developed infrastructure and systems) to enable her 
implement its international AML obligations with ease.  
 
 There is no doubt that regional integration of economies has been a positive 
force in creating development opportunities either within some or across 
regions. The flipside is that the transition to the market economy has also 
presented a new typology of challenges to states and regions. It also needs to 
be noted that in the absence of a robust legal system and a framework to 
harmonise interstate differences, integration of markets might not work as 
expected. For instance, the successful of the European Union regional market 
can be contrasted with the demise of the East African Community (1977), ten 
years after it had been created. The skewed nature of the EAC system 
resulted in a disproportionate distribution of the benefits accrued between 
Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Kenya was accused of taking a lion’s share of 
the benefits accrued from the community, an issue which Uganda and 
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Tanzania were disenchanted about. Therefore, it is not likely for countries 
subject to varying development dynamics to gain proportionately from 
common initiatives. Secondly, understanding the dynamics of the global AML 
framework requires one to understand the perverse nature of the global 
market system. 
  
1.15 Limitations 
 
Globalization generally and global AML/CFT regimes specifically merit a 
broad field of enquiry given that it encompasses a wide range of issues which 
transcend different legal jurisdictions. While the study examined the 
adaptability of the global AML framework in Uganda and United Kingdom, the 
effect of globalization might not be captured by sampling a handful of 
countries. There was not enough data on money laundering and its predicate 
offences on Uganda. Money laundering crimes are glossily understudied in 
Uganda and because of this; it was also not possible to access sufficient data 
to corroborate some aspects of this study. By contrast, data generated on 
money laundering and its predicate crimes on UK was almost overwhelming. 
 
It would have been better to work closely with AML/CFT agencies to gain an 
all round empirical AML/CFT experience in the three jurisdictions the study 
was analysed. This collaboration was not possible due to the reasons 
highlighted earlier in this study. 
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 While it is possible that the study digressed into the discussion of the intricate 
global theory, the digression was acceptably necessary since the context of 
the study was globalisation. As for the review of the literature was, while many 
books and journal papers have been published on the twin issue of 
globalization and money laundering, it was not easy to access specific 
literature articulating the interplay between them in the context of this study.   
 
 I did not conduct interviews as had been earlier planned because I failed to 
secure funding. Carrying out interviews would have helped to mitigate the bias 
inherent in the use of secondary data sources. It would also have 
corroborated the complexities of money laundering and its regulation in the 
three countries the study was analysed. I sent out questionnaires to some 
individuals and organizations in Uganda with the aim of corroborating this 
study. Unfortunately, the questionnaires were not returned to us, presumably 
because they were not answered. It was also not possible to generate a 
comparative analysis of the three countries of Uganda, South Africa and 
United Kingdom based on available data. In United Kingdom, data generated 
on various aspects of this study was almost overwhelming; and by contrast, it 
was not possible to access sufficient data for this study on Uganda. 
 
1.16 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided the framework for analyzing complexities of 
harnessing a global AML/CFT framework across different jurisdictions. It has 
articulated the importance of the global AML/CFT framework and desired 
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changes in the way global AML/CFT framework are evolved and harnessed.  
The theory of globalization generally is based on the false premise of 
clustering states together regardless of their individual development 
dynamics. The limitations of the global AML/CFT framework notwithstanding, 
it is still necessary for states to adopt it as a common legal grid to deal with 
overlapping issues, to foster international cooperation and to leverage poor 
countries with regard to sharing resources such as intelligence information.73  
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CHAPTER TWO: MONEY LAUNDERING, SUBSTANTIVE OFFENCES AND 
TYPOLOGIES74 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter underscores the genesis of money laundering and the 
multifaceted dimensions in which it is conceptualised. The phrase ‘money 
laundering’ is relatively new, having come into parlance in the mid-1970s.75 It 
was coined as a term of art from the early practice of American criminal 
organisations operating laundromats as cash intensive businesses to hide 
their criminal wealth. It has become a term of art in titles of relevant legislation 
and legal texts. It can be found, for example, in titles such as the US Money 
Laundering Control Act (1986) and the 1990 European convention on money 
laundering, search, seizure and confiscation of crime proceeds.76 The earliest 
legal development against money laundering took place in the United States 
with the passage of the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) (1970).77 The Bank Secrecy 
Act fully recognised the link between money laundering, including security 
fraud and the global dimension of the problem.78 BSA required banks to report 
cash transaction of $10,000 and this provision was also enacted in the money 
laundering Act (1986), for the first time defining money laundering as a federal 
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crime.79 Until 1980s, money laundering was also not a distinct offence in 
United Kingdom; it would only be prosecuted under various Statutes such as 
Theft Act 1968. For instance, section 22 of this Act created a framework for 
the prosecution of launderers who dishonestly handled stolen Assets. The 
concept of money laundering in UK can also be traced back to the House of 
Lords decision in R v. Cuthbertson [1980].80 This decision underscored a 
failure of forfeiture laws to deprive the offender of the proceeds of crime. The 
case was about the defendants who were engaged in long term criminal 
enterprises involving the supply of controlled substances. The defendants 
were charged for laundering over £750,000, some of which were placed into 
bank accounts in Switzerland and France. Pleading guilty, the defendants 
were convicted and the court ordered that their assets to be forfeited. The 
Appellant appealed to the House of Lords against the sentence and the 
forfeiture orders of their assets. The question of law presented before their 
Lordships was the interpretation of Misuse of Drug Control Act (1971) and the 
section on which the court was empowered to order the forfeiture of the said 
assets.81 It was concluded that the powers of the court to order forfeiture of 
assets did exist but only when the asset in question was a tangible property 
and not choses in action such as cheques or other intangibles.82 The Drug 
Control Act (1986) was passed to consolidate confiscation orders of criminal 
assets by stripping criminals of the proceeds of their criminal activity. Section 
24 of the Act creates an offence of assisting another to retain the proceeds of 
Drug Trafficking. However to secure a successful prosecution, the defendant 
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would need to demonstrate that he/she knew or suspected that the owner of 
the property has been engaged in drug trafficking or has benefited from drug 
trafficking.83  Section 24 was however only applicable in relation to 
confiscation of the proceeds of drug trafficking, an issue that for sometime 
confined money laundering to drug trafficking. The international efforts 
towards combating financial systemic abuse and specifically money 
laundering intensified in the late 1980’s due to the growing concerns about 
drug trafficking and the limited scope of earlier regimes. The wide spread use 
of drugs in America in relation to production, distribution and consumption—
sensationalized as ‘the war on drugs campaign’ was seen as a threat to 
humanity and the fabric of human society. The wide spread use of Narcotic 
drugs did not only have adverse social effects on societies; but also seen as 
an assault on social justice, civil liberties, tax evasion, disrespect of the law, 
erosion of work ethic, violence and corruption in relation to the lucrative black 
market.84 These concerns led to the adoption of United Nations AML 
instruments such as the Vienna Anti-Narcotic Convention (1988); and later 
Palermo Convention on Transnational Organised Crimes in December 2000.  
 
 
2.2 A brief Overview of the UN AML initiatives 
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In December 1988, the United Nations adopted a Convention on Illicit Drug 
Trafficking and Other Psychotropic Substances in Vienna.85 The adoption of 
this instrument was preceded by a series of General Assembly Resolutions86 
where the concern over drug abuse was expressed by delegates from many 
national governments. In the foregoing UN Resolutions, drug abuse and 
trafficking was viewed as of increasing concern in international arena, 
prompting the UN General Assembly to adopt Resolution 39/141 of December 
1984 entitled “Draft Convention against trafficking in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances.”87 The securitisation of drug abuse and trafficking 
through their conceptualisation as a threat resulted in the call for a specialised 
conference88 to deal with the threat of drug trafficking and its social effects on 
societies. In adopting a similar securitisation discourse, the then Secretary 
General of United Nations89 stated that existing resources were inadequate to 
deal with the drug plague, which was contaminating, corrupting and 
weakening the very fabric of society. In UN Resolution 40/121 describes 
activities of transnational criminal organisations engaged in drug trafficking as 
“threat to the well being of people; the stability of democratic institutions; and 
the sovereignty of states”, and calls in its second paragraph for maximum 
priority to the fight against drug production, demand and traffic and related 
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international activities.90 The UN Resolution 40/122 on the other hand, 
expressed the same concerns through the decision to convene the 
conference in 1987 at the Ministerial level: “as an expression of political will of 
national, regional and international levels and to adopt a comprehensive multi-
disciplinary outline of future activities which focuses on concrete and 
substantive issues directly relevant to the problems of drug abuse and illicit 
trafficking.”91 The absence of international legal instruments was identified as 
a potential challenge to law enforcement officials in investigating the flows of 
money across national borders; but also there was a need for an international 
framework within which states could respond to the overlapping character of 
money laundering offences. The treaty offers a meticulous definition to the 
specific elements that encompass trafficking in drugs and other related drug 
substances. Thus, the foregoing concerns led to the adoption of the UN 
Convention on illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and other psychotropic 
substances (1988). This instrument had a limited purview—covering drugs 
and drug trafficking but void on other serious predicate crimes such as 
smuggling, fraud, serious financial crimes, and the sale of stolen goods.92 In 
December 2000, the United Nations Convention on Transnational Organised 
Crimes and its attendant three protocols were adopted in Palermo (Italy). The 
primary focus of Palermo Convention was to address the limitations of Vienna 
Anti-Narcotic Convention (1988) with regard to its limited scope of activities 
constituting serious predicate money laundering offences. In addition, 
Palermo Convention created four additional offences: participation in 
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organised criminal groups, money laundering, corruption and obstruction of 
justice. It also establishes modalities for extradition through mutual legal 
assistance, law enforcement and co-operation in the area of information 
exchange.93  
 
The 1996-7 survey by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF)94 on money 
laundering measures noted that along with drug trafficking, financial crimes 
(bank fraud95, credit card fraud, investment fraud, advance fee fraud, 
bankruptcy, fraud, embezzlement and the like) were the most mentioned 
sources of proceeds of crime.96 The European Union Council of ministers 
approved the revisions of EU’s, AML framework to reflect desired international 
changes in scope and definition of money laundering predicate offences.97  
 
2.3 The transposition of AML norms into sovereign countries 
 
To appraise the applicability of the global AML framework, the study 
deconstructed the envisaged AML regimes in United Kingdom, Uganda and 
South Africa. This was undertaken to provide insights into the ease and 
challenges of harnessing the global AML/CFT regimes in different 
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jurisdictions. The World Bank and IMF have played a prominent role in 
spearheading normative financial sector reform programmes across countries. 
In so doing, they have facilitated fledging states to develop the requisite 
capacity needed to implement the desired AML initiatives. The World 
Bank/IMF financial sector reform programmes have also helped to strengthen 
the capacity of fledging countries to develop a requisite economic and social 
infrastructure.98  There is evidence that there are gaps in the global AML laws 
manifested by the fact that some countries (for instance, the ones already 
referred to) 99 have not domesticated the UN Convention on Transnational 
Organised Crimes (2000) in Italy.100  While it is essential for states to adopt 
AML regimes to level the playing field in implementing its provisions across 
countries; it needs to be noted that states have the discretion to decide the 
extent of their cooperation. For instance extradition proceedings are still not 
easy to invoke as it is not automatic. The state has the discretion to decline 
extradition request from another state for alleged anti-money laundering 
offences unless both states treat money laundering as a criminal offence 
(double criminality).101 For a requesting country to secure extradition 
proceedings, the alleged offences should have been constituted as an offence 
in both countries (double criminality). In jurisdictions where money laundering 
has been purposely defined as fiscal offence, extradition will be denied on the 
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ground of being a matter for the domestic state’s jurisdiction.102 Thus, there is 
a need for a uniform global framework to prevent criminals from exploiting 
loopholes in the regulatory system. 
 
2.4 The justification for global prohibition regimes 
 
Global regulatory regimes have been defined as rules, principles and norms 
that require agreement on normative behaviour of all participating actors in 
international relations. International prohibition regimes are derived from the 
voluntary agreements among judicially equal actors. The conceptualisation of 
global regimes is rooted in the classic characterisation of international politics 
as relations between sovereign entities dedicated to their own self-
preservation, so that individual states do not have to depend on themselves 
for survival.103 
 
The adoption of global prohibition regimes is justified by the fact that 
contemporary crimes are multifaceted and not amenable in the realm of 
individual states. With this in mind, the adoption of global AML/CFT regulatory 
framework is justified because it circumvents the adverse effect of the 
prisoner’s dilemma where participants are not sure whether others will lend 
their support against certain exigencies or not. The adoption of global 
regulatory regimes can level the playing field in application of engendered 
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norms across states. It also needs to be noted that subscribing to a common 
regulatory framework based on international standards strengthens the 
individual state’s capacity to deal with overlapping challenges.104 It needs to 
be clarified that international cooperation cannot mean that countries should 
be on the same level of development. However, international cooperation is 
necessary to level the playing field across jurisdictions to prevent regulatory 
arbitrage and free riding.  
 
In LDCs, which are characterised with weak structures and tenuous 
legitimacy, the global AML/CFT framework is justified by the fact that the 
power wielded by transnational criminal groups can be overwhelming on the 
power of the sovereign state.105 It is therefore imperative for governments to 
adopt common regulatory initiatives to deal with contemporary threats to 
national security. The contemporary securitarisation discourse encompasses 
threats broad enough to undermine societies in the dispensation of their 
responsibilities. The transnational element of security has undermined the 
fabric of society in three dimensions: against the individual, the state and the 
international system of states.106 Some of the aforementioned threats are 
insidious and pervasive to national sovereignty due to permeability of national 
borders. In the current global environment, societies have been disorganised 
by the activities of organised criminals’ such as corruption, fear of violence or 
intimidation, national stability and state control, creating a rival authority 
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structure, or a state without a state-based system, a black market economy, 
and infiltration of the State and financial institutions by criminals.107 
 
The global regulatory initiatives are also necessary to ease cooperation of 
states and prevent criminals from taking advantage of the system.108 There is 
a need for countries to subscribe to common global regulatory initiatives to 
enhance interstate cooperation.109  The adoption of unilateral measures at a 
domestic state level cannot safeguard state against the inherent challenges in 
the global market system. Home country control (where the parent company 
oversees the affairs of the branch) can prevent market abuse at an 
institutional level, but it cannot be used to freeze and confiscate assets in the 
absence of a domestic law. Invariably, this means that if municipal and foreign 
laws are not harmonised by way of an enabling legislation, markets could be 
undermined by unfair competition and regulatory arbitrage.110 Globalisation of 
financial markets is manifested at three levels: the movement of financial 
institutions such as banks, investment houses, insurance companies, 
securities firms, across the border.111 Another dimension of financial 
globalisation is manifested by the movement of capital across borders; and 
the development of financial regulations due to cross border movement of 
funds.  
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As already noted, global exigencies are overlapping and not amenable within 
one state’s regulatory domain. For instances, it has been a challenge for law 
enforcement agencies to control telecommunication related crimes, such as 
theft of intellectual property rights, electronic dissemination of offensive 
materials, electronic money laundering and electronic vandalism through 
physical land borders.112 The prospect of cyber crimes has threatened to pose 
fresh problems for policing since they cut across geographic, social and 
political and gendered boundaries, calling into question conventional notions 
of space, place and time in the narrow confines of modern states. 113 Far from 
the politics of borders, the link between crimes and relaxed border controls 
cannot be flatly dismissed.114  It is possible that relaxed border controls in 
certain regions could act as a pull factor for drug traffickers and other 
criminals such as small arms trafficking, illegal immigration to perpetuate 
cross border crimes. Therefore the nexus between relaxed borders controls 
and an increase in cross border crimes cannot be overly dismissed. 
Traditionally borders represent operational limits for law enforcement 
agencies from the other side of the border. Different borders connote different 
countries, different languages—and the possibility of language barriers, 
different legal systems, different laws and procedures.115  
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With regional integration agreements (RIA), physical land borders have 
become more porous and permeated than ever before.116 In the field of 
crimes control, the official line between domestic and non-domestic crimes 
has become blurred especially in the area of criminal justice system.117 In 
view of the foregoing challenges, the local and the global discrepancies 
should be harmonised to prevent criminals from taking advantage of the 
system.  
 
2.5 The open borders and crime floodgate theory 
 
The interplay between the issue of relaxed border controls and its potential to 
increase cross-border crimes is supported by two propositions: opening 
borders is seen as opening crime floodgates. However, the nexus of relaxed 
borders and crimes floodgates has not been properly supported by empirical 
evidence. However, what is not in dispute is that decisions erstwhile taken in 
the domain of sovereign states are now taken at the peripheral regional level. 
This can be demonstrated by implementation of decisions and rules taken by 
European Union institutions into United Kingdom and other EU member 
countries mandatorily. It can be inferred that the traditional state—manifested 
by physical land borders, is sidelined in exercising its constitutional mandate 
because of the growth of supranational initiatives in many regions of the world 
today.118 Similarly, enhanced global media system coupled by technologies of 
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rapid communication and travel have rendered national borders porous and 
permeable by people travelling for all sorts of purposes. As such, the issue of 
relaxing border controls—an attendant facet of most regional trade 
agreements can potentially trigger negative externalities across countries.119 
The foregoing proposition is confirmed by studies carried out on this same 
subject in Canada and United Kingdom.120 
 
 In the foregoing scholarship, opening internal borders is hyped as opening 
‘crime floodgates.’121 This theory has been espoused by those who seek to 
portray immigration parochially based on its negative externalities—what 
migrants “take and receive” and underplaying their contribution to host 
economies.122 In other scholarships, the issue of “open borders and crime 
floodgates theory” is dismissed as baseless and a myth.123 It is this supposed 
mythology that has been exploited for political expediency.124 The open 
border and crime floodgate dichotomy is designed to drum up fear against 
market integration in some regions and to maintain the status quo.125 
Paradoxically, anti-immigration sentiments are laudable in countries which are 
proponents of the global market system. It is this same theory that is exploited 
to drum up fear against integration of markets. In these two theories, there is 
both an element of truth; and an element of falsehood. Firstly, drawing on 
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example of terrorism as a transnational crime, it has long predated the advent 
of regional integration.126 The open borders and crime floodgate dichotomy is 
over-emphasised to create ‘a ring of steel’ around some regions, for example 
Europe, in order to repel the threatened flood of immigrants from less 
developed regions of the world. The right wing politicians have tried to 
articulate a clear connection between illegal immigrants and a corresponding 
increase in serious crimes. The removal of internal border controls is likely to 
have a very little impact on spreading and planning of terrorist crimes as 
frontier controls have never prevented terrorism in the past.127 For example 
the 7/7 terrorist attacks in London were orchestrated (though allegedly with 
outside influence) and committed by home grown British passport holders—
they did not cross any border. The same view applies to drug trafficking 
because the adoption of strict border controls can undermine the efforts of 
traffickers in the short term but it cannot suppress drug related crimes in the 
long run. Heavy policing of national borders can constrain supply and 
undercut drug consumption in the short term. However, drawing on the 
economic principles of demand and supply, the lower the supply, the higher 
the prices. This environment will attract drug traffickers and money launderers 
into a country, apparently to take advantage of high market prices for 
drugs.128 This is why countries like Netherlands—which operate a liberal 
drugs policy have achieved a higher success rate in controlling drugs than 
those which apply stringent anti-drug laws such as the United States of 
America. There is the issue of high street prices for drugs in USA,  which will 
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continue to work as a “pull factor” for drug traffickers—dealers exploiting every 
avenue possible to smuggle them into the country.  On other hand, it is also 
true that relaxed borders could be exploited for criminal purposes, especially 
in countries which are deficient in requisite infrastructure and oversight 
regulatory institutions. The issue of immigration is complicated because it 
generates both social-economic benefits to an economy; but it also generates 
negative externalities on host economies.  
 
2.6 The role of IL in localisation of global AML regimes 
 
In a legal context, globalisation is a loose term that is devoid of a clear 
definitive legal meaning. The proliferating global regimes are independent and 
often not amenable within the realm of state regulatory domains.129 There are 
many global regulatory regimes, which have emerged through adhoc 
arrangements such as the FATF forty plus nine recommendations for the 
prevention of financial crimes.130 Furthermore, the default of the global system 
is that what we often call ‘global’ is manifested locally; and is a confederation 
of states or institutions affiliated to a group of states.  Technically the 
distribution of legitimate powers and decision-making processes within 
countries are dictated by the principle of separation powers between the 
judiciary, the executive and the legislature. The paradox of globalisation is 
that there is often no global central authority to co-ordinate the relationship 
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between different market domains and to articulate distribution of legitimate 
global powers between different constituencies.  
 
Markets cannot function across countries without harmonisation of legal 
systems, procedures, customs that span the globe. Harmonisation initiatives 
are either based on either ratified interstate treaties or the soft law 
instruments—enunciated at various market domains. Treaties are 
implemented subject to the individual states consent; while soft law 
instruments are regulatory guidelines that are not meant to be legally binding. 
Soft law instruments are only intended to harmonise existing differences 
between jurisdictions and enhance interstate cooperation.131  
 
The majority of global prohibition regimes tend to be deficient in effective 
enforcement mechanisms. This has made scholars such as Axelrod and 
Keohane to brand globalization processes and concomitant failures as 
“Anarchy”.132 The global AML/CFT framework as it stands today cannot be 
effectively implemented globally unless its ethos reflects the varying global 
market conditions, which cannot be exclusive of local conditions. As states 
surrender their sovereign space to reconstitute at a regional level (as 
manifested by the United Kingdom’s accession to the EU in 1972), criminals 
have demonstrated the agility to fill that void in the regulatory system. For 
example, the growth of motor vehicle trafficking crimes—a manifestation of 
cross border threats in the East African region133, is attributed to weak border 
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controls between the East African member countries. On the converse, there 
have been no reported incidences of cross border crimes between Indo-
Pakistan borders because of strict border controls over the issue of 
Kashmir.134  
 
2.7 Money laundering as a criminal offence 
 
As noted earlier, money laundering is relatively new, having come into 
parlance in the middle 1970s.135 It is derived from the early practice of criminal 
organisations in the US where they used to operate laundromats as cash 
intensive business to hide their criminal wealth. It has since become accepted 
as the term of art and is used in titles of relevant legislation and legal text. It 
can be found for example in titles of US Money Laundering Control Act 
(1986); and the 1990 European Convention on money laundering, search, 
seizure and confiscation of crime proceeds.136 
 
Money laundering underscores the process of manipulating legally or illegally 
acquired wealth to obscures its existence, origin or ownership for the purpose 
of avoiding law enforcement.137 The phrase “money laundering”138 refers to 
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“the conversion or transfer of property; the concealment or disguise of its 
origin; its acquisition or possession or use; and the participation or association 
to commit, attempts to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counseling 
the commission of any of the foregoing acts.” It also underscores the conduct, 
which in effect is similar to the offence of handling of the proceeds of crime.139 
Money laundering is a complicated process which involves the following 
elements when committed intentionally: the conversion and transfer of 
property, knowing that such property is derived from criminal activity, for the 
purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of 
assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such activity to 
evade the legal consequences of his action.140 The act of concealment or 
disguising of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights 
with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is 
derived from criminal activity or from an act of participation in such activity. 
The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of the 
receipt that such property was constituted criminal activity or an act of 
participation in such activity. Participation in, association to commit, attempts 
to commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counseling the commission of 
any of the actions mentioned in the foregoing indents.141 Requisite 
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knowledge, intent or purpose as an element of the foregoing activities is 
satisfied when these activities have been carried out in the territory of another 
member state or in that of a third country.142 ‘Property’ means assets of every 
kind, whether corporeal or incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or 
intangible, and legal documents or instruments evidencing title or interests in 
such assets.143 
 
The element of conversion underpins the meaning of money laundering 
offences because it marks the stage where illicit cash is turned into a less 
suspicious form, so that the true source or ownership of tainted assets is 
concealed and a legitimate source created. The limitation with the Vienna 
Convention (1988) is that it was specifically limited to the laundering of the 
proceeds of drug trafficking. Following the adoption of Vienna Convention in 
1988, a number of countries based their AML laws on this framework limiting 
the definition of money laundering offences to the laundering of drug profits. 
Subsequently, there has been a move to extend the definition of money 
laundering to include the proceeds of other serious criminal activities, 
including smuggling, fraud, serious financial crimes and the sale of stolen 
goods.144 The 1996-7 survey by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) of 
money laundering measures noted that along with drug trafficking, financial 
crimes (bank fraud, credit card fraud, investment fraud, advance fee fraud, 
bankruptcy fraud embezzlement and the like) were the most mentioned 
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sources of proceeds of crime.145 Many countries have extended the scope of 
money laundering offences, taking into account a wide range of activities 
which generate illicit proceeds of crime.  
 
 Money laundering is also described by the process through which the 
proceeds of crime are camouflaged, disguised or made to appear as if they 
were earned by legitimate means. It is a three stage process where initially 
the dirty money must be severed from the predicate crime generating it; (ii) 
characterised by a series of transactions designed to obscure or destroy the 
money trail in order to foil pursuit; and (iii) reinvesting the crime proceeds in 
furtherance of the objectives of the business (launderer). This is a well-
established offence in many EU member states146 except that money 
laundering would incur a higher penalty than mere handling of the proceeds of 
crime.147 Thus, the conduct constituting money laundering extends beyond 
mere handling of stolen goods as would be the case in relation to section 22 
of Theft Act 1968. As regards money laundering, there has to be action 
beyond mere possession of stolen goods such as assisting in retention or 
removal of property for the benefit of another person.148 The Proceeds of 
Crime Act assimilates money laundering offences introduced by the Criminal 
Justice Act (CJA) 1988 as amended by the CJA 1993. Section 93A (1) (a) of 
the CJA 1988 focuses on assistance when the retention or control by or on 
behalf of another (A) of A’s proceeds of criminal conduct is facilitated whether 
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by concealment, removal from the jurisdiction or transfer of nominees or 
otherwise.149  
 
2.8 Money laundering several outcomes 
 
The definition of money laundering envisages several outcomes. The 
definition envisages that the launderer is scheming to hide the existence of 
the wealth or its amount, as in the case of tax evader who wants to shelter his 
wealth from the reach of tax authorities; but it also envisages that he or she 
could be intending the following as well: 
o He/she could also be intending to hide or disguise the ownership of 
the generated wealth, as in the case of a drug lord who wants to obscure the 
money trail that might lead to his detection by severing the link between him 
and the funds through a shell company or a trust; 
o He/she could be intending to hide its disposition where the money is 
intended for investment in a criminal or terrorist organisation; 
o He/she could be intending to disguise the origin of funds by 
fabricating another legitimate source of wealth. 
 
The outcome of the money laundering process depends on the purpose of the 
launder him/herself as well as on the law and law enforcement in the 
jurisdiction where the activity is taking place.150 The money launderer’s 
overriding objective is to reinvest the illegal wealth in another illegal 
enterprise, by obscuring the ownership of the money or its trail to the illegal 
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destination. Disguising the source and legitimising it will be irrelevant when 
the launderer invests his wealth in jurisdictions which operate a lax approach 
to the illegality of the funds. 
 
2.9 Typologies of Money laundering 
  
Money laundering patterns are said to fall into three distinct categories. The 
first one is internal money laundering—characterised by the laundering of 
proceeds of crime committed within a given country or assets to be used in 
committing more crimes there; citing the prominent case of ‘daga’ trade.151 
The second pattern is the incoming/inflowing money laundering, which entails 
the laundering of assets derived from crime committed outside the country 
and reintroduced as investment. The most notorious of this being foreign 
currency importation; and the third last category is the outgoing money 
laundering which very closely mimics the classical cases. In this typology the 
proceeds of crime committed within the country are exported to one or more 
countries as highlighted by the case of currency counterfeits in Uganda. The 
overriding objective152 of the launderer is to get the money to the international 
money markets at some stage where total flexibility can be achieved. The 
provenance of the funds having been totally concealed, the beneficiary can 
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pose, as a rich person who invests anywhere in the world legitimately using 
the Banking system at will.153 
 
2.9.1 The process of money Laundering 
 
The ultimate objective of the money launderer is always to ensure that ‘illicit 
proceeds of crime’ also known as ‘the dirty money’ is eventually safely placed 
into the financial system as clean money as one would expect. The dirty 
money would have passed through what is literally likened as ‘a washing 
cycle’ where the dirty money is washed up clean in a series of washing 
circles. There are two main objectives of the money launderer. These are 
mainly avoiding the gaze of the law; and using money laundering as a 
strategy of transmitting the proceeds of crime from point A to B.  
 
2.9.2 Avoiding Law enforcement 
 
Any money laundering scheme ultimately aims at circumventing law 
enforcement and evading the reach of the law. The purpose of the launderer 
is to secure or avoid the confiscation of his ill-gotten wealth or to avoid or 
evade tax authorities from slashing his wealth. For those who extend money 
laundering to civil wrong, the launderer’s purpose could be to avoid the 
enforcement of a court ruling against his assets in a divorce case.154 But 
money laundering is also exploited as strategy of achieving the launderer’s 
objective of placing tainted money safely into the financial system. 
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  2.9.3 Strategy 
 
Money laundering is used as a strategy of transmitting money from point A to 
B. The launderer must change the form of the money of illicit cash to another 
asset so as to conceal the true source or ownership of the illegally acquired 
proceeds, and the creation of the perception of legitimacy of the source and 
ownership.155 For example, drug trafficking, is highly cash intensive. Indeed in 
case of hard drugs (heroin and cocaine) the physical volume of notes 
received from street dealing is much larger than the volume of drugs 
themselves.156 Reliance on cash as a central medium of exchange in turn 
gives rise to at least three common factors: drug dealers need to conceal the 
true ownership and origin of the money; the money launderers need to control 
the money and to foster their criminal enterprise. Money laundering strategies 
must be differentiated from money laundering techniques. There are as many 
techniques used in committing money laundering as one can possibly think of. 
 
 
 
2.9.4 Techniques of Money Laundering 
 
In an effort to achieve their goals of undertaking a money laundering 
operation, money launderers have resorted to the use of a variety of 
techniques. The most common ones include: currency smuggling; the 
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conversion of cash into negotiable instruments; the creation or use of facilities 
offered by financial and tax havens; the establishment and use of the front or 
shell companies; the use of currency and brokerage houses; the creation of 
false or inflated invoices; the use of casinos and other gambling enterprises; 
the use of credit cards obtained from tax haven banks; the use of facilities 
provided by underground or parallel banking systems; and resort to cash 
purchases.157 The techniques of money laundering are innumerable, diverse, 
complex, subtle and secret. What is not in dispute however, is the ability of 
the launderer to manipulate the legitimate process in his transactions. The 
analysis of the Canadian money laundering police files158 revealed that over 
80 percent had an international dimension suggesting that the perpetrators of 
this trade exploit the transactional movement of goods, capital and people, 
just in the same way the legitimate business community does in this global 
era. As the EU commission has noted, internationalisation of economies and 
financial services are opportunities which are seized by money launderers to 
carry out their criminal activities, since the origin of funds can be better 
disguised when put outside the reach of national authorities where the crime 
was initially committed.159This proposes the need for international cooperation 
against money laundering such as bank secrecy laws and making sure it is 
criminalised internationally. 
 
 The acts or transactions which constitute money laundering are limited only 
by the purpose for which they are structured and the skill of the launderer. 
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There is almost an unlimited number of ways in which the launderer can 
achieve his purpose. This process encompasses the three money-laundering 
stages, which are treated separately under techniques of money 
laundering.160 
Money can be laundered using one of the following techniques: 
Investing the ‘dirty money’ in legitimate businesses either through shell 
companies or through genuine companies in pseudo names; 
 The launderer may acquire assets from the proceeds of crimes; 
 Deposit of money in banks in non-co-operative countries and remittances 
through banking channels to the host country; 
 Use of non-banking channels to transfer money such as hawala and hundi 
which is now a common method of remitting money to Uganda and other East 
African Community countries; 
 Over-invoicing of goods in seemingly normal business transactions; 
 Theft and smuggling of luxury motor vehicles within and into the region, 
commonly used in East Africa and Eastern seaboard of Southern Africa; 
 Routing money through tax haven countries, Cayman Island and the 
Caribbean have been very prominent in this respect. 
These techniques are further broken down in each of the stages (placement, 
layering and integration) through which the ‘money washing cycle is 
processed. 
 
The first one is the placement stage where the illegitimately acquired or 
destined assets are placed into the financial system. This initial stage can also 
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involve greatest risks for the culprit since the placement stage often requires 
substantial sums of money across the counters of the bank and other financial 
institutions. According to Barry Rider161 ‘money in flight will first be noticeable 
when it literally first splashes into the pool.’ Thus, money laundering 
operations are more noticeable, and thus easier to stop, when money is first 
introduced into the system (the placement stage) since deposits without an 
apparently bonafide commercial reason more easily arouse suspicion at the 
point of face-to-face contact with the bank. However detection has often been 
avoided by the process known as ‘smurfing’ which involves the use of what is 
a small army of individuals who deposit cash sums, which 162fall below the 
reporting threshold.163 It may be said that individual bankers are in the best 
position to monitor and report suspicious financial transactions. However, the 
attempt to stop money laundering at the placement stage has exerted 
considerable pressure on banks and indeed on the tradition of the laws of 
countries. Several issues arise here: the banks requirement to report to the 
authorities not only knowledge and suspicion of illicit activities but the duty the 
bank owes to the customer based on the principle of customer 
confidentiality.164 
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During the placement stage, one or all of the following aspects are likely to 
happen: 
 Physical disposal of bulk cash proceeds—because a large volume of cash 
may draw attention to their illegal source and carry a continuos risk of theft or 
seizure, criminals are motivated to exchange small denomination bills for 
larger bills, to deposit cash and buy financial instruments or otherwise dispose 
of bulk cash promptly. 
 Structuring/Smurfing—of cash transactions (deposits, monetary instrument 
purchases), to evade the common regulatory requirement that transactions, 
which exceed a certain amount of money, be recorded and sometimes 
reported. 
 Bank complicity—where money laundering is facilitated when bank 
personnel are corrupted, intimidated or controlled. 
 Misuse of exemptions—unsupervised unilateral ability of a financial 
institution to exempt itself or its customers from a reporting or recording 
regime can offer money launderers a way in which to avoid an audit of their 
cash transactions. 
 Committing of licit and illicit funds—committing of funds and establishing 
front companies is away to take advantage of these circumstances, by 
obscuring illicit proceeds in a forest of illicit transactions (co-mingling) or 
masking them with the appearance of legitimate receipts of a largely cash 
business activity (front companies). 
 Assets purchased with cash—large-scale purchases can support a 
luxurious life style, change the form of the proceeds from conspicuous form; 
or obtain major assets, which will be used to further the criminal enterprise. 
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 Currency smuggling—the cross border smuggling of currency and 
monetary instruments by various methods accomplishes the desired physical 
transfer without leaving an audit trail.165 
What generally happens at this stage is illustrated by the following two 
metaphors: 
 Money laundering is analogous to throwing an object166, (say a stone) in 
water. Immediately the object is thrown in water, one can see the ripples 
where it first hit. But as it sinks and goes deeper the ripples disappear with it, 
to a point when they can be seen no more. At some point, it is hard to tell that 
the object was even thrown in water. Drawing on this metaphor, it has been 
said that unless money laundering is prevented at the placement stage, it 
becomes very difficult to control at a layering and integration stage when it 
has ‘sunk deeper’ within the financial system. 
 
  Money laundering typologies have been167explained in the following 
analogous terms. Hand Wash—when a criminal organisation uses the money 
(generally small amounts) to buy goods and services for the organisations. 
Family Washing Machine—when criminal organisations or family launders its 
money according to family goals and collusion with banks or financial 
institutions. Washing programs can consist of the short cycle, such as 
opening a deposit account in a bank in the name of a given person and 
depositing the money there; the long cycle, which involves terms such as 
prewash, wash, rinse and drying to describe the different passages from 
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cleaning the money to its investment in legitimate activities. Then there is 
Condominium Washing Machine—when several families belonging to the 
same criminal syndicate, such as mafia, organise a laundering enterprises 
with complicity of someone in a bank of financial institution. Last but not least 
is what is called a launderette—when a criminal organisation offers criminal 
and criminal syndicates a money laundering service with different cycles: 
short cycle for cleaning the money only, or the long cycle which includes all 
the activities from laundering to investment. 
 
The second is the layering stage or agitation stage where numerous 
transactions designed to act as a smoke screen to disguise the true origin of 
the money. One of the many such transactions used as part of the layering 
stage is over invoicing of the value of imported goods. The use of gold is also 
much favoured by money launderers in view of its highly mutable qualities. 
Whether in form of ingot, a ring, bracelet, pendant or ornament, its value 
remains constant therefore a single piece of gold can be changed many times 
in order to disguise its original form without any significant change in its worth. 
This approach to a great extent mirrors parallel calls to transplant 
interpretations of knowledge on the basis of the case law on constructive 
trusts in criminal law sphere in order to include a broadly defined concept of 
wilful blindness. 
 
 The creation of a false paper trail—the intentional production of false 
documentary evidence to disguise the true source, ownership, location, 
purpose of or control over the funds. 
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 Cash converted into money instruments—once illicit proceeds have been 
placed into a bank or a non-bank financial institution, they can then be 
converted into monetary instruments such as traveller’s cheques, letters of 
credit, money orders, cashiers cheques, bonds or stocks. Conversion into 
monetary instruments allows the proceeds to be more readily transported out 
of the country without detection, to be deposited into other domestic financial 
institution accounts, pledged for loans etc. 
 Tangible assets purchased with cash and converted—to benefit offset 
transaction costs: the identity of the parties may be obscured by untraceable 
transactions, and the assets become difficult to locate and seize. 
 Electronic funds or wire transfers—possibly the most effective layering 
method available to money launderers. They offer criminals the much-needed 
speed, distance and minimal audit trail and virtual anonymity amid the 
enormous daily volume of electronic funds transfers, all at minimum costs. 
 
The third stage of money laundering process is the integration or reintegration 
stage. This stage occurs when the dirty money has been safely placed and 
then layered to the extent that it is safe to return to the launderer via the 
legitimate financial system.168 
 
 Real estate transactions—property can be bought by shell corporations 
using illicit proceeds. The property can then be sold and the proceeds appear 
as legitimate sales proceeds. A reduced price can be declared and partial 
payment made in cash to the seller, guaranteeing a paper profit when the 
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property is resold at the market value. Inflated prices can be established by a 
series of trades, enabling the last seller to show a legitimate source of 
substantial, although fictitious profit or providing justification for inflated loan 
transactions. 
 Front companies and sham loans—in this way the owner can pay his 
foreign laundering subsidiary interest on the loan and deduct it as business 
expense, thereby reducing his tax liability. 
  Foreign bank complicity—money laundering using accomplice foreign 
banks represents a higher order of criminal sophistication and presents a very 
difficult problem both at technical and political level. Such a bank can conceal 
many incriminating details relating to persons and transactions; not to mention 
providing sham loans secured by criminal proceeds, while guaranteeing 
immunity from law enforcement scrutiny due to the protective banking laws 
and regulations. 
 False import/export invoicing—fictitious transactions, overvaluation of 
entry documents and/ or overvaluation of exports serves to justify funds 
transfers involving criminal proceeds.169 
 
It should be noted that the foregoing stages are not cumulative constituent 
elements of money laundering, in a sense that they should all exist before the 
offence is committed. The commission of any one of them may be sufficient 
for guilt to arise. It is however improbable that layering or integration could 
occur without placement having preceded them. As is apparent in the three 
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dimensions of money laundering, there are instances when money laundering 
is committed without the placement stage.  
 The two phase model, distinguishing between: money laundering of first 
degree, concerning the laundering of money stemming directly from illegal 
acts; and second degree laundering, indicating mid or long term operations, 
through the laundered money appears as a legal income and is restructured 
in the legitimate financial system (recycling); 
 The circulation model, based on the cycle of water and divided into seven 
stages;170 
 The four sector model, in which the sector contains a refinement process; 
and 
 The destination/teleological model based on diverse money laundering 
targets (for example integration, investment, and tax evasion, financing of 
organised crime). 
 
As far as the underground criminal economy is concerned, money laundering 
is embedded primarily in its potential to facilitate the evasion of detection of 
the underlying criminal activity that generates the profit171. Secondly, money 
laundering can sustain the enjoyment of profit from crime or their reinvestment 
in future criminal activities. Thirdly, money laundering facilitates the 
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development of trans-national networks, and linkages with criminal 
environments of disparate origins. Law enforcement authorities have come to 
the conclusion that by combating money laundering activities, they can disrupt 
the cycle used by criminal groups to derive benefits from illegal profits, and 
thereby weaken or even destroy their viability. If the primary motivation behind 
syndicated crime is economic, and the economic gain is removed, the crime 
will cease. 
 
 Sophisticated attempts to conceal the sources of money can involve 
hundreds, perhaps thousands, of bank accounts in numerous jurisdictions in 
an attempt to create as complex a web as possible. This makes it difficult to 
trace transactions by presenting law enforcement authorities with 
administrative barriers against obtaining financial details, making it impossible 
to do so.172 
 
It needs to be noted that in any type or stage of money laundering process, 
the goal of the launderer remains to conceal the true ownership and origin of 
criminal proceeds and change their form by constantly maintaining control173. 
The element of concealment or disguise is integral to the conceptualisation of 
money laundering phenomenon and essential to distinguish it from the simple 
hiding of illicit proceeds.174 This is not always taken into account by certain 
theorisations on the process of money laundering, especially in models such 
as hand wash—which involves the use of a small amount of money to buy 
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goods. It doesn’t involve the intention to conceal the origin of the criminal 
proceeds and may not involve the use of credit and financial institutions. 
 
2.10 The responsibility of banks in fighting money laundering 
 
Financial institutions are by law required to create a normative anti-money 
laundering environment—laws and ethics based on international standards. 
This environment is necessary to ensure that banks are not exploited as 
vehicles for the transmission of illicit proceeds through the banking system. 
The banks’ vulnerability to money laundering schemes is clearly 
demonstrated by the fact that banks, apart from offering a frontline service of 
receiving deposits and paying money to its customers, they also sell 
sophisticated financial products such as traveler’s cheques, letters of credit, e-
money, and so forth and so on, to members of the public. The foregoing 
challenge has exposed banks to risks of money laundering through 
sophisticated money laundering schemes which could prima facie look 
legitimate. On the other hand, it can also be argued that banking is a 
business, which means that banks should be allowed to do just banking and 
to leave enforcement of regulatory regimes to oversight anti-money 
laundering institutions. For instance banks are required to report suspicious 
transactions, to monitor clients and their accounts, and to perform any other 
related duties as part of executing their customer due diligence (CDD) 
mandate. The CDD mandate puts the bank in a supposedly invidious position 
of reporting on its very customers and perhaps causing them to get arrested 
by the authorities. How do banks square the foregoing reporting regime with 
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the principle of customer confidentiality and its responsibility to the authorities 
not to tip off customers? It would seem that requiring banks to report 
suspected money laundering activities would arguably sideline the bank in 
terms of its business operations. It would create a hostile business 
environment—for example does it not scare off potential customers or 
generate an anti-business climate in a particular bank?  
 
2.10.1 Bank—customer relationship 
 
The bank-customer relationship raises significant issues of the banks duty of 
customer confidentiality and that of tipping off. These duties are owed by the 
bank both to the customer and the regulatory authorities as well. The bank’s 
duty of disclosure can potentially conflict with the duty of confidentiality owed 
to the customer by virtue of the contractual obligations between the bank and 
the customer; but also if the bank knowingly assists in receipt of deposits 
generated from money laundering it could be liable as an accessory to the 
alleged money laundering offences. What does the bank duty of confidentiality 
entail? 
 
2.10.2 Bank’s duty of confidentiality 
 
It is an established tradition in English common law that the relationship 
between a bank and a customer is a contractual one; and that the bank has a 
legal duty arising out of this contract to protect the information relating to a 
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customer which it received as a confidant.175 An implicit term of the contract is 
that the bank should not disclose to third parties either the state of the 
customer’s account or any of his transactions with the bank or any information 
relating to the customers acquired through maintenance and administration of 
the account.176 In Tournier v. National Provincial Union Bank of England177, 
Bank L.J clearly argued that this duty extends at least to all the transactions 
that go through the account…even beyond the period when the account is 
closed… {and} extends to the information obtained from other sources than 
the customer’s actual account.178  While the duty not to disclose is a legal one 
arising out of the law of contract, it is not an absolute one but qualified. The 
first qualification is where there is a duty to the public to disclose; secondly 
where disclosure is under a compulsion by law, thirdly where the interest of 
the bank requires disclosure; and lastly where disclosure is made with the 
express or implied consent of the customer.179 The implied consent of the 
customer is manifested in a situation where, for instance, the customer has 
filled the consent form and authorised the bank to pass information to a third 
party. 
 
There are circumstances in which courts have allowed money to be followed 
at common law into the hands of a subsequent transferee180; and the position 
of the law seems to assert the common law right to follow an asset and to 
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recover it in personal action, just as much as in case of a debt or other chose 
in action.181 The instructive example in this situation is the Court of Appeal 
decision in Banque Belge Pour L’ Etranger v. Hambrouck182, in which the 
facts of the case were as follows: 
 The first defendant, Hambrouck, fraudulently obtained a number of crossed 
cheques drawn, or purporting to be drawn in his favour by his employer, paid 
these into a bank account opened in his name for that purpose and, after the 
proceeds had been collected by his bank from the plaintiff banker, and 
credited to his account, drew a cheque on that account in favour of his 
mistress, the second defendant, who paid them into her own bank account 
with the third defendant. The plaintiff bank there upon brought an action 
against all three defendants for the declaration that the money paid by the 
second defendant into her account with the third defendants was the property 
of the plaintiff, and an order for payment to them. The third defendant paid the 
sum in question into the court and was dismissed from the action. The plaintiff 
succeeded against the remaining defendant, and the second defendant 
appealed. The Court of Appeal rejected the appeal on the grounds that the 
right to follow the money had and received was lost by the appellant’s 
payments of money into the banking account, upholding the decision of the 
earlier court. Both Banks L.J and Atkin L.J were of the opinion that the money, 
having been paid into the third defendant and by them into the court, was 
clearly identifiable as money to which the plaintiff were entitled, and which 
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they could thus recover at common law, in an action for money had and 
received.183 
 
2.10.3 The bank as an accessory in money laundering offences 
 
 If the bank does not adhere to tight regulatory standards and accepts a 
wrong mandate, for example tainted proceeds of crime, the bank could be 
liable for aiding and abetting money laundering. Similarly, if the bank does not 
adhere to the required standards in relation to its operations and knowingly 
accepts deposits accrued from the sale of criminal property, it will be liable for 
knowing receipt.  As regards aiding and abetting, the law on accessories is 
set out in ‘Accessories and Abettor Act 1861’ thus: ‘Whosoever shall aid, abet, 
counsel or procure the commission of any indictable offence…shall be liable 
to be tried, indicted and punished as a principal offender.’184 Where two or 
more people agree to an act in prohibited circumstances, the law has long 
adopted a view that they should be liable for the direct and agreed 
consequences of that joint enterprise. The only problem would be when one 
of the parties exceeds what was agreed.185 For the defendant to be liable in a 
joint enterprise offence, the defendant (the bank in this case), will have had 
requisite mens rea in relation to its own conduct, notably an intention to 
encourage the commission of money laundering. This could take the form of 
mens rea in respect to the principal offence and its consequences or it could 
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involve mens rea in relation to mental state of the principal offender.186 
Similarly, the foregoing situation could also elicit issues of conspiracy to 
commit money laundering under Conspiracy Act 1977. Section 1(2) of the Act 
requires that in order for the defendant (bank) to be liable for an offence of 
conspiracy, the defendant must intend or know that the prohibited 
circumstances will exist when the offence is committed. Since conspiracy is a 
crime of specific intent, the prosecution will have to prove that the bank has 
committed the conduct and the consequence element of the substantive 
money laundering offences.187In the case of Gray v. Johnson188, it was clearly 
established that unless the bank has misapplied the funds, amounting to a 
breach of trust or where the bankers are privy to the intent to make the 
misapplication of the trust funds.189 Equally, banks are not under any fiduciary 
obligation as trustees to its customers or third party, but in circumstances 
where there has been mal fides for example in situations where the bank is 
sufficiently aware of money laundering, the bank may be liable to the victim of 
this conduct as ‘a constructive trustee.’190 The bank will not be made a 
constructive trustee simply because it acts as the agent of the trustee in 
transactions within their legal powers, unless they have assisted with the 
knowledge and fraudulent design on the part of trustees.191 As such, for the 
prosecution to succeed, it will have to clearly articulate a causal relationship 
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between the defendant’s intention (in this case the bank), and the commission 
of the substantive offences, which is the basis of conspiracy.192 
 
If the bank converts negotiable instruments, an oft-used method in the 
layering stage of money laundering process, it could be liable for the tort of 
conversion. Equally where the bank has knowingly received funds which have 
been misappropriated in breach of trust or fiduciary duty, it will be liable for 
‘knowing receipt.’ knowing receipt is a form of secondary liability where the 
wrong doer is primarily liable for the act or omission committed.193This is a 
form of personal liability rather than proprietary liability, manifested in a 
situation where the bank receives the funds properly and then applies them 
for its own benefit.194 One of the prerequisite for knowing receipt is where the 
money has been disposed of in breach of trust; and where the bank has 
applied the money for its own benefit.195The prosecution will have to prove 
that the bank had knowledge that it was misapplying the money in breach of 
trust. The liability of the bank is through its officers and agents, who have 
requisite knowledge of the money or its proceeds.196Knowledge is delineated 
as ‘actual knowledge’ or ‘constructive knowledge.’ The bank is deemed to 
have knowledge, where it wilfully shuts its eyes to the obvious, wilfully or 
recklessly fails to make such inquiries as an honest and reasonable bank 
would make; knowledge of circumstances which would indicate the facts to an 
honest and reasonable bank; knowledge of circumstances which would put an 
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honest and reasonable bank on inquiry.197 Constructive knowledge is to be 
inferred from objective factual circumstances, if the defendant is not able to 
explain or to provide evidence exonerating him of the alleged money 
laundering offence.198  
 
It is possible that the bank could also be liable for knowing assistance offence, 
if it acts to facilitate fraud on the trustees either by receipt of information in 
breach of confidence or where it induces breach of trust or fiduciary.199 In 
Barnes v. Addy200, for the bank to be liable for this form of liability, there has 
to be ‘a dishonest and fraudulent design’ on the part of the trustees. Secondly, 
there has got to be an element of fault, although knowledge has been said to 
suffice.201 The dishonest test adopted in relation to the above is the 
Cunningham subjective test rather than an objective bystander test otherwise 
known as Caldwell test recklessness.202 As such questions like, would an 
honest and reasonable bank acted differently at the time have got to be 
asked. 
 
2.10.4 The Banks mandate in Customer Identification Requirement 
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Banks are required by law to exercise customer due diligence and to ensure 
other regulatory standards are implemented.203 In some jurisdictions such as 
the US, non-compliance with regulatory rules has been exacted with the 
imposition of severe penalties on the person requested (including financial 
institutions as juristic persons), giving priority for US to enforce its domestic 
laws on other jurisdictions.204 Section 319 of the PATRIOT Act exports the 
forfeiture of criminal assets to financial institutions otherwise beyond 
American control, with the intended effect of coercing such financial 
institutions into implementing acceptable AML programmes and placing 
institutions against their customers.205 Section 319 of the foregoing Act 
presents foreign banks with two stark choices: either they have to comply with 
the American investigations and police their customers to ensure that no 
assets subject to forfeiture are ever deposited with them, accept the possibility 
of disruption and loss of termination and forfeiture of correspondent accounts 
or cease to do business directly with domestic financial institutions.206 The 
FATF replicates the same enforcement regimes, asking banks to ensure that 
they are vigilante in their dealings with customers.207 
 
Financial institutions208 are required to satisfy themselves as to the identity of 
‘their customers’, whether they are dealing with occasional or usual 
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customers. Identification must be established by official or any other 
equivalent satisfactory documents.209 This requirement aims to ensure that 
the financial system is not used as a channel for criminal funds. As such, 
banks are asked to undertake reasonable measures and determine the true 
identity of all customers requesting the institutions services. According to this 
requirement banks are no longer allowed to hold anonymous accounts. In this 
case, the bank needs to satisfy itself as to the independence and reliability of 
information relating to third persons. Particular care is taken in identifying the 
ownership of all accounts and those using safe custody facilities. 
 
While the adoption of customer due diligence measures is necessary to 
ensure that the banking system is not exploited for criminal purposes, this 
chapter postulates that banks which adopt sophisticated AML procedures in 
place should always be compensated (in form of tax rebates) for onerously 
acting as a policeman on behalf of regulatory authorities. This would also 
encourage all financial institutions to apply the same regulatory standards and 
counter the challenge of regulatory arbitrage—where rules are applied 
differently or arbitrary.  
 
2.11 Money laundering predicate offences 
 
The Council of Europe Anti-Money Laundering Convention in 1990 defined 
predicate offences broadly to include “any criminal offence as a result of 
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which proceeds were generated that may become the subject of money 
laundering”.210 While the FATF approach leaves choice to national 
legislatures to include or exclude corruption as a predicate offence for money 
laundering, the approach of the Council of Europe does not seem to give such 
a choice.211 In the UK law, predicate offences are defined by section 93A of 
the Criminal Justice Act (1993), which extends money laundering offences to 
include “any criminal conduct which constitutes an offence triable on 
indictment in the crown court”.212  The Strasbourg Convention and the FATF, 
however provide for optional extension of criminalisation to further categories 
of predicate offences.213 The scope of money laundering predicate offences is 
clearly elaborated in the glossary to FATF 40 recommendations to 
encompass the following. It includes participation in organised criminal groups 
and racketeering; terrorism, (including financing of terrorism); trafficking in 
human beings and illegal migrant smuggling; sexual exploitation (including 
sexual exploitation of children); illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances; illicit arms trafficking; illicit trafficking in stolen and 
other goods; corruption and bribery; fraud; currency counterfeiting; 
counterfeiting and piracy of products; environmental crimes; murder or 
grievous bodily injury, kidnappings, illegal and hostage taking; robbery or 
theft; smuggling; extortion; forgery; piracy; and insider trading and market 
manipulation.214 
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Countries are given the discretion to exclude crimes committed abroad or to 
eliminate those crimes they do not deem truly relevant from the definition of 
domesticate predicate crimes such as corruption.215 Corruption as an 
economic crime generates illicit proceeds and qualifies as money laundering 
predicate crime. The term “predicate crime” covers a wide range of activities 
which generate illicit proceeds of a crime. Corruption is defined as ‘the abuse 
of public office, either to commit some act in breach of a duty or to demand 
some kind of favour in return for doing something which one is bound to do 
anyway, that is, for a private gain’.216 Corruption often concerns the behaviour 
of public officials, whether politicians or civil servants, in which they improperly 
or unlawfully enrich themselves or those who are associated with them.217 
The World Bank defines corruption as “the abuse of public office for a private 
gain.”218 This definition is fairly straight forward to capture a wide range of 
crime activities that fall within this working framework. Thus, corruption can be 
viewed as a specific type of violation against moral norms and values of the 
society for selfish personal reasons. Corruption is a domestic offence when 
committed within the boundaries of a single country, for example an official of 
the government offering a bribe to secure a business contract in a company 
registered in a country. Transnational corruption on the other hand transcends 
national boundaries and occurs within many jurisdictions.  Transnational 
corruption is illustrated by a hypothetical example, where for instance, an 
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American company offers bribes to a government official, say in Uganda, in 
order to secure its interests in a government contract. However, the bribe can 
also be given by a government official to gain a contract in a foreign country. 
In both of these cases, the act of the perpetuator amounts to corruption.  In 
view of this analysis, the World Bank definition of corruption is limited in scope 
as it does not capture corruption committed in the private sector such as 
bribery in private businesses. Another example of private sector corruption 
can be manifested by corporate fraud where a director of a company defrauds 
it of millions of dollars.219 Private sector corruption would seem more 
prevalent in developed economies while public sector corruption is rampant in 
developing economies.220 
 
2.11.1 Corruption as a ML predicate offence 
 
In many developing countries, money laundering schemes are inextricably 
linked to corruption, being both a cause and predicate offence. Money 
received in corruption constitutes illicit proceeds of crime which makes it 
satisfy the definition of predicate offences. The laundered assets either 
constitute the proceeds of corruption or the process of laundering illicit 
proceeds is facilitated by corrupting law enforcement officials to place illicit 
proceeds into the system.221 The use of corruption to facilitate money 
laundering related threats such as drug trafficking, prostitution, small arms 
                                                          
219
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trafficking, illegal currency trafficking has destroyed the myth that corruption is 
a domestic political issue amenable within individual states.222Therefore the 
design of anti-corruption policy measures should encompass effective 
implementation strategy of customer due diligence such as “KYC” and proper 
enforcement of anti-corruption laws.223 
 
It needs to be noted that “the money” accrued from corruption constitutes 
criminal property under AML legislation in many jurisdictions.224 Criminal 
property is defined as “property of any kind that one knows or suspects to be 
derived from criminal conduct.”225Criminal conduct includes not only offences 
committed in United Kingdom, but also any act which, although it was 
committed abroad, would have constituted an offence had it been committed 
in United Kingdom.226Therefore the remit of the foregoing definition covers a 
British resident who embezzles government money in their own countries 
before coming to United Kingdom. For example, somebody who occupies a 
position of power in which he/she is expected to work in the interest of the 
state and then embezzles government funds, or abuses his position in any 
other way such as taking a bribe will have committed a criminal offence.227 
Another example could be highlighted by a situation where a government 
official accepts a gift from a representative of or the agent of a company so 
that he/she could influence a bid for a contract.228  
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The causes of corruption are many and vary from society to society where it 
has been committed. In Uganda, corruption and money laundering are 
manifested by tax evasion; the swindling of public funds and siphoning it to 
foreign jurisdictions.229 In some countries corruption has eroded the fabric of 
society and it has proved stubborn to overcome.230Corruption has remained 
intractable despite countries having taken positive measures such as 
campaigning vigorously against it; and introducing rigorous laws against it.231 
Kickbacks, commissions, or representation fees are sought in return for 
rigging bids; that is, manipulating laws adopted to govern the privatisation 
process. Apart from weakening support for liberalisation of markets and 
desired market reforms, corruption creates laxity in creating laws and reform 
programmes.232 Lax financial regulation has attracted money launderers 
because to a large extent in such an environment, the authorities do not fully 
co-operate in international efforts aimed at suppressing the threat of money 
laundering.233  
 
There is a close connection between corruption234and money laundering in 
many jurisdictions. Where the money launderer cannot achieve their aims 
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through the use or threat of the use of violence, they will employ corruption as 
a strategy to infiltrating the system. There are many forms of corruption such 
as bureaucratic corruption where officials take bribes or political corruption, 
which includes politicians235 taking bribes to award contracts, influencing 
elections or providing patronage. Grand corruption involves misuse of power 
by heads of state, ministers and top officials for private pecuniary profit, and 
even noble cause corruption where the instruments of government such as 
intelligence services are used to provide finance and other support for criminal 
activity, such as assisting terrorism, providing secret arms supplies beyond 
the scrutiny of political process and laundering secret funds.236  
 
2.12 The role of the World Bank in fighting Corruption 
 
The World Bank and IMF have (through the imposition of SAPs) cultivated an 
environment of good governance in many borrowing member countries.237 
Good governance includes promotion of transparency and accountability in 
member countries to ensure that borrowed funds are properly utilised.238 
Although the World Bank has a limited mandate239 to enforce its will within a 
member state, it nevertheless ensures that soft law obligations are 
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applied240to stem the problem of corruption.  To demonstrate its commitment 
to fighting money laundering, in 1997 the IMF went as far as warning member 
countries that funding could be withdrawn unless they adopted measures 
against corruption. IMF issued policy guidelines highlighting the dangers of 
corruption such as diversion of public funds through misappropriation, tax 
evasion, fraud, money laundering, the misuse of foreign exchange reserves, 
abuse of power by bank supervisors’ as well poor practices in regulating 
foreign direct investment.241 
 
However, there is a need for the World Bank to spearhead the fight against 
corruption by tightening conditions for lending to governments where 
corruption is rampant. It needs to learn a lesson from its past failures. For 
example, even though Mobutu Seseko—the president of Zaire (1965-1994) 
had been known by the World Bank to be stealing up to 50 percent of the 
money in development assistance, the World Bank did not stop lending to 
Mobutu’s corrupt government until 1993.242 The Articles of Agreement—the 
mandate for the World Bank’s operations in member countries, requires it to 
ensure that the proceeds of its loans are spent only on the designated 
purposes and that due attention is given to economy and efficiency.243 
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Corruption diverts the proceeds of the bank’s loans from its designated 
purpose to private pockets. Corruption therefore undermines the development 
effort of the bank and reduces public interest in the reform process. The 
abuse of privatisation process has made the World Bank’s work to be 
perceived in bad light in some countries.  Suffice it to say, the World Bank and 
IMF are not mandated to deal with matters involving corruption as it was 
deemed to be an internal matter in the individual state’s jurisdictions.244 But 
again it needs to be noted that corruption undermines the stability of domestic 
economies, which brings it within the World Bank and IMF’s mandate.245 
Bribes represent illegal use of fees, taxes, access charges paid to public 
agents. These payments represent economic decisions bringing it within the 
purview of the World Bank and IMF to address.246 If the level of corruption in a 
country247 is so high as to have an adverse impact on the effectiveness of the 
bank’s assistance, and there is factual and objective analysis that the 
government is doing very little about it, the bank will often take that as a factor 
in its lending strategy towards that country.248 Given that corruption has 
always been viewed as a political matter, it was deemed to be an internal 
matter for which the bank did not have the mandate to deal with. Until 1990s, 
the bank’s work in relation to corruption was literally curtailed but post 1990s; 
corruption was brought within the requirement of good governance to be 
                                                          
244
 Due to the fact that the Bank does not have any mandate on corruption, the official of the 
bank who witnesses corruption is not allowed to inform the government or to talk to the press 
directly about it. If he does, he or she will risk being deported out of the country for political 
meddling. 
245
 Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, (n 239). 
246
 Susan George Ackerman, Corruption and government: Causes, consequences and 
reform, (Cambridge University Press, 1999), 20. 
247
 On a number of occasions, the Bank suspended funding on the development projects 
upon discovering evidence of corruption. 
248
 Shihata, (n 239). 
 107 
addressed by a country as a condition for lending.249 The Articles of 
Agreement was the major obstacle which made corruption an internal matter 
outside the jurisdiction of the World Bank. But while corruption was deemed 
as an internal matter its prevalence is a sign of bad governance. In 1992, the 
World Bank issued a report on good governance highlighting that good 
governance was central to creating an environment for a strong, equitable 
development and good economic policies.250 This marked a change in attitude 
towards corruption and henceforth the bank would incorporate measures 
against corruption as a governance challenge to be addressed by countries 
seeking development assistance.251 
 
To ensure leadership by example on corruption, the World Bank enacted 
internal staff rules, requiring annual financial disclosure of all assets and 
financial transactions by senior staff, disclosure of adverse family interests 
that affect the World Bank’s dealings, and provides guidelines how its 
employees are expected to behave in their dealings inside and outside of the 
World Bank.252The IMF provides countries with advice and technical 
assistance for promoting good governance in areas within the IMF mandate 
and expertise (mostly legal and institutional reforms), collaborating with other 
institutions particularly the Work Bank, to co-ordinate their complementary 
areas of expertise.253 It does this by assisting member countries economic 
policies through building and strengthening policy institutions and improving 
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accountability of the public sector.254 Besides, the internal anti-corruption 
measures adopted by the World Bank and IMF; they have also required 
borrowing countries to implement requisite reforms especially in the public 
sector. This was deemed to be essential and to demonstrate their seriousness 
in fighting corruption across borrowing countries. In 1997, the international 
donor community cut funding to the government of Kenya, pending the 
implementation of requisite reforms. Aid was suspended to Kenya because 
there was rampant corruption and lack of progress on many aspects of law—
as a harmonising instrument. Kenya was required to harmonise its laws in 
areas of de-monopolisation, deregulation, accountability, privatisation, 
prosecution and governance, protection of human rights and clarification of 
rules according WTO benchmarks.255  
 
 
2.13 Conclusion 
 
The current global AML framework is a patch work of complimentary 
measures of states and market oriented initiatives such as the Basle 
Committee supervisory guidelines, FATF forty plus nine recommendations 
and other institutions. This chapter has also provided insights into the 
complicated dynamics—processes, schemes and techniques money 
laundering offences and its predicate offences are manifested. The global 
AML/CFT framework provides a strong caution on money laundering and its 
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predicate crimes.  The role of the, the UN, the World Bank and IMF, FATF 
and regional initiatives such as the EU remain cornerstones of the global 
efforts to forestall money laundering and corruption globally.  
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ANALYSIS OF THE BACKGROUND 
LITERATURE 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
To ensure this study was not duplicating other studies, a scoping review of the 
literature was undertaken. The purpose of conducting this literature review 
was to establish the discrepancies in the theory and practice of states in 
harnessing the global AML/CFT framework. The analysis span UN, AML/CFT 
treaties, the FATF forty plus nine recommendations and the Basle Committee 
regulatory standards were undertaken. In conclusion this chapter articulates 
the gaps and weaknesses that characterise the current global AML/CFT 
framework. 
 
3.2 An overview of the global and other AML/CFT counter-measures 
                 
The regimes evolved under United Nations AML/CFT treaties are 
complimented by soft law instruments such as the FATF forty plus nine 
recommendations (2003). Soft law instruments are adopted as regulatory 
guidelines plug gaps in the law and foster cooperation of states on common 
interstate issues.256  Thus, the global AML framework is an amalgamation of 
collective interstate measures such as the UN AML treaty (1988) and soft law 
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instruments.257 The United Nations Convention on Illicit Narcotic Drug 
Trafficking and Other Psychotropic Substances (1988) have created a wide 
range of AML regimes such as definition and characterization of money 
laundering offences; inter-state cooperation including mutual legal 
assistances and extradition arrangements; enforcement mechanisms, 
including stripping criminals of the profits realised from money laundering and 
other predicate crimes.258 In Article 3(1), state parties are mandated to enact 
legislation necessary to establish a modern code of criminal offences relating 
to illicit trafficking in all its different dimensions.259 The scope of criminalisation 
should cover a comprehensive list connected to drug trafficking-from 
production, cultivation and possession to the organisation, management and 
financing of trafficking operations.260 Article 3(1) also requires each party to 
the convention to establish money laundering as a criminal offence in its 
domestic law, when committed internationally.261  
 
In Article 3(1) (b) each state party is required to establish as a criminal offence 
“the conversion or transfer of property knowing that such a property is derived 
from any offence or offences established in accordance with subparagraph (a) 
of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such offence or offences, 
for purposes of concealing or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of 
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assisting any person who is involved in the commission of such offence or 
offences to evade the legal consequences of his action. The concealment or 
disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, movement, rights 
with respect to, or ownership of property, knowing that such property is 
derived from an offence or offences established in accordance with 
subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or from an act of participation in such an 
offence or offences.” 
 
To foster a uniform global AML framework among contracting member states, 
Article 3(1) (c) requires that each state party render money laundering as a 
criminal offence. “The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing at 
the time of the receipt, that such property was derived from an offence or 
offences established in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or 
from an act of participation in such offence or offences.”262 This Article 
clarifies the scope for criminalisation of money laundering as a serious 
offence and also ensuring that co-operation in respect of confiscation; mutual 
legal assistance and extradition would be forthcoming. The Convention has 
been hailed263 particularly in relation to extradition proceedings—a subject, 
which is addressed by articles 6 as thus: because all parties are obliged to 
establish Article 3(1) offences as criminal offences in the domestic law, any 
requirements of dual criminality, that is, the offence is criminal in both 
jurisdictions, in a party’s extradition should be met. At a practical level, an 
Article 3(1) provision signifies that states which have accepted to transpose 
the international legal instrument must similarly accept to fully comply with its 
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treaty obligations and their attendant effects.264 Governments are obliged to 
comply with obligations created by the treaty because of the International law 
principle of pacta sunt servanda.265 This is a Latin maxim which means that 
interstate agreements must be respected and implemented. Governments 
comply with international treaty obligations because it is the right thing to do in 
order to uphold the ideals embodied in the treaty; but also to foster 
international co-operation. This notwithstanding, the implementation of 
treaties would still depend on the individual country’s ability to harness it. 
 
While there is a universal recognition that illicit drug trafficking offences should 
be extraditable offences, narcotics related money laundering is a new criminal 
offence for many states and has not been recognised as extraditable offence. 
The universal recognition of narcotics related money laundering as an 
extraditable offence is one of the most important provisions established by 
this Convention.266 The enforcement mechanisms under the convention are 
designed to impact on the financial aspect of drug trafficking such as 
confiscation of the profits derived from criminal activity. A number of states 
would subsequently enact legislation to implement their obligations under the 
treaty.267 The need for substantial international co-operation in this sphere 
was deemed a necessary mechanism to enhance co-operation of States in 
this area.268 Individual states are urged to enact domestic forfeiture legislation 
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enabling the state in question “to identify, trace, seize, freeze or forfeit 
property or proceeds located in the requested states, where property was 
allegedly derived from or used in drug trafficking and drug money laundering 
in violation of laws of the requesting state.” In so doing, the Convention 
creates a framework to undermine the efforts of those who are moving money 
internationally within the financial system particularly to jurisdictions where 
there is customer confidentiality or bank secrecy laws in place as deterrence. 
The existing bank secrecy laws are being used in many instances to obstruct 
co-operation and the provision of information needed for the investigation of 
allegations of drug related offences.269 The Convention acknowledges the 
indispensability of domestic courts in fostering the fight against money 
laundering and its predicate crimes. Thus, Article 5(3) empowers each state 
party’s, courts or relevant authorities to order that a bank, financial or 
commercial records be made available before the local judge for examination. 
Similarly, no party shall decline to act under the provisions of this paragraph 
on the grounds of bank secrecy.270  
 
Parties to the Convention are encouraged to enter into detailed bilateral and 
multilateral confiscation agreements in order “to enhance the effectiveness of 
international co-operation pursuant to the above Article.”271 However in the 
absence of such an international instrument, Article 5(4) (f) stipulates that 
where a party/a treaty nexus with the requesting state in order to provide such 
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assistance “that party shall consider the convention as the necessary and 
sufficient treaty basis.” Article 5(6) addresses the need to ensure that 
proceeds derived from and instrumentalities used in illegal trafficking couldn’t 
escape forfeiture simply because their form had been changed or they had 
been co-mingled with other property.272 At the same time it was deemed 
necessary to provide that Article 5 shall not be construed as prejudicing the 
rights of bonafide third parties.273 The extradition procedures shall be 
expedited as much as possible by simplifying rules of evidentiality relating to 
the offence and other requisite extradition procedures.274  
 
The UN AML Convention (1988) is imbued with a mechanism for extradition of 
alleged money laundering offenders to jurisdictions which have made formal 
request, and to have them arraigned before the respective jurisdiction’s courts 
of law. According to Article 6(5) extradition shall be subject to the laws of the 
requested state party. The extradition procedure, the standard of proof, and 
the defences to extradition are to be defined exclusively by the domestic law 
of the requested party. Article 6(5) must be read together with Article 3(1) and 
article 10 which amends bilateral extradition treaties to preclude the denial of 
extradition on the grounds of Article 3(1) offence: “fiscal, political or politically 
motivated offences”.275 If the party makes extradition conditional on the 
existence of a treaty and it receives a request for extradition from another with 
which it has no extradition treaty, it may consider this convention as the legal 
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basis for extradition in respect of any offences to which this provision applies. 
On the other hand, parties which do not make extradition conditional on 
existence of a treaty shall recognise offences to which this Article applies as 
extraditable offences between themselves.276The state from which the request 
has been lodged may refuse to comply if to do so substantially, leads its 
judicial or other competent authorities to facilitate the prosecution or 
punishment of any person on account of his race, religion, nationality, or 
political opinion or would cause prejudice for any of those reasons with any 
person whom the request applies.277 In some countries like Uganda where 
money laundering is not a distinct offence, it might be difficult to get the 
alleged money laundering offenders extradited to the requesting state.278 
Technically, for a state to accept extradition request from another, both states 
must have transposed the treaty which makes money laundering as an 
extraditable offence.279 The foregoing UN anti-narcotic treaty provides the 
basis for extradition as set out in Article 6(1). States may choose to 
circumvent this provision by alluding to exceptions in the treaty such as race, 
sex nationality and alleged offences being an exclusive matter of domestic 
jurisdictions. However, unlike other international crimes such as crimes 
against humanity, money laundering does not have to be constituted as a 
prosecutable offence under the municipal laws of both countries (double 
criminality). Under the principle of double criminality, a state cannot extradite 
someone to another state for a particular offence, which does not satisfy the 
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double criminality requirement, and then proceed to try the alleged offender 
for an offence that does not satisfy the foregoing requirement.280 The biggest 
challenge for the prosecution is that extradition might be unavailable or 
unavailing if the person the state seeks to extradite is not the person the law 
enforcement authorities are after—to satisfy the technicalities of a criminal 
trial.  
 
The Convention also creates modalities for mutual legal assistance in relation 
to serious drug trafficking offences.  For instances, Article 7(1) provides that 
“the parties shall afford one another, pursuant to this article, the widest 
measure of mutual legal assistance in investigations, prosecution and judicial 
proceedings in relation to criminal offences established in accordance with 
article 3 paragraph 1: The provision is an invitation to states to examine the 
possibility of doing so.”281The assistance, which may be requested in this mini 
mutual legal assistance treaty, includes: the taking of evidence or statements; 
effecting service of judicial documents; executing searches and seizures; 
examining objects and sites; providing information and evidentiary items; 
providing relevant documents and records including bank, corporate or 
business records; and identifying, or tracing proceeds and instrumentalities of 
evidentiary purposes, providing information and evidentiary items.282 Similarly 
in order to enhance the fight against money laundering, Article 7(5) imposes 
duties on states: “it is an obligation for state parties to enact an implementing 
legislation, if necessary, to modify domestic bank secrecy laws to permit 
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execution of the request for bank records under the convention.” Secondly, 
with respect to individual request for bank records to be produced as 
stipulated by the Convention, this provision obliges the requested party to 
grant the request, if the only basis would be bank secrecy laws.283 The state 
parties may afford one another any other form of mutual legal assistance 
allowed by the domestic law of the requested party. Article 7(4) stipulates that 
parties shall facilitate, encourage to the extent consistent with their domestic 
law and practice, the presence of availability of a person in custody, who 
consents to assist in the investigations or participate in the proceedings. It is 
therefore imperative for states to criminalise participation in organised criminal 
groups within AML framework that takes into account the worldwide context in 
which criminals operate.  
 
3.3 United Nation’s Convention on Organised Transnational Crimes (Palermo) 
 
In order to strengthen the earlier efforts of states against organised 
transnational crimes, the United Nations General Assembly adopted, ‘a 
Convention on Transnational Organised Crimes (UNCOTOC) 284(otherwise 
known as Palermo Convention) of December 2000.285This Convention 
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underscores a range of provisions designed specifically to reinforce the fight 
against transnational organised crimes; and committing countries that ratify it 
to implement its provisions into their municipal laws.  
 
Palermo convention obligates each state subject to a treaty to implement and 
criminalise money laundering, including all serious predicate crimes of money 
laundering, whether committed in or outside of the country, and permit the 
required criminal knowledge or intent to be inferred from objective facts;286 In 
Article 2(1) an offence is transnational in nature if: “it is committed in more 
than one state; it is committed in one state but a substantial part of its 
preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another state; it is 
committed in one State but involves an organised criminal group that engages 
in criminal activities in more than one state; and lastly, it is committed in one 
state but causes substantial effects in another state.” 
 
Contracting states are required to enact AML mechanisms, including 
customer identification, record keeping and reporting of suspicious 
transactions;287 States are also required to authorise the co-operation and 
exchange of information among administrative, regulatory, law enforcement 
and other authorities, both nationally and internationally, and consider the 
establishment of financial intelligence unit to collect, analyse, and disseminate 
information; 288and the convention also creates provisions to enhance 
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international co-operation.289 Palermo Convention creates modalities on 
matters such as extradition, mutual legal assistance on civil and criminal 
matters, transfer of proceedings and conducting joint investigations. State 
parties are required to provide necessary technical assistance to developing 
countries so that they are able to take measures to deal with transnational 
organised crimes.290 Palermo Convention subsumes and extends the AML 
framework under its predecessor. State parties are obliged to undertake 
measures transposing their international obligations. 
 
While sovereign states have the right to self-determination and the attendant 
discretion to determine their political and economic destiny, they also owe 
certain obligations and responsibilities to act in a normative way towards other 
states. The example which underscores the interplay of rights and obligations 
of a state is the skirmishes of Seychelles and the FATF in (2001). The 
government of Seychelles enacted an investment law—‘Economic 
Development Act (hereinafter EDA) in 2001. This law granted immunity to 
anyone, who would invest into the country $10 million or more in investment 
schemes from prosecution; and protected their assets from compulsory 
acquisition or sequestration.291 The law in question offered immunity to 
anybody regardless of whether the source of money was either money 
laundering or drug trafficking. The exception to stay the proposed immunity 
under EDA was only when the source of money was through violence or drug 
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trafficking committed in Seychelles itself.292 Seychelles was admonished and 
asked to withdraw EDA, which was effectively designed to facilitate violence, 
drug trafficking and money laundering. The ensuing international pressure 
forced the government of Seychelles to enact another legislation effectively 
rescinding ‘the EDA’.293 Much as states have the sovereign right to pass laws 
as they see fit, laws capable of undermining international peace and security 
cannot be tolerated under customary international law. It is therefore 
important to examine the role of treaties and customs in fostering an effective 
global AML/CFT ethos across states. Customary international law (as 
demonstrated in condemnation of EDA in Seychelles), provides mechanisms 
to condemn behaviors that do not reflect the consensus of nations.294 The 
FATF admonition of Seychelles attracted a lot of media attention, prompting 
some governments to issue statements of their own condemning the same 
law. The ensuing international pressure forced the government of Seychelles 
to enact another legislation effectively rescinding EDA.295  
 
3.4 The legal status of treaties and CIL 
 
Treaties as legal instruments are essential to foster interstate co-operation on 
a range of overlapping issues across individual states. It needs to be 
remembered that in dualist states, ratified treaties cannot generate the 
desired effect, unless they have been transposed through national 
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parliament.296 By ratifying the convention, the state signifies that it is 
contemplating its adoption and can only generate a binding effect once it has 
been transposed nationally. The foregoing analysis implies that international 
law is only applicable subject to individual state’s consent. As a result, the 
state is the law maker and the enforcer, which potentially means that there is 
conflict of interest. Also, international treaties cannot be binding on states they 
have been ratified. The only exception are norms of customary law (jus 
cogens) from which no state can derogate. Once a custom has been validly 
established on things such as money laundering crimes, it will have a 
normative force in all states regardless of treaty obligations.297  
 
While ratified treaties signify consensus of states to implement the respective 
provisions of the treaty nationally, they cannot provide an effective framework 
for interstate cooperation on overlapping challenges. First of all, there is an 
issue of domestic politics dynamics which dictates the ease of implementing 
treaties as legal instruments. On many occasions, states tend to circumvent 
obligations created under ratified treaties by narrowing the scope of their 
application nationally. This is so because even though states may have 
ratified treaties, they have the discretion to determine the level of their 
applicability nationally. For instance, EU treaties are transposed into domestic 
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law subject to the principle of subsidiarity.298 Subsidiarity means that treaties 
can only be effective if they have been ratified by a member states on specific 
aspects they have been internalised; and binding as to the result to be 
achieved.299 This presupposes that much as EU member states ceded their 
sovereign powers to foster the interests of an integrated European Union; 
some long outstanding legal traditions in a member state would be 
maintained. This model is based on the principle of home country control and 
minimum harmonisation—a recognition that it would not be possible to ignore 
certain definitive legal traditions and cultures of member states. Therefore 
individual member states are given the discretion to determine the mode of 
implementing their EU treaty obligations. They are three ways of internalising 
EU law into contracting member states: directives, regulations and decision of 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ). Regulations have a normative force 
given that they are directly applicable in all Member state without recourse to 
further measures irrespective of national interests. Directives on the other 
hand are transposed in a member state in a stipulated timescale usually 
taking into account national considerations.300 Directives are legislative 
measures binding member states as to the result to be achieved. They 
determine certain targets usually relating to certain economic and regulatory 
matters.301 As regards the character of the decisions of ECJ, they are binding 
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on the state parties they have been issued to. The decisions of ECJ have a 
both vertical (state v state) and horizontal (state v citizens) application. 
 
3.5 CIL as a source of AML/CFT obligations 
 
As a source of international obligations, customary international law is the 
product of state practice and opinion juris, as opposed to legislation, which is 
the product of ideas. Customary law is the presentation of its conditions of 
social ordering in form of law whereby societies set the terms of the future 
coexistence of the society members in their legal relations.302 The space of 
consent in making customary international law is subtle, not made by any 
specific act of will (such as a treaty) on the part of the subject. Their consent 
or opinio juris is manifested in their participation in day to day struggle of 
social ordering, knowing that some aspect of that social ordering may come to 
be universalised as law.303 Customary law is based on both practice and 
opinio juris—which literally translates as the opinion of lawyers. The two tests 
on which customary international law is predicated demonstrate that there is 
regularity in the way in which states behave and that there is consensus 
among lawyers that such behaviour is itself lawful.304 It might be worth asking 
the following rhetoric questions. 
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What if a state decides to engage in money laundering activities or in other 
subversive acts such as sponsoring of terrorism because it is a sovereign 
state, can the international community simply look away in the face of those 
blatant violations of international law? Prior to September 2001 terrorist 
attacks on USA, Afghanistan had decided to provide sanctuary and training 
facilities—camps, funds and military supplies to Osama Bin Laden and his 
cadres; and to use it as a base for planning and launching terrorist acts 
whenever they chose. One can only presume that Afghanistan must have 
decided to act in the way it did, in the knowledge that it was a sovereign state 
having the right to self-determination on matters of internal polity. Technically, 
the right to self determination allows a state to take independent decisions 
without seeking approval from another State. However, the question the 
foregoing analysis juxtaposes is whether a State can be allowed to act in 
breach international law and allude to the right to self determination? In 
relations to money laundering, if the international practice of states does not 
condone it as a legitimate activity because of its adverse effects, the state 
engaging in acts of money laundering can be sanctioned under international 
customary law. Customary international law generates obligations on the state 
regardless of whether it has enacted a law on an issue or not. Legal 
obligations will be imposed on the state regardless of whether it has legislated 
on the matter or not. As long as the international community does not approve 
of the actions of the respective state, those actions are presumed illegal and 
in breach of international law. Customary law is a way of alluding to 
activities—whether of a state or of individuals, generally disproved of, 
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whereby the method used to perpetuate such actions are unlawful or targets 
protected interests or both.305 
 
In the case of United States v Nicaragua (1986), the international court of 
justice relied on international customary law to declare unlawful paramilitary 
activities sponsored by United States against the contras.306 This case was 
important in demystifying the myth that international custom as a source of 
law supports the powerful against the weak because it was the actions of 
United State that was under the spotlight.307 It can therefore be inferred that 
any actions deemed inconsistent with established customs of the land will be 
overwhelmingly disapproved of by the community of nations using any 
international forum. 
 
In relation to Seychelles’ enactment of EDA, it had a legitimate right as a 
sovereign state to pass any law it desired. However, this right was delimited 
by the fact that as sovereign state, it also had an obligation to respect the 
norms of customary international law. In addition to the practice of states is 
the opinion of lawyers in the international legal fraternity. If the opinion of 
lawyers (opinio juris) condemns the actions of the state, the respective state 
action is deemed in contravention of international norms. The case of 
Seychelles demonstrates that notwithstanding the sovereign right of states, 
the state can’t be allowed to behave irresponsibly. In Buvot v. Barbuit308, Lord 
Talbot unambiguously declared that the law of nations in its full context was 
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part of the law of England so that the Prussian commercial agent could not be 
rendered liable for failing to perform a decree.309 Customary international law 
is integral to common law of England tampered by the principle of stare 
decisis or judicial precedent and upheld by British courts in ensuring that 
decisions of the higher court are influential on lower courts.310 It needs to be 
noted that established customs of the land which reflect general consensus in 
the community have a profound impact on shaping the international legal 
system. There is no State or entity of the State that can afford to ignore the 
customs and traditions of the international community. 
 
3.6 The European AML Directives 
 
The EU, AML/CFT framework is underscored by the three EU AML Directives 
issued especially by the commission and the Council. The EU has long been 
at the forefront of fighting money laundering manifested in its early initiatives 
by the Council of Europe (1990).311  The Council of Europe Convention in 
1990 was the first to adopt a framework for harmonization of practice and 
policy on money laundering, tracing, seizure and confiscation of the proceeds 
of crimes within European member states.312 The EU subsequently issued 
three AML Directives (1991, 2001, 2005), to bring about a certain degree of 
harmonization of money laundering laws within its member countries. There 
are several discerning trends in the European Union AML drive: (i) the linkage 
with FATF standards and discussions is both strong and in many ways, 
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binding; (ii) G7 members such as the United Kingdom and France are at the 
forefront of proposals and more eager to push for comprehensive regional 
standards; (iii) countries with long established offshore status, most notably 
Luxembourg, are experiencing intense pressure to address the potential 
weaknesses in its AML/CFT regulatory framework.313  It has to be noted that 
the European AML Directives are also adopted in order to align EU law to 
desired international standards. The European Union has been very robust in 
the implementation of its AML obligations. The relationship between EU 
Directives and FATF recommendations is underscored by the fact that every 
time FATF adopts new recommendations, the EU responds by adopting 
measures to transpose those obligations within EU member states. For 
example, when FATF issued its first forty recommendations, the European 
Council adopted its first AML directive in June 1991.314 When FATF revised its 
recommendations in 1996 to extend their scope to “designated non-financial 
businesses and professions”, the EU Council issued the second AML directive 
in December 2001.  
 
The Second European AML Directive (91/308/EEC) was adopted in the form 
of Amendments of the first directive, inserting a new provision which required 
member states to ensure that obligations laid down in the first directive were 
imposed on, among other bodies, notaries, and other independent legal 
professionals when they assist in planning or execution of any of activities 
which effectively constitute money laundering.315  
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The Directive was adopted in response to fears among EU member states 
that an integrated financial system could fuel drug trafficking and money 
laundering, thereby undermining the integrity of the financial system and 
disrupting the market.316They were also troubled by the prospect of ad hoc 
efforts to curb money laundering by individual nations, which they perceived 
would have a negative effect on a unified system. Thus the Directive 
prescribes a series of measures to be adopted by all member states in their 
approach to money laundering. 
 
The Directive prohibits the ‘knowing acceptance’ and disposition by financial 
institutions and non-bank finance companies of the proceeds of non-drug 
related crimes, as well as the proceeds of narcotic trafficking.317It thus 
requires member states to criminalise the laundering of the proceeds of drug 
offences as set out in the UN Convention and “any other criminal activity 
designated as such for the purpose of this Directive by each member 
state."318 The Directive primarily focuses on the prevention and detection of 
money laundering by proposing the adoption of prevention and detection 
mechanisms within financial institutions.319It applies to all financial institutions 
because of their potential vulnerability to money laundering schemes. 
Financial institutions are defined in the directive as “undertakings whose 
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business is to receive deposits or other repayable funds from the public and to 
grant credit for their own account”.320 
 
The Directive defines financial institutions as “an undertaking other than credit 
institutions whose main activity is to carry out one or more of the functions 
listed in the Second Banking Directive.”321 These functions include lending 
(consumer and mortgage credit), financial leasing, money transmission 
service, guarantees and commitments, trading for own account or for 
customers account, money broking, portfolio management and advice.322 
Financial institutions also include insurance companies authorised in 
accordance with the insurance Directive (79/267/EEC) as amended.323 Credit 
and financial institutions include branches located in European states whose 
home offices are based outside Europe.324 Article 12 of the directive provides 
that member states must extend either all or part of the 
directive…professional categories, other credit and financial institutions 
referred to in article 1, which engage in activities likely to involve handling 
money and hence the potential for being exploited for money laundering 
purposes. This would include Casinos and the proliferating money changing 
or lending businesses spurred as a response of the current dynamics of the 
global market.325 
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The third AML Directive was adopted with broad mandate which extends its 
remit to lawyers and other professionals such as accountants. The European 
Council directive326 on money laundering has articulated the basic principles 
on the prevention of money laundering in Europe.327  The third AML Directive 
also introduced a risk based approach to ‘customers due diligence’ creating a 
two-way reporting regime for low risk clients (Article 9); and ‘enhanced due 
diligence’ in situation regarded as high risk of money laundering.328 The latter 
is caught by situations where there is no face to face interactions  with the 
client, for example where the transaction is made on line, over the telephone 
etc; the second category relates to cross-border banking relationships; and a 
new category of politically exposed persons residing abroad (Article 10). The 
broad mandate introduced by anti-money laundering directives is transposed 
by EU member states through national anti- money laundering measures.  
 
3.7 Sanctions mechanisms under the Directive 
 
There are two types of sanctions mechanisms operated in the European 
Union. Firstly, there are specific sanctions designed to implement the United 
Nations Resolutions pursuant to Chapter seven (such as economic sanctions 
and the use of force) of the Charter of United Nations 1945.329 Secondly, 
there are EU autonomous sanctions regimes which include arms embargo, 
trade sanctions, flight bans, restriction on admission to the EU for countries 
aspiring to join the European Union. The foregoing EU Directive prescribes a 
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range of duties on credit and financial institutions to take appropriate 
measures to ensure full application of its provisions, and in particular the 
penalties to be imposed for infringement of the measures adopted.330 The 
European Commission brought its first action to enforce the money laundering 
directive in May 2000, when it instituted proceedings against Austria for failing 
to enact the necessary laws to implement the foregoing directive. In pursuit of 
Article 226 of the European Community Treaty (1957), the Commission 
alleged that Austrian legislation did not comply with the European AML 
Directive. Precisely it alleged that Article 40 of the Austrian Banking Act 
(1959) wrongly provided for exemption to identify customers when opening 
passbook account. This had the effect of allowing persons to open as many 
passbook accounts as they desired without declaring their identity.331 Such a 
provision is clearly inconsistent with the directive, which requires member 
states to enact laws prohibiting financial institutions from keeping anonymous 
accounts and requiring them to take appropriate measures to identify 
customers.332 Austria responded to this action and to pressure from other 
international bodies (for example FATF) by amending Article 40 to prohibit the 
issuance of anonymous passbook accounts after November 1, 2000, as well 
as imposing an obligation to identify all depositors after this date (with the 
exception of transfer securities deposits).333  
 
 The Directive demonstrates that the European Union has adopted the 
strictest AML standards than many jurisdictions. It perpetuates “KYC”, the 
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concept first introduced by the Basle committee on supervisory standards and 
later broadened in the FATF Recommendations. It adds teeth to the 
suspicious transaction reporting standards advanced by the FATF by making 
such reporting mandatory.334 
 
To broaden the extraterritoriality effect of the Directive, the EC AML legislation 
is not only confined to candidate countries or offshore jurisdictions, but 
continuously seeks to incorporate agreements to bind non-member states.335 
According to the Commission, the standard clause refers to efforts and co-
operation to avoid money laundering and the establishment of suitable 
standards against money laundering equivalent to those adopted in the EU 
and in other International bodies such as the FATF.336 
 
The Second AML Directive extends the scope of money laundering to include 
a wide range of criminal activities. This was largely a reflection of the policy 
agenda from the ‘war on drugs’, which had served the justification for the 
initial money laundering counter-measures against the multifaceted threat of 
organised crime.337 It also reflects the views of experts who advised that the 
limitation of money laundering only to drug trafficking would render the 
directive ineffective. This was provided for in the United Nations report as 
follows: “The time may have come to end the artificial division of criminal 
money into categories depending on the nature of the crime.” 
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 As far as the European Union AML framework is concerned, the issue of 
money laundering predicate offences has been partly addressed in the 
specific context of third pillar measures on fraud338 and confiscation.339 
According to recommendation 26 (b) of the action plan on organised crime, 
criminalisation of laundering of the proceeds of crime should be created as 
broad as possible to ensure a range of powers of investigations into these 
offences.340In its report on the first Commission Implementation report, the 
European parliament adopted a motion, whose resolution point 5 calls on all 
member states, in so far as they have already not done so, to extend their 
legislation on combating money laundering, not only to money derived from 
drug trafficking but also professional practice and organised crime.341 
 
The link between drug trafficking and money laundering is clearly established 
in the adopted text  of the directive which states that, “member states shall 
ensure that obligations laid down in this directive are imposed on the following 
institutions: credit institutions (as defined previously); financial institutions 
(also as defined previously); and on the following legal or natural persons 
acting in exercise of their professional activities: auditors, external 
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accountants and tax advisors, real estate agents, notaries and other 
independent legal professionals, when they participate, whether: by assisting 
in the planning or execution of transactions for their clients concerning, (i) 
buying and selling of real property or business entities; (ii) managing of clients 
money, securities or other assets; (iii) opening of management of bank, 
savings or securities accountants; (iv) organisation of contribution necessary 
for the creation, operation or management of companies; (v) creation, 
operation or management of trusts, companies or similar structures; (b) or by 
acting on behalf of and for their client in any financial or real estate 
transaction, dealers in high value goods, such as precious stones or metals, 
or works of art, auctioneers, whenever payment is made in cash and in 
amount of EUR 15,000 or more.” 
 
The quest to expand the scope of money laundering predicate offences was 
also reiterated in the Tampere European Council conclusions, which called for 
a ‘uniform and sufficiently broad scope’ of predicate offences (paragraph 55). 
This position was also reflected by the European Union on the proposed 
United Nations Convention of Transnational Organised Crimes.342Article 1(5) 
states that, “in the money-laundering field, the convention should extend a 
broad range of offences, and in particular should be consistent with the 40 
Recommendations of the FATF.” This particular provision was incorporated as 
an acknowledgement to the international trends of money laundering, such as 
the revision of the FATF recommendations, justified by the need to facilitate 
                                                          
342
 Joint Position of 29.3.1999 defined by the Council on the basis of Article k.3 of the treaty of 
the European Union, on the proposed United Nations Convention against Organized Crime, 
OJ L87, 31.3.1999 at P. 1. 
 136 
suspicious transaction reporting and international co-operation in this area.343 
Rather than following the all-crime prohibition, the Commission opted for an 
extension to cover, along with the drug offences of the 1991 text, the following 
conduct: participation in the activities linked to organised crime; and fraud, 
corruption or any other illegal activity damaging or likely to damage the 
European Communities financial interests.344 The adoption of the EU Directive 
(91/308/EEC) was influenced by the increasing use of financial and non-
financial institutions for money laundering purposes. This was considered to 
result from money laundering counter-measures and the increased level of 
compliance by credit and financial institutions—prompting launderers to shift 
to non-regulated professions for their activities.345 This trend was also 
associated with the sophistication in money laundering activities, which 
involve a wide range of intermediary professions of varied expertise.346  
 
The growing role of professionals such as accountants, solicitors, and 
company formation agents was emphasised since they were frequently 
mentioned in money laundering cases.347 In establishing sophisticated 
businesses that conceal money laundering, it is the professionals that provide 
advice and extra layer of respectability to money laundering operations.348 
FATF addressed the foregoing concerns by revising the 40 plus 
recommendations in 1996. Recommendation 8 (formerly 9) was revised to 
ensure that Member states equally apply anti-money laundering standards to 
                                                          
343
Recital 12 and 13, (n 304). 
344
 United Nations Convention against Organized Crime, OJ L87, 31.3.1999. 
345
The FATF, Annual Report 1996-97, para. 16. 
346
 Mitsilegas, (n 340). 
347
The Second Banking Directive brought lawyers within the scope of money laundering 
reporting regime, now subsumed in the third AML Directive. 
348
 FATF 1998/1999. Para. 47. 
 137 
non-financial institutions which are not subject to formal prudential supervisory 
regime in all countries such as Bureaux De Change.349 Recommendation 9 
(formerly 10) on the other hand requires national authorities to consider 
extension of the recommendations’ duties to ‘the conduct of financial activities 
as a commercial undertaking by businesses or the professions, which are not 
financial institutions, where such conduct is not allowed or not prohibited’. In 
the same context, the Parliament proposed the extension of the ratione 
personae scope of the Directive350 to cover a wide range of the professions at 
the risk of being involved in money laundering or abused by money 
launderers.351 The indicative list includes both the financial and non-financial 
professions such as estate agents, art dealers, auctioneers, casinos, bureaux 
de change, transporters of funds, notaries, accountants, advocates, tax 
advisor and auditors.352 
 
The European Union AML counter-measures have been strengthened by the 
third AML Directive which consolidates the earlier directives on the same 
issue.353 The third AML Directive reflects the changed regulatory market 
environment and typologies of money laundering as per the revised FATF 40 
recommendations. The revision was aimed at, in particular to extend the 
scope of predicate offences, providing guidance on customer identification 
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requirements, which now take place on the basis of a risk based approach,354 
taking into account categories of individuals such as politically exposed 
persons (peps) and misuse of corporate vehicles.355 As a strategy to undercut 
terrorist funding, which is largely fuelled by money laundering, the third AML 
Directive signalled a concerted effort in the EU to link money laundering and 
the threat of terrorism.356 In relation to enhanced reporting requirements, 
member states are asked to establish Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) with 
the specific mandate to access national databases of countries. This would 
help to overcome the issue of data protection provisions under national law 
that impede organisations from accessing individual persons file.357  
 
3.8 The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
 
 The most prominent inter-governmental agency on money laundering and its 
predicate crimes is the FATF.358 The FATF is a free standing specialist body 
concerned with multilateral enhancement of AML/CFT capacity of countries 
globally.359 This body is composed of twenty-nine member states or 
terriritories and maintains a small secretariat housed at the Offices of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 
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Paris.360 Prior to 1989, few countries had explicit anti-money laundering laws.  
The creation of FATF was influenced by United States and France at Paris 
economic summit of the group of seven (G-7) in 1989.361 As far as United 
States was concerned, the FATF would create another front to enhance the 
war on drugs. For other countries, it would provide a multilateral front on 
money laundering and indeed FATF has established itself as a global AML 
institution with the mandate to create global AML/CFT standards. Today, 
many countries are required by the World Bank and IMF to apply the FATF 
revised forty plus nine recommendations to demonstrate their preparedness 
to fight money laundering and its related predicate threats. Similarly, the FATF 
recommendations provide a framework of rules and procedures for States to 
counter money laundering and financing of terrorism. 362In 1997, the FATF ad 
hoc group estimated the magnitude of money laundering by focusing its 
efforts on gathering data in relation to drug consumption, production and 
pricing.363 Using an indirect approach in 1987, the UN had estimated drug 
trafficking worldwide at US$300 billion, much of which would be laundered. 
Other estimates have been made at US$300-US$500 billion of ‘dirty money’ 
that is poured into the financial system each year, or roughly 2 percent of 
global GDP.364  
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The preventive role of financial institutions against money laundering has 
been substantially enhanced through the work of FATF under the auspices of 
OECD.365 FATF has the composition of 31 member countries and two 
regional organisations from America, Europe and Asia, as well as 18 
observers (including the Fund and the World Bank).366 Although located at the 
OECD headquarters in Paris, where it maintains a small secretariat, the FATF 
is independent of the OECD. It is the principal AML multilateral organisation. 
FATF is a voluntary task force and not a treaty organisation; its forty plus nine 
recommendations do not constitute a binding national convention but a 
guideline framework for states to combat money laundering.  
 
Although the FATF forty plus nine recommendations are soft law instruments 
and non-binding, they have a subtle binding effect on states. For example all 
member countries must criminalise money laundering and require financial 
institutions to implement vigilant “KYC” and other necessary transparency 
procedures. FATF member countries take a political commitment to combat 
money laundering by implementing its recommendations. Besides self-
assessment exercise and mutual evaluation, the FATF, in close collaboration 
with its members and other organisations conducts regular typology exercises 
to uncover new money laundering techniques and to develop strategies for 
countering them.367 
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The FATF’s AML efforts set out in its forty recommendations plus nine relate 
to the enforcement of criminal laws and complementary measures in the 
financial sector to foster international co-operation.368 The recommendations 
that apply to law enforcement can be grouped under, (a) the criminalisation of 
money laundering; (b) the seizure and confiscation of money laundering 
proceeds; (c) the suspicious transaction reporting; and (d) international co-
operation in the investigation, prosecution and extradition of crime suspects. 
Recommendations dealing with financial sector regulations relate primarily to 
customer identification and record-keeping requirements, which are 
commonly, referred to as “KYC” standards.369  
 
The FATF, AML regimes can be analysed at three levels: (i) the 
recommendations sets out the general framework, justifying their adoption on 
the ground of the need for rapid tough action, and the need for practical 
measures.370 In this context, the recommendation refers to the growing 
dimension, and the increasing awareness of the problem of money laundering 
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which would justify a reinforcement of the Vienna Convention provisions in the 
field; furthermore, to avoid the risk of discrepancy between national 
measures, and a call to build upon and enhance the Basle statement of 
principles and to proceed towards harmonisation of practical aspects not 
covered.371 Secondly, the recommendations are devoted to the general 
improvement of the national legal system to combat money laundering.372 
Article 5 attempts to extend the definition of money laundering by calling for 
an extension of the scope of the offence to ‘any other crimes for which there is 
a link to narcotics, or, alternatively, to criminalise money laundering based on 
all serious offences, and/or on all serious offences that generate proceeds of 
or on certain serious offences. The third part constitutes the corner stone of 
the FATF initiative, aims at the enhancement of the role of the financial 
system’, 373their scope extending to bank and non-bank financial 
institutions.374 The institutions concerned are called upon to comply with a 
series of duties relating to the following: 
 
3.8.1 Customer Identification Requirements 
 
Financial institutions375 are required to satisfy themselves as to the identity of 
‘their customers’, whether they are dealing with occasional or usual 
customers. Identification must be established by official or any other 
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satisfactory documents.376 This requirement aims to ensure that financial 
system is not used as a channel for criminal funds. As such they have to 
make reasonable efforts to determine the true identity of all customers 
requesting the institutions services. According to this requirement banks are 
no longer allowed to hold anonymous accounts. In this case, the bank needs 
to satisfy itself as to the independence and reliability of information relating to 
third persons. Particular care is taken in identifying the ownership of all 
accounts and those using safe custody facilities.377 
 
Where an institution suspects that the customer is just a nominee account 
holder, for example, holding an account on behalf of another, or where the 
account holder is a company, the financial institutions must satisfy itself as to 
the identity of the principals on whose behalf the accounts are conducted.378 
Likewise, on going due diligence should be conducted or the transactions 
undertaken at the behest of the customer to ensure that information submitted 
by the customer is consistent. It is imperative that the source of the funds is 
legitimate and checks should be made and evidence procured to make certain 
that that is the case.379 Enhanced due diligence and monitoring mechanisms 
are necessary to ensure that politically exposed persons (as these are 
prominent public figures) do not abuse their positions and commit money 
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laundering. While dealing with cross border correspondent banks or other 
cross border firms, additional due diligence measures should be undertaken 
which include: (a) Understanding the business of the correspondent 
institution; (b) determining that it has rigorous money laundering checks and 
regulatory supervision in place and; (c) ascertaining if any money laundering 
investigation was carried out against it.380 Records on the customers and the 
transaction should be maintained for the minimum of five years. This is 
necessary to provide a paper trail to the authorities in case they need to take 
legal action against the customer for any criminal activity.381 The transaction 
should be examined in detail especially those which are complex for no 
apparent reason. The requirement of CDD and record keeping are also 
applicable to designated non-financial businesses and professional in the 
following situations: casinos-when the transactions are equal to or above the 
applicable designated threshold; real estate agents-transaction involving 
buying and selling of real estate; dealers in precious metals and dealers in 
precious stones-cash transactions with equal to or above the designated 
threshold; lawyers notaries or other independent legal professionals and 
accountants as with respect to transactions involving buying and selling of 
real estate; management of client money securities or other assets; 
management of bank, savings or securities accounts; organisation of 
contributions for the creation, operation or management of companies.382 
 
3.8.2 Compliance with the Law 
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The FATF mandates the bank’s management to ensure that business is 
conducted in conformity with high ethical standards ensuring that laws and 
regulations pertaining to financial transactions are adhered to. As regards 
transactions executed on behalf of customers, it is accepted that banks may 
have no means of knowing whether the transaction stems from or forms part 
of the criminal activity. In an international context, it may be difficult to ensure 
that cross-border transactions are in compliance with the regulations of 
another country. Nevertheless, banks should not set out to offer a service or 
provide active assistance in transactions which they have good reason to 
suspect being associated with money laundering activities. Banks should co-
operate fully with national law enforcement authorities to the extent permitted 
by specific local regulations relating to customer confidentiality. Care should 
be taken to avoid providing support or assistance to customers seeking to 
deceive law enforcement agencies through the provision of altered, 
incomplete or misleading information. 
 
3.8.3 Financial Transaction Reporting (FTR) 
 
Most jurisdictions, which have money-laundering regulations in place, require 
financial institutions, designated non-financial institutions and professionals to 
have a fully-fledged AML officer.383 The employees are required to report 
suspicious activities to the money-laundering officer who will then take it up 
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with the FIU.384 Employees are required to receive appropriate training on 
anti-money laundering procedures on suspicious transactions and reporting 
lines.385 The foregoing FATF recommendation states that “Financial 
Institutions should pay special attention to all complex, unusual or large 
transactions, and unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent 
economic or visible lawful purpose.” Banks should examine the background 
and the intentions behind such transactions to the fullest extent possible, and 
they should record their findings in writing in order to assist the relevant 
authorities.386If financial institutions suspect that the funds are connected to 
criminal activity, “they should be permitted or required to report promptly their 
suspicions to the competent authorities.”387 To promote this reporting duty, the 
recommendation suggests that financial institutions should be immune from 
civil and criminal liability when they make such reports in good faith.388 For 
example recommendation 14 states that: “financial institutions should 
maintain, for at least five years, all necessary records on transactions, both 
domestic and international, to enable them comply swiftly with information 
requests from the competent authorities. Such records must be sufficient to 
permit reconstruction of individual transactions (including the amount and type 
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of currency involved, if any) so as to provide, if necessary, evidence for 
prosecution of criminal behaviour.389  
 
3.8.4 Mechanisms for sanctioning NCCs 
 
In 1996, FATF adopted a formalised policy of sanctioning members that fail to 
translate its 40 recommendations into practice.390The FATF sanction policy 
consists of a series of graduated steps designed to pressurise member 
countries into enacting reforms necessary to achieve compliance. The initial 
steps include the issuance of a letter from the FATF President to the non-
complying governments, and the dispatch of a special delegation led by the 
FATF President to the country concerned. More serious measures include 
urging financial institutions world wide to scrutinise all business relations and 
transactions with persons, companies, and financial institutions domiciled in 
the relevant country under the provisions of recommendation 21391and 
ultimately to suspend the respective country from the FATF membership.392 
FATF has invoked the most severe sanctions underpinned by its rules, in 
particular recommendation 21 on two occasions. The first case involved the 
government of Turkey-in 1996, after exhausting all other means to encourage 
the government of Turkey to enact a legislation criminalising money 
laundering and to take other measures necessary to adhere to the 40 
recommendations. FATF issued a press release cautioning Financial 
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Institutions in respect of transactions with persons or businesses domiciled in 
Turkey.393The public shame that was created by the statement and the 
Turkish governments’ political objectives for becoming a member of the 
European Union led Turkey to enact a law making money laundering a 
criminal offence and to implement other mandatory FATF 
recommendations.394 (ii) The second time FATF invoked its sanctions was in 
June 2002 against Austria. Austria was already under investigation by the 
European Commission when in 1999; FATF began to investigate Austrian 
bank secrecy laws. The FATF investigations exposed Austria to negative 
publicity in a period when it was under international scrutiny because of the 
investigation of the right wing freedom party in its governing coalition. On 
February 3, 2000, FATF threatened the ultimate sanctions against a member 
state—including the threat of suspension from the group—unless it fulfilled 
two conditions.395 It asked Austria to make a clear statement that all 
necessary steps to eliminate the system of anonymous passbook accounts in 
accordance with the 40 recommendations would be taken by June 2002. 
FATF also required Austria to introduce a bill prohibiting opening of 
anonymous passbook accounts; and to eliminate existing anonymous 
accounts. The Austrian Government responded in June 2000 by stating that it 
would conform completely to FATF demands.396 On June 7, 2000, the first 
Chamber of the Australian Parliament adopted an Amendment to the Banking 
Act, which would lead to the elimination of anonymous passbook saving 
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accounts. The measure adopted by the Austrian government addressed the 
concerns of FATF and significantly enhanced the Austrian anti-money 
laundering programmes.397 Another clash between FATF and Seychelles 
concerned the enactment and an investment law. The law in question 
Economic Development Act (“EDA”), granted immunity from criminal 
prosecution to investors who placed $10 million or more in approved 
Investment schemes, and protected their assets from compulsory acquisition 
or sequestration. An exception to this immunity existed only for acts involving 
violence or drug trafficking in the Seychelles.398 
 
The FATF has taken the work of the Basle committee much farther by 
stressing the importance of requiring Member States to implement its 
standards. In 1991 FATF issued a statement indicating that its members had 
agreed to a process of mutual assessment to ensure that the 40 
recommendations were being put into practice.399 The members also agreed 
to expand the membership of the Task Force and to influence non-member 
jurisdictions to follow the 40 recommendations.400Thus the significant work of 
FATF is devoted to promoting compliance with the 40 recommendations and 
promoting a requisite AML infrastructure.401Therefore as part of its mandate, 
the FATF conducts on site, peer evaluation of member’s adherence to the 40 
recommendations.402 An evaluation team is composed of legal, regulatory and 
law enforcement experts from member states visits to relevant countries; and 
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conducts a thorough review of their anti-money laundering infrastructure. The 
findings are published in the report, which is reviewed internally to later be 
reviewed by the FATF membership.403 FATF also provides guidelines for 
identification of those jurisdictions that were not co-operating in taking 
measures against money laundering so as to encourage them to implement 
international AML standards adopted by FATF.404This process involves the 
use of 25 criteria against which to identify detrimental rules and practices that 
impede international co-operation in the fight against money laundering. They 
include: (i) loopholes in financial regulations that allow no, or inadequate 
supervision of, financial institutions, weak licensing or customer identification 
requirements, excessive financial secrecy provisions, or lack of suspicious 
transaction reporting systems. There is also the issue of weak commercial 
regulations in relation to identification of beneficial ownership and registration 
of business entities; obstacles to international co-operation, both in 
administrative and judicial items; inadequate resources for preventing, 
detecting and repressing money laundering.405 
 
As part of the review process, 406FATF established four regional groups to 
begin the process of considering the position in a number of jurisdictions, both 
within and outside FATF membership.407 The review involve the gathering of 
all the relevant information, including relevant laws and regulations, as well as 
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any information derived from these reviews will be analysed with respect to 
the 25 criteria, and a draft report prepared and sent to the jurisdiction 
concerned for comment.408 In June 2000, FATF established the names of all 
non-co-operative countries. They include: Andorra, Anguilla, Aruba, the 
Bahamas, Barbados, the British Virgin Islands, Manaco, Maldives, Marshal 
Islands, Montserrat, Nauru, Samoa, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Vincent, 
Turks and Caicos Island, Vanuatu.409 The sanctions mechanisms established 
by FATF are further strengthened by the Nine United Nations Security Council 
Resolutions adopted in 2001.410 
 
3.9 The UNSCR on Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism 
 
The terms “terrorism” connotes the use of terror as a means of achieving 
political objectives. It can therefore be argued that terrorism and money 
laundering are distinct offences. However, this distinction is submerged by the 
fact that narcotic drug dealers, money launderers and terrorists have forged 
partnerships to use terror as a means of achieving their varied 
objectives.411Terrorists are known to use the traditional money laundering 
techniques to move money about and to integrate it into the mainstream 
financial economy. The International Convention on the suppression of 
financing of terrorism, adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 
1999 defines the primary purpose of terrorism as “to intimidate a population, 
or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain 
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from doing an act.”412  For terrorists to operate, they need unfettered supply of 
money to facilitate training, travel and secure supplies. They therefore exploit 
the international flow of money to operate wherever their intended target is.413 
 
After the simultaneous bombing of United States embassies in Kenya and 
Tanzania by terrorists in 1998, the United Nations Security Council adopted 
two Special Resolutions—1267 and 1373 (1999), as provisional measures 
taken under Article 40 of the Charter of United Nations 1945.414 These 
Resolutions were specifically adopted to undermine the efforts of terrorists 
through the financial sector. Resolution 1267 imposes a wide range of 
sanctions against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for providing sanctuary 
and training of international terrorists’ related activities.415 Specifically, 
Resolution 1267 required UN member countries to freeze funds and other 
financial resources (including property owned or controlled by the Taliban) as 
designated by a Committee established under resolution 1267.416 UN 
Resolution 1333 (2000) relates to asset freezing of the Taliban regime, 
Osama Bin Laden and any persons associated with him including Al-Qaeda 
as designated by 1267 committee. The term “associated” is used to denote 
acts or activities indicating that an individual, undertaking or entity associated 
with Osama Bin Laden, Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This includes although not 
limited to the following: 
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 “Participating in the financing, planning, facilitating, preparing or 
perpetuating acts or activities by, in conjunction with, under the name 
of, on behalf of, or in support of;417 
 Supplying, selling or transferring arms or related materials to; 
 Recruiting for or  
 Otherwise supporting the acts or activities of Osama Bin Laden, the Al-
Qaida organisation and the Taliban or any cells, affiliate sprinter group 
or derivative thereof.”418 
In order to make the foregoing Resolutions easily enforceable within member 
countries, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1363 (2001) on 30 
July 2001. This Resolution creates mechanisms for implementing Resolutions 
1267 and 1333, including establishing a monitoring group of five experts, 
reporting to 1267 Committee; and the sanctions enforcement support team of 
fifteen experts under the monitoring group. In order for the above Resolutions 
to function properly, UN Resolution 1363 required member countries to 
enforce and strengthen through legislative or administrative measures to 
prevent violations of the requirements under Resolutions 1267 and 1333.419 
UN Security Council Resolution 1390 (2002) adopted on 16th January 2002 
required member countries to interlia freeze without delay any funds and 
financial assets of Osama bin Laden, members of Al-Qaida organisation and 
the Taliban regime; and other persons and entities associated with them, as 
designated in the list by 1267 Committee pursuant to the earlier resolutions 
1267 and 1333.420 It was however noted that the wholesale application of the 
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foregoing regulatory measures might have negative effect on innocent parties. 
Thus, it necessitated the need to allow exemptions to state authorities in 
certain exceptional situations. The UN adopted Resolution 1452 (2002) on 
20th December 2002, creating provisions for member countries to exempt 
certain funds and other financial assets or economic resources, notably those 
necessary for basic expenses (such as payment for food, mortgage, 
medicine, and medical treatment etc).421 This would be undertaken by 
notifying the 1267 Committee and for extraordinary expenses to be approved 
by 1267 Committee. The United Nation General Assembly Resolution 1455 
(2003) adopted on 17th January 2003, calls upon to interlia take urgent 
measures— both legislative and administrative against their nations, other 
individuals or entities operating in their territory to prevent and punish 
violations of the asset freezing provisions under 1267, 1333 and 1390.422 
These would have far reaching consequences for banks failing to honour their 
obligations under in particular Resolution 1267. Furthermore, under UN 
Resolution 1526 (2004) adopted on 30 January 2004, member countries were 
required to cut the flow of funds and other financial assets or economic 
resources to persons and entities associated with Osama Bin Laden, the Al-
Qaeda organisation and the Taliban, taking into account appropriate 
international codes and standards for combating the financing of terrorism. 
This would include those designed to prevent the abuse of non-profit or 
charitable organisations and alternative remittance systems. Member 
countries are urged to implement comprehensive international AML standards 
embodied in the FATF 40+9 recommendations. This requirement is provided 
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for under the UN General Assembly Resolution 1617 of 29th July 2005. To a 
large extent, the foregoing Resolution reiterates the obligations of member 
countries relating to persons and entities associated with Osama Bin Laden, 
the Al-Qaida organization and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.423 On 19th 
December 2006, the UN General Assembly adopted the Resolution 1730 to 
further streamline the sanctions regimes against designated persons. This 
Resolution was passed after a request from the UN Secretary General and 
requires member countries to establish Security Council subsidiary Organs as 
focal points to coordinate operations of different committees.424 These focal 
points would receive delisting requests from persons and entities listed by 
various sanctions committees of the United Nations Security Council, 
including 1267 Committee, and delisting request to be incorporated by 
sanctions committee in their own procedures. Finally, Resolution 1735 (2006) 
was adopted on 22 December 2006, providing clarification on the following:  
 Information to be provided for proposing persons and entities for 
inclusion in  the consolidated list, including identifying those parts of the 
information that can be publically published;425 
 Setting out requirements in relation to delisting from the consolidated list, 
specifically as to whether there was a mistake in the original inclusion of 
the person or entities or whether the person or entity continues to meet the 
criteria for inclusion—as set out under Resolution 1617.426 
 Also providing mechanisms for delisting those people or entity that had 
severed links with the Taliban regimes, Osama bin Laden and the Al-
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Qaida organization.427 These regimes are based on the respective 
provisions of the treaties of United Nations on prevention of money 
laundering and its predicate crimes. The global anti-money laundering 
framework is also based on soft law instruments enunciated by various 
market domains such as FATF and the Basle Committee regulatory 
regimes. While UN, AML treaties are legally binding on states which have 
transposed them, soft law regimes are market oriented regulatory 
guidelines. International AML/CFT regimes based UN treaties are legally 
binding subject to transposition.428 These treaties include but are not 
limited to the following: the Vienna Convention on Illicit Drugs Trafficking 
and other Psychotropic substances (1988); the treaty against organised 
trans-national crimes adopted in Palermo (Italy) in December 2000; and 
the European Union AML Directives.429 In part, the foregoing regimes 
constitute the global framework on money laundering and its predicate 
threats. As regards the FATF and Basle Committee regimes on 
supervisory standards are market oriented regimes evolved in response to 
exigencies of globalisation of financial markets especially in the G-12 
Countries. These regimes are said to be adhoc because they have been 
adopted by G12 member countries in response to an unusual exigencies 
and the need to adopt more pro-active measures in their jurisdictions.  As 
a matter of fact, market oriented regimes have been criticized as 
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undemocratic because of the nature in which they are evolved and 
subsequently applied across States.430 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
 
The literature review has revealed that the current global AML/CFT framework 
is not robust enough to caution states against the threat of money laundering. 
The UN AML treaties cannot be enforced on the state unless they have been 
ratified. Even if they have been ratified, the state has the discretion to 
determine the scope of the applicability the applicability of the treaty inside its 
borders. States can also refuse (as in the case of Iran and Afghanistan) to 
ratify UN AML treaties. As for market oriented regimes, they are adhoc in 
character, often adopted in response to global exigencies. Every time there is 
a crisis, FATF and Basle Committee adopt new regimes but only to be 
superseded by other unforeseeable challenges. It is a wrong approach to 
cluster states together and subject them to the same regulatory framework 
without taking into account their individual dynamics of development. 
Similarly, globalisation paradigm (context of this study) is a misnomer 
because it is manifested in sovereign states, which are often vested with 
strategic state interests. This presupposes that states can dictate the manner 
engendered global regimes can be implemented. The literature has also 
revealed the inherent weaknesses of the global AML framework. There is no 
global government, parliament and what is often called ‘global’ is manifested 
locally. Therefore, there is a possibility that proponent of global AML 
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framework to make false assumptions in championing its adoption. More often 
than not, global prohibition regimes are adopted based on the local regulatory 
conditions in developed financial centres disregarding what could be 
happening globally. This is particularly the case with regard to the FATF AML 
regimes. Some of the AML regimes such as the Basle Committee core 
principles on banking supervision; and the forty plus nine recommendations of 
FATF are not meant to be legally binding. Soft laws guidelines such as the 
forty plus nine recommendations of FATF and the World Bank financial sector 
reforms are implemented on goodwill of states.431 The FATF and the Basle 
Committee supervisory standards are now co-opted into the World Bank and 
IMF structural adjustment programmes. Normative global AML/CFT regimes 
should be implemented pragmatically across countries to reflect the realities 
of development between different countries and regions. To fully qualify as 
global regimes, the prevailing development conditions across LDCs should be 
factor in evolution of global AML regimes. There is likelihood that countries 
which are marginalised in the adoption of the global AML laws will be less 
inclined to lend their support to global regimes. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: THE SCOPE OF FINANCIAL MARKETS REGULATORY 
FAILURE IN LDCS”432 
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
The success or failure of the global AML/CFT framework to a great extent 
depends on individual jurisdiction’s capacity to harness it. Thus, this chapter 
explores the regulatory environment across LDCs and how it constrains the 
individual states ability to harness global AML/CFT regimes. The majority of 
LDCs are saddled with the absence of robust local institutions, lack of 
requisite skills, poverty and its constraining social-economic effects and the 
new typological challenge of HIV/AIDS.  These economies are also saddled 
with wide spread corruption, lack of robust education systems, the absence of 
robust oversight institutions and weak political leadership, for instance in 
some African countries.  I use the acronym “LDCs” to denote a group of 
countries which are characterised by general systemic failure, lack of a 
requisite infrastructure and capacity to harness a robust global AML/CFT 
framework. This chapter in the rubric of (H1 and H2 of the study) support the 
thesis that lack of a robust environment in LDCs constrains their capacity to 
harness the global AML framework. 
 
 
.  
 
                                                          
432
This chapter substantially draws on my book: Norman Mugarura, The Global AML 
Regulatory Landscape in Less Developed Countries (Ashgate, Farnham      2012):pp. 145-
173. 
 160 
4.2 Disparities in AML infrastructure between countries 
 
The majority of LDCs are deficient in requisite infrastructure—a prerequisite to 
domesticate the global AML/CFT framework. For instance, things which are 
taken for granted in developed countries such as electricity, internet, 
telephones, TVs, cars, roads, hospitals, schools, universities are limited, if not 
non-existent in the majority of LDCs . These deficiencies have translated into 
the inability of some countries to harness normative global AML/CFT regimes. 
The FATF requires international financial institutions to continuously monitor 
customers’ accounts in order to counter money laundering and its predicate 
crimes.433 A corollary of the duty to report suspicious transactions is the 
obligation of credit and financial institutions to demonstrate due diligence in 
their transactions. Credit and financial institutions are under a duty to examine 
with special attention any transactions which they regard as particularly likely, 
by their nature to be related to money laundering. This duty extends the scope 
of cooperation beyond suspicious transaction reporting. According to EU 
Commission, co-operation is a necessary condition of reporting to be 
demonstrated by banks even when there is not yet specific suspicion of 
money laundering.434 Banks are under a duty to foster an environment where 
it is easy to implement the “Know Your Customer” identification paradigm. The 
bank’s CDD mandate is highlighted by recommendations 15 (now 14) and 21 
of the FATF (2001).435 Recommendation 14 of FATF requires financial 
institutions to pay special attention to all complex or unusually large 
transactions, or unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent 
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economic or visible lawful purpose. Recommendation 21, on the other hand, 
requires special attention to be paid to business relations and transactions 
involving countries which do not or sufficiently apply the FATF, AML/CFT 
standards.436 The wording of these recommendations was reiterated in Article 
4 of the Directive,437 which places credit and financial institutions under a duty 
to “examine with special attention any unusual transactions not having an 
apparent economic or visible lawful purpose”.438 In this respect, an attempt 
was made to establish the objective model of due diligence through the 
introduction of the concept of “an unusual transaction”.439 However, what 
constitutes unusual transactions prompted a series of reactions related to the 
absence of legal certainty and the potential of the provision to impose a heavy 
burden on the institutions concerned.440 
 
In fact, the FATF requires banks to keep account books and records of 
transactions for prudential supervision, statistics and tax records purposes for 
five years.441 Lack of requisite infrastructure in some countries has translated 
into failure to harness the global AML/CFT regimes such as “KYC”.” In LDCs 
such as Uganda, the regulatory system is either rudimentary to provide ‘just-
in-time’ results; or information profiles generated on customers are too patchy 
and unreliable for regulators to make instant strategic and policy decisions. In 
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many developing countries, 442there is not only scanty data on different crime 
typologies, but there is also a limited access to a centralised database of 
cases on crimes. Lack of requisite data has constrained regulatory agencies 
to adopt requisite AML standards. Unless there is sufficient data on different 
crime typologies, the AML/CFT enforcement agencies will not be able to 
respond robustly to money laundering threats. In some countries, the AML 
laws are still in their infancy, including their legislative component. Low 
salaries for government officials, the need or desire to supplement modest 
salaries of public sector officials, and the use of clever business practices to 
mask the receipt of illicit payments are all among the many problems that 
affect the proper functioning of global AML laws in many countries. 
 
The requirement for banks to continuously monitor their customers’ accounts 
and cash flows so as to determine with reasonable certainty the source of 
their income and to use it in countering money laundering is impeded by the 
environment of systemic failure in LDCs. In these countries, regulators are not 
able to access records on customer profiles because of structural bottlenecks. 
For instance, in Uganda, it is difficult for forex bureaux to verify or generate 
the required customers’ profiles because forex bureaux are used on a one-off 
transactional basis with no established customer verification mechanism. The 
transaction takes place at the counter where scanty data or the identity of the 
                                                          
442
 This problem has been voiced by AML Committee in East Africa, which works under the 
auspices of the East Africa and Southern African Anti-Money Laundering Group (EASAMLG). 
However because of international pressure to harmonise local laws, there is some 
improvement as regards record keeping. 
 163 
customer is kept or is generated.443 Similarly, drawing on the Ugandan 
experience, the majority of Ugandans do not hold bank accounts and for small 
businesses operate on a cash-only basis. This environment has rendered 
prevention of money laundering crimes an insurmountable challenge. When 
people sell their produce (whatever these may happen to be) on an open 
market, they are paid cash, which they carry around in briefcases until it is 
disposed of on another purpose. In the interim, some may prefer to keep the 
money ‘under their beds’ since, for a large section of people in the society, the 
concept of opening a bank account is still remote and inconceivable.444 In so 
doing, they miss out on the attendant benefits of harnessing innovative 
facilities such as letters of credit, bonds and other financial instruments in 
securely effecting business transactions since these products are limited to 
bank account holders. The foregoing challenge underscores the difficulties of 
fighting money laundering in a jurisdiction where there is no mechanism to 
distinguish between ‘tainted’ and ‘clean’ money in the financial system. The 
public needs to be sensitised not only about the threat of money laundering 
but also on its impact with regard to fuelling other forms of crimes. As 
demonstrated in the table below, some SADC jurisdictions have not adopted 
measures to transpose the global AML framework.  
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Table 1445 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 provides insights into the capacity of a handful of jurisdictions in East 
and Southern African Countries to implement a requisite AML system 
nationally. It can be argued based on Table 1 that the government issued 
identification documents (such as passports, birth certificates and the least 
used Identity cards in countries like Uganda) should be appropriately utilised 
to facilitate banks in generating records on prospective bank clients in LDCs. 
However, in situations where this mechanism cannot be implemented, an 
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 Is money 
launderin
g a 
criminal 
offence? 
Does the 
jurisdiction 
have 
client-
profiling 
guidelines 
for 
financial 
services 
intermediar
ies and 
facilitators
? 
Are 
financial 
services 
intermediar
ies and 
facilitators 
required to 
report 
suspicious 
transaction
s? 
Is the 
money 
laundering 
law extra-
territorial in 
effect? 
Jurisdiction 
 
Yes No 
 
Yes No Yes No Yes No 
Botswana X   X  X X  
Lesotho  X  X  X  X 
Malawi X  X   X  X 
Mauritius X  X  X  X  
Mozambique  X  X  X  X 
Namibia  X  X X   X 
Seychelles X  X  X  X  
South Africa X   X X  X  
Swaziland  X   X X  X  
Zambia  X  X  X  X 
Zimbabwe X   X  X X  
Uganda  X  X X   X 
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equivalent pragmatic mechanism of should be devised in verifying customer 
profiles.446 For example in Uganda local leaders, working under the aegis of 
the local council system447are used to provide an interface for verifying the 
identity of persons who wish to obtain Ugandan passports for purposes of 
travelling abroad.448 The possible advantage of using the foregoing regulatory 
model—based on the interplay between local councils and public officials is 
that local councils (LCs) are in close proximity with passport applicants and 
capable of vetting who they are than the passport issuing officer. Since LDCs 
lack the capacity to generate sufficient data, they need to devise their own 
distinctive regulatory approaches to plug information shortfalls. Public officials 
in countries where systems for customer verification are inadequate might not 
be in a position to authenticate information on a passport applicant. This 
regulatory model should be adopted in LDCs to enhance information 
exchange and foreclose deficiencies in the system. It is therefore essential for 
banks to forge a close working relationship with other agencies (such as the 
anti-fraud wing of the police) to ensure that the system of verification is 
streamlined and properly utilised in regulation of financial markets.  
 
In the majority of LDCs, it is possible for banks to be susceptible to 
sophisticated money laundering schemes because of lack of sufficient data on 
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present and prospective bank clients.449 It is evident that lack of sufficient data 
on potential bank customers in some countries undermines banks and other 
financial institutions in making important strategic and policy decisions. Banks 
cannot easily verify records on persons wishing to use the banking services 
such as borrowing money or even opening bank accounts. There is a 
possibility that a person, who borrows money and defaults in one bank, can 
simply walk across to the next bank and borrow money without ever being 
detected as the defaulter in the former bank. LDCs need to be given 
assistance so that they able to develop requisite technological capacity and 
be able to cope with the speed and dynamics of a robust AML/CFT regulatory 
system.450 
 
4.3 Disparities in ICT Development 
 
Since the global system is technologically embedded, the space in which it is 
manifested no doubt favours technologically advanced economies as 
opposed to LDCs. The wide spread encryption technology undermines the 
capacity of fledging countries to harness the technologically oriented AML 
procedures and systems.451 The ICT world is developing faster than LDCs 
can afford to adjust; and they are accordingly at “a back foot” and prone to 
criminal exploitation. Criminals have demonstrated the potential to manipulate 
markets, to undermine controls and to keep a step a head of detection. They 
have exploited enhanced technology to interact with their sponsors and other 
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syndicates in setting up schemes and in liaising with local criminal groups. 
The Internet technological environment has not only engendered new crime 
typologies but it has also changed the regulatory landscape in which modern 
crimes are regulated. Meanwhile, in most DCs, advances in technology often 
imply that many business operations are impersonalised (for example, the 
Internet and telephone banking), making the system prone to exploitation.452 
There is no longer the urge for the business and customer intermediation 
since the business is conducted either on line, by telephone or any other 
electronic means without knowing who the parties are. Criminals are known to 
exploit advances in communication technology to stay ahead of law 
enforcement authorities by circumventing state prudential controls. In theory, 
globalisation of markets has been applauded for transmitting technological 
benefits from developed to less developed countries, helping to bridge the 
digital divide between economies. On the negative note, the Internet has 
precipitated an ideal environment for those contemplating to perpetuate 
money laundering related crimes to do so with ease. 
 
The administration of KYC, AML/CFT paradigm in LDCs has been derailed by 
the slow pace of technological development. Due to the radical changes in the 
regulatory environment as a result of innovations in advanced technology, 
criminals who, often would have been identified at the initial business stage 
have slipped through the impersonalised nature of the modern business 
technological landscape unnoticed. Thus, much as globalisation of markets 
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has generated economic synergies for the business community,453 the system 
is still slanted in favour of DCs as opposed to LDCs.454 No doubt the new 
technological environment has undermined the capacity of some countries to 
harnessed desired AML/CFT regimes. Asymmetries in information in some 
countries signify that important policy issues will be misjudged, resulting in 
increased transactional costs and reduced profit margins. Therefore, LDCs 
should put emphasis on developing and promoting technologically oriented 
education, to enhance fight against corruption and money laundering.455 
 
4.4 The use of education to leverage the fight against money laundering 
offences 
 
The early experiences of many DCs in achieving their development goals 
through education correlates the importance of education in stabilization of 
markets. For instance, Japan was able to modernise and to position its 
economy on the path to development by evolving a policy of educating its 
populace in Western knowledge and practices.456 To foster its development 
goals, the government would later launch an ambitious educational 
programme of all Japanese children, adopting systems principally from 
France, Great Britain and the US.457 Many Asian economies, such as South 
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Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, and later post reform China and 
Thailand and other countries in East and South Asia have done remarkably 
well in spreading economic opportunities through adequately supportive social 
background, including high levels of literacy, numeracy and basic 
education.458 The government of Japan integrated moral ethics within its 
education curriculum as a means to translate government’s developments 
programmes at a later stage. It can be inferred that, if education is properly 
exploited, it has the potential to generate information and enhanced 
awareness on AML/CFT regimes and how they should be adapted nationally. 
If properly utilized education can enhance the globalization of markets by 
generating the desired skills requirements through training. There is 
overwhelming evidence that LDCs are deficient in requisite technical capacity 
to develop robust AML counter-measures. They are also marginalized on 
many aspects of global governance. Just one of the many examples, they are 
marginalized in the WTO trade policy negotiations and they have 
subsequently failed to gain substantially from engendered trade policy 
initiatives. LDCs are said to lack negotiators with sufficient knowledge and 
expertise on technical issues tabled for negotiation in the WTO. During the 
Uruguay trade round (1986-1994) many countries including South Africa 
made several commitments to the multilateral trading system without fully 
realising the implications of those commitments on their economies.459 
   
Specific skills training especially in tertiary institutions should focus on 
developing appropriate models to offer solutions on a wide range of policy 
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areas where the priorities of the economy are. Education should include a 
component of ethics training because cognitive skills alone have proved less 
robust in fostering the development needs of economies. At a national level, 
education should be integrated with ethics training to safeguard against 
money laundering and corruption.460 A good education can potentially foster 
desired changes and precipitating a development oriented outlook in the 
populace. In this same vein, all managers of enterprises or organisations 
should undergo specific and tailored ethics-training programmes as part of 
local strategic leadership initiative. In my view, lack of ethics training 
component in academic degree programmes is responsible for the raging 
corruption in the African continent. For instance in Uganda, corruption has 
become so widespread that it is perceived as a norm rather than an 
exception.  The public should be sensitized (through educational platforms 
like universities, public seminars and government sponsored outreach 
programmes) on the ramifications of money laundering and corruption in the 
society. Owing to antiquated systems in countries like Uganda, record 
keeping is manual and of poor quality. In most financial institutions in less 
developed economies, there are no records at all that can help in monitoring 
transactions or tracking cases of money laundering because records are 
poorly kept. It is for this reason that education should be reformed to reflect 
pertinent changes and challenges in the society.461 
 
LDCs should be supported in grants and technical assistance so that they are 
able to develop requisite skills in the key policy areas such as regulation of 
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markets, international trade and other exigencies. In relation to money 
laundering crimes, education institutions can essentially be utilised as a 
platform for promoting public consciousness campaign across different 
segments of the society. Similarly, education institutions can be utilised to 
disseminate information on policy, law and other development exigencies 
using seminars, public enlightenment campaigns, workshops, conferences, 
press release and training. Since many LDCs are faced with the challenges of 
skills shortages, government policy institutions make optimal use of 
academics in evaluating anticipated policy needs. There should be 
government supported public outreach campaigns to help members of the 
public to understand the problems of financial system abuse by unscrupulous 
persons engaged in various illicit activities such as money laundering and 
corruption. Information should be generated and consolidated on national 
databases and made readily available to agencies in adapting desired anti-
money laundering regimes.462 It needs to be noted that some crimes such as 
corruption are fuelled and sustained by ignorance. Thus, education institutions 
should be aided to train and sensitize grass root communities on changes and 
challenges in the society. If the public is sensitized, it can foster desired 
changes on policy and development in the society.463 
 
Legal education in all globalising countries should be evolved with a 
component of ethics training so that it serves as the flagship of development 
in individual countries. Education institutions can provide opportunities to 
undertake research studies on crime typologies, financial markets regulation 
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and other challenges in the society.464 For instance, education institutions in 
England are utilised by the government in policy analysis and evaluation. I 
presume, there would be no problem for LDC’s to replicate successful 
development models from other jurisdictions but to localize them to suit their 
local particularities of development. It is not only necessary for LDC’s to 
implement the global AML framework but also to integrate into the wider 
global market system. However, there is a need for a trade off to ensure that 
the adoption of normative global AML/CFT standards by individual states is 
not undertaken in a careless manner to alienate individual countries.465 
Emulating for example the USA and other DCs where national policy 
initiatives are fostered through academic institutions, fledging countries should 
replicate the foregoing model in internalising AML regimes. The use of 
academics in formulation and implementation of desired policies has the 
potential to leverage LDCs in overcoming requisite skills shortages. Banks 
and other financial institutions should spearhead training programmes on 
markets, corruption and policy related challenges in the society. In Uganda, 
financial market regulator (Bank of Uganda) has made sure that local 
stakeholders are enlightened on the complexities of the market economy. It 
does this through periodical press release trying to inform local stakeholders 
on their vulnerability to global factors (how the local market can be susceptible 
to remote events in other parts of the world).466 Equally, the FATF should 
forge partnership with national governments to undertake desired reform 
programmes where both domains can benefit. They should establish 
                                                          
464
 This is well illustrated by the fact that many anti-money laundering initiatives are geared 
towards building a strong data base on both present and prospective bank clients. 
465
 Mugarura (n 432). 
466
 This can be achieved by disseminating information through National News papers, and 
market sensitisation seminars, hosting radio talk shows and television programmes. 
 173 
mechanisms to ensure that engendered AML/CFT regimes are fostered 
through a local-global partnership. The local-global partnership should be 
encouraged using communication platforms such as local media (radios, 
televisions or local news papers), academic think tanks and academic 
institutions.  
 
 Education institutions should be brought in the mainstream in formulation of 
national crimes control and prevention strategies.467 They should be utilised 
as platforms to undertake desired research studies and to evaluate 
government policies. Governments should impose continuous skills and ethics 
training as an obligation on managers of corporations, regulators and policy 
makers so that they are adequately equipped to address the offshoot 
challenges to the global market system including money laundering. The 
global AML regimes can easily be harnessed in an environment where there 
is robust information so that regulators are able to implement effective 
policies. There is also a need for enhanced technological capacity to ensure 
that societies are able to cope adequately with the inherent challenges of 
globalization. Governments should make the development of requisite 
technological capacity a priority since it is a linchpin for proper functioning of 
modern markets.  Similarly, the ICT factor is also a prerequisite for institutions 
to harness normative AML regimes. The education policy failure in many 
countries, in part explains why some countries have languished behind others 
in terms of development.  Therefore, it does not matter whether the issues at 
stake is harnessing global AML regimes or any other policy issue, there is no 
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society that can afford to dispense with the need for robust education, if it 
wants to remain viable. 
 
4.5 Economic structural Issues 
 
The majority of AML/CFT regimes are largely focused on regulating the formal 
financial sector such as banks and financial institutions. 468 This approach 
tends to overlook the fact that criminals operate informally and in a 
clandestine way.  In order to close the void between the formal and informal 
sectors,469 there is a need for a well coordinated intelligence system designed 
to establish the level of criminal activity in individual societies. Therefore, 
there is a strong rationale for the state to remain in the loop in regulation of 
financial markets, because its withdrawal would undermine intelligence 
gathering by its security institutions such as the police.470 State 
interventionism is necessary to maintain and restore the stability of domestic 
markets.  
 
As regards foreign bank establishments, their parent companies should act as 
the lender of last resort. This should ensure that there is a safety net for 
foreign banks in the event of financial distress and to avert its attendant spill 
over effect on countries. Supervision of foreign business establishments 
should be consolidated to make sure that neither branch nor subsidiary 
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escapes supervision.471 This should be adequate and comprehensive. An 
adequate supervision is one in which the host authorities are responsible for 
the supervision of the foreign bank establishments (subsidiaries)472 operating 
in their territories as individual institutions, while the parent authorities are 
responsible for them as parts of the larger banking group.473 Parent 
authorities should be informed by the host authorities of any serious problems 
which arise in a parent bank’s foreign establishment and similarly, parent 
authorities should inform host authorities when problems arise in the parent 
bank which is likely to affect the parent bank foreign operations.474 Bank 
supervisors should be competent to practise consolidated supervision, in 
which case the parent banks or banking groups should be responsible for the 
supervision, as well as the adequacy of their capital on the basis of the 
business wherever conducted.475 
 
The implementation of desired AML/CFT regulations in the majority of LDC is 
derailed by the fact that the majority of these economies are cash-based. This 
means that cash is used in effecting almost every transaction, even when 
transactions involve millions of shillings in the case of Uganda.476 Buyers 
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simply go to their banks, withdraw whatever amount of money they want and 
effect cash payments to their creditors. The use of cash transactions are the 
norm rather than an exception across African countries. Introducing threshold 
cash reporting requirements is often proposed, but difficult to implement in 
practice because of the structural problems within these societies. Then there 
is also the challenge of cross-border transportation of cash and other criminal 
proceeds across countries. In Africa, it is easy for criminals to move illicit 
proceeds of crime across national borders without drawing attention of the 
authorities, due to the porous nature of land borders.477  
 
The challenges inherent in a cash economy curtail the financial institutions 
efforts to distinguish “dirty” from “clean” money.478 Distinguishing tainted and 
clean money underscores what money laundering is and what it is not. The 
FATF’s recommendation 1 imposes obligations on countries to take measures 
to stop terrorists and criminals from using cash carriers to finance their 
activities.479 Banks rely on the “verbal information” provided by the customer, 
which may be inaccurate, exaggerated or hard to corroborate. The absence of 
data registry centres to generate data profiles on customers in relation to 
things like bank loans has created serious market risks. For example, the 
absence of customer credit profiles implies that both defaulters and non-
defaulters are treated in the same way and subjected to the same 
assessment benchmarks. This has made major banks in Uganda to embark 
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on a pilot study to revaluate the system and test the possibility of introducing a 
credit reference bureau. This project was initiated to generate desired data 
profiles which would ease identifying customers when applying to access 
banking services. The information profiles generated would then be 
exchanged across banks to enhance identification of potential bank 
customers.480 
 
The KYC mandate481 requires institutions to identify and know who their 
customers are at the point of initiating a business relationship such as when 
opening bank accounts and continuously thereafter. The KYC applies to all 
cases involving entering into a business relationship, especially when opening 
a savings account or when offering a safe custody facility. The KYC 
requirement applies to any transactions to the tune of £10,000 or 15,000 
Euros in case of United Kingdom and European member countries 
respectively. If it should transpire that the institution doesn’t know the sum 
involved at the time of the transaction, it must proceed with the identification 
procedure as soon as it knows the sum and has established that the amount 
involved meets the threshold requirement. Even in cases where the amount of 
the transaction is less than 15,000 Euros, the institution must ask for 
identification if it suspects money laundering.482 Identification procedures for 
personal customers when opening accounts may need to be varied 
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depending on whether the individual is resident or non-resident.483 Different 
considerations may apply in opening of ‘trust accounts’. An even greater 
range of possibilities will need to be catered for in the opening of accounts for 
legal persons.484 The identification duty is complemented by the obligation of 
credit and financial institutions to keep records of the following, in order to be 
used as evidence in any money laundering investigation: 
(a)  In the case of identification, a copy or the reference of the evidence 
required; 
(b)  In the case of transactions, the supporting evidence and records 
(consisting of the original documents or copies) should be admissible in 
court proceedings under the applicable national legislation. 
There are situations, however, where identification requirements have been 
relaxed, for example in cases involving insurance policies written by insurance 
undertakings within the meaning of the AML Directive,485 where the annual 
periodic premium amounts paid do not exceed 100,000 Euros. Member states 
may waive the identification requirement for insurance policies in respect of 
certain pension schemes.486 On the other hand, where there is doubt that the 
customer is operating on their own behalf, or where it is certain they are not, 
credit and financial institutions are required to take reasonable measures to 
obtain information so as to ascertain the true identity of the persons on whose 
behalf the customers are acting.487 
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Most LDCs are deficient in customer profiling mechanisms and capacity to 
verify present and potential bank customers. This is highlighted by the fact 
that very few residents would have their physical land addresses registered, 
let alone known by authorities. This is contrasted with DCs where customer 
identification mechanisms have been simplified to a matter of seconds 
because of advances in technology and availability of post code system.  
 
Meanwhile, the administration of the KYC paradigm in the majority of the DCs 
financial institutions has either been misused or overused against certain 
groups who are disadvantaged in the society such as non-naturalised 
immigrants.488 It is within this cohort that many applicants are refused bank 
accounts either because they are unable to produce the required documents 
such as birth certificates489 or to satisfy residence requirements, and work 
profiles of the prospective customers who may want to open a bank account 
with a particular bank. This is one of the factors why alternative remittance 
systems (ARS)490 as a means of remitting money to immigrants’ countries of 
origin have proliferated in many parts of the World.  
 
The ARS operate in such away that the sending customer (the originator of 
the money/value transfer) pays or hands over funds to the ARS operator. The 
originator also specifies the recipient or beneficiary of the transaction along 
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with his or her location. The funds can be paid in cash, cash equivalent, 
cheques, in other monetary instruments or in stored value cards. In certain 
situations, the originator can pay cash directly into a bank account operated 
by the ARS operator. In large ARS networks, the customers generally have 
access to the ARS through local agents (sub-agents). The originator usually 
receives a unique reference to identify the transaction, which is then passed 
on to the beneficiary. The originator’s only role will be to follow up and relay 
the information to the ARS operator if there is any problem with regard to the 
receipt of the money.491  
 
These informal banking channels have grown in popularity across many parts 
of the world apparently because of favourable market conditions spurred by 
globalisation. However, in relation to money laundering, remittance channels 
are sometimes infiltrated or misused by those contemplating to launder illicit 
proceeds of crime.492 The use of false identities and structuring are common 
techniques to which ARS are vulnerable. The risks associated with ARS will 
vary from country to country. For example a developing country relying 
heavily on domestic ARS, but without the infrastructure to verify the identity of 
the sender, faces different regulatory challenges compared to a country with a 
developed formal sector.493  
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While appreciating the importance for a global AML framework, some of the 
AML/CFT regimes are not yet compatible with the regulatory environment in 
LDCs. At a more specific level, recommendation 12 of FATF requires banks to 
know their customers prior to initiating a business relationship. It is evident 
that this recommendation is too onerous for many fledging countries to 
harness because they lack requisite capacity on many regulatory issues. 
There are no centralised registries where information on nationals of the 
country can be collated, verified and accessed by oversight institutions. This 
has rendered financial institutions susceptible to criminal exploitation due to 
lack of requisite data on business counterparties. To streamline the system 
such as identification of national residents and potential bank customer, it is 
essential for banks working closely with national governments to encourage 
and facilitate registration of land ownership. Land registries which would 
leverage economies in plugging information gaps in countries like Uganda are 
antiquated, disorganised, understaffed or staffed with underpaid corrupt public 
officials.494 Secondly, registration of land ownership is still in its infancy and 
not widespread in countries like Uganda. By contrast, it is possible for banks 
in DCs to verify a prospective bank account holder in a matter of seconds, by 
way of verifying registered addresses using the postcode system. 
 
While the FATF requires countries to adopt its AML/CFT framework as 
caution against money laundering, it might not be feasible for some countries 
to implement it because of their local dynamics of development. In my view, 
the priority for countries should be to first eradicate poverty and corruption to 
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demonstrate their seriousness to internationalise their economies. In my view, 
LDCs are likely to remain sidelined, if they do not rethink their strategies in the 
global market system. With widespread poverty and the tenuous 
infrastructure, developing countries are predisposed to conditions of capability 
deprivation.495 It is evident that poverty has cultivated an environment for 
criminal exploitation such as money laundering and its underlying predicate 
crimes. 
 
4.6 Lack of resources and its inhibitive effect in domesticating desired market 
reforms 
 
The ability of a state to harness the global AML framework or not is dictated 
by availability of requisite human and physical resources capacity and vice 
versa. The availability of resources factor is essential to facilitate the creation 
of laws and procedures; and to ensure that requisite AML laws are integrated 
into national legal systems. Thus, resource constraint effect has inhibited 
individual countries ability to develop a comprehensive policy framework 
against corruption and its attendant social evils. The three East African 
countries of Uganda, Tanzania and Kenya have all contended that their efforts 
to participate fully in regional initiatives and to implement the UN Conventions 
on cross border crimes (such as Palermo, 2000)496 are often derailed or 
constrained by lack of sufficient resources. Lack of requisite resources has 
constrained the capacity national regulatory and policy institutions in 
harnessing desired policy initiatives. For example, in Kenya and Uganda, 
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national institutions such as the police—whose constitutional mandate 
includes keeping law and order by fighting crimes have fared badly in 
executing this mandate. On the majority of occasions, the police is either 
complicit to crimes, constrained in requisite capacity, antiquated in their 
operational methods and unable to respond astutely to imperatives of the 
dynamic global market economy.  For instance, in undertaking this study, I 
was astonished to learn that some police officers in Uganda did not have a 
clue of what money laundering—as crime is. I presume this is to do with the 
fact that Uganda has not enacted a law which proscribes money laundering 
as a distinct offence.  This could also be due to lack of resources to 
spearhead training of the police on the typologies of modern crimes they are 
dealing with. Lack of resources has derailed efforts towards fighting money 
laundering offences, not only in LDCs but also in DCs too. In United Kingdom 
for instance, money laundering laws (though laudable in theory) have been 
hamstrung in practice by the chronic lack of resources available for tackling 
money laundering, disjointed handling of suspicious activities and the low 
police priority given to money laundering prosecutions.497 
 
Local capacity building in many African countries has been derailed by the 
following factors.498 Some of the internal problems in Africa vary, but include 
inherited colonial legacies and the transition from colonialism to undemocratic 
and often corrupt, militarised neo-colonial regimes.499 The foregoing 
predicament has undermined economies by diverting resources away from 
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areas such as education, industrialisation, and building a stable economic and 
social infrastructure to support development. Similarly, lack of civil liberties, 
gender discrimination, lack of freedom of expression, bad education and a 
failure to promote education have not helped to advance stability in the 
majority of LDCs. Lack of adequate professional expertise such as 
supervisors of oversight institutions, auditors, policy makers, legal experts in 
some countries has been manifested into a precarious environment in which 
to implement normative AML regimes.500 
 
Many developing countries have been depleted of their human resource 
capacity through corruption, perpetual Wars, Malaria, HIV/AIDS and other 
economic and social vagaries. This has been compounded by the effect of 
negative globalisation where some countries have become marginal 
participants (losers) in the global economy.501 LDCs have lost people of all 
ranks and ages to HIV/AIDS, many of whom would have been highly skilled 
and not easily replaceable by the standards of affected countries. This plight 
is vividly demonstrated by the fact that conditions across the whole of the 
Southern African region deteriorated in the 1990s to their worst ever recorded 
levels: under five year old mortality (140 per 1000 children); incidence of 
deadly diseases such as malaria (15-45 years of age), tuberculosis (149 per 
100,000 people) and HIV/AIDS (30 AIDs cases per 100,000 people and 12 
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percent prevalence for adults under 49 years of age in 1995).502  While social 
suffering in the majority of LDCs increased, their capacity to increase 
expenditure on health and education declined. Many developing countries 
have become resourcefully constrained and unable to implement normative 
AML standards, or any other normative global initiatives. It needs to be noted 
that poverty creates conditions of capacity deprivation, not to mention 
relegating a society to a life of suffering and misery.  
 
The foregoing analysis presupposes the need for LDCS to undertake radical 
reforms so as to reverse economic and social trends that have marginalised 
them on many issues of global governance.503 There is a need for countries to 
facilitate police training in criminal and cross border jurisdictional matters 
because a well-trained police force can easily leverage the fight against 
crimes including corruption and money laundering. Similarly, police training 
with regard to professionalism and ethics can help to promote local 
consciousness about crimes and new crime typologies. States need to 
appreciate that every crime control strategy at a national level has got to 
involve the police whose constitutional mandate includes enforcing law and 
order. Therefore there are varied challenges across different jurisdictions 
which necessitate the need for flexibility in harnessing normative AML laws.  
 
4.7 The Ugandan financial markets regulatory experiences 
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While crimes which generate criminal proceeds are proscribed under the 
Ugandan law, money laundering is still treated as a derivative offence.504 
Through the World Bank financial sector reform programmes, Uganda was 
able to adopt the Financial Institutions Statute (FIS) 1993, which was intended 
to enhance the regulation of financial markets.505 This law was enacted 
following the financial sector reform programmes that started in 1991 with the 
support of the World Bank financial sector adjustment credit.506 The 
enactment of the FIS was meant to lay down a sound legal framework for the 
regulation of banking business in a newly liberalized market environment. This 
was meant to control the legislative deficiencies, the banking sector had 
experienced under the Banking Act 1969. To foreclose gaps in the financial 
markets regulatory system the Foreign Exchange Act (2004) was enacted.507 
This Act contains provisions such as clause 8(3) which prohibits Forex 
Bureaux from dealing in money transfer to or from the country. It was 
envisaged that if foreign exchange bureaux were allowed to operate in a 
relaxed regime, it would undermine financial institutions in implementing the 
Basle508 guidelines on Banking supervision and regulatory practices. These 
guidelines were transposed in Uganda through the adoption of Financial 
Institution Statute (FIS) 1993. With the reduced regulatory oversight of the 
central bank of Uganda (regulator), criminals were able to counterfeit 
currencies and to introduce it into the financial economy.  The integrity of 
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financial institutions in Uganda was tainted by the fact that banks and forex 
bureaux had been complicit to money laundering offences. Many foreign 
exchange bureaux were found to have been aiding and abetting money 
laundering.509  
 
The economic structural problems in Uganda have translated into the failure 
of national financial institutions to harness the global AML framework. Banks 
are required by law to institute internal mechanisms so that they able to know 
who their clients are at the point of initiating the bank/customer relationship 
and subsequently thereafter. In opening bank accounts with Ugandan banks, 
the prospective bank customers are introduced to the bank by someone who 
already holds a bank account with a particular bank of a customer’s choice. In 
the interim, the prospective bank customer would have completed a form and 
furnished the bank with verifiable documents such as a passport or a driving 
licence.510  At the moment, it is not easy to verify the identities of prospective 
bank customers using government issued identification documents such as 
passports in Uganda. In the first place, the process of obtaining Ugandan 
passports has in the past not been properly streamlined. This has resulted in 
Ugandan passports being issued to people who are not legally entitled to hold 
them. Secondly, information provided on passport application forms is 
confirmed through the chairmen of local councils, locally known as “LCs”.511 
The LCs are used as an essential interface for the government and local 
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communities in implementing government policies. The advantage of this 
model is that LCs are in close proximity with individual passport applicants 
and capable of verifying who they are.512 The down side however is that many 
village LCs are not properly educated to fully comprehend information 
provided on the forms, leave alone what the applicant has filled in. There are 
no government sponsored training programmes of LCs to ensure that they are 
knowledgeable in all core areas of their responsibilities. The government 
should spearhead mandatory training programmes of all village LCs in core 
functions and responsibilities such as filling forms, interviewing, security and 
more, so that they are able to provide an interface for proper regulation of 
financial markets. Secondly, the fact that “LCs” are not paid salaries, save for 
small allowances, has made susceptible to corruption especially from those 
who have money to buy their way. The Ugandan government should 
streamline the LC system and utilize it as a mechanism to plug essential 
information shortfall on potential customers. There is a need for LCs at 
various levels of local government to be paid salaries so that they are not 
exploited for criminal expediency. 
 
 In my view, the effect of corruption has sidelined LDC’s far more than 
HIV/AIDS, considering the amount of public funds stolen by government 
officials. Millions of people’s lives have either been put at risk or lost due to 
none payments of salaries of medical staff, stealing of drugs and other 
medical supplies by those charged with the responsibility of administering the 
system.  
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There is a need for sequencing of desired policy reforms, focusing attention 
on problem areas where the country is deficient in requisite capacity. As a 
result of corruption and its attendant vices, the global AML measures cannot 
be implemented in many LDCs easily as expected. The government issued 
documents have sometimes fallen in the hands of people not legally entitled 
to hold them. For many years, the passport issuing office in Kampala has 
been dogged with challenges of corruption, inefficiencies, poor work ethic of 
staff, the absence of a centralized database on passport applicants and thus 
the likelihood for Ugandan passports to be issued to people who are not 
legally entitled to hold them.513   
 
 Therefore, much as government issued documents can be used to ease the 
verification of potential bank clients, it has not been easy to use this 
mechanism in harnessing the system. This is due to many factors but the 
overriding one is poverty and its constraining social and economic effects. It 
needs to be noted that financial markets cannot function properly in an 
environment of poverty. For instance, the majority of Ugandans do not 
appreciate the importance of opening bank accounts514 when they are virtually 
living on breadline with no money to deposit into those accounts. This has 
made the majority of Ugandans to keep money in their houses and perhaps 
under mattresses until they have what to dispose it on. Secondly, banks are 
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exposed to enormous regulatory risks in an environment devoid of the 
capacity to generate robust information. It is therefore difficult, if not 
impossible for institutions in some Countries to administer robust CDD 
measures based on the prescribed FATF standards as required. 
 
4.8 An overview of the South African experience 
 
In South Africa, when the AML/CFT legislation was adopted in (2000), the 
Minister of Finance negotiated and applied an exemption under the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (FICA).515 This exemption was deemed 
essential to level the playing field as many potential bank customers would be 
excluded by lack of verifiable residential addresses; and lack of essential 
documents such gas or telephone bills.516 Currently, Exemption 17 of the 
above Act applies to all banks, mutual banks, post banks and other financial 
institutions such as Ithala development corporations.517However, for a person 
to qualify under the Exemption 17, he or she must be a natural person who is 
a citizen of, or resident in South Africa. The business relationship and single 
transactions must not allow the customer to withdraw, transfer or make 
payment of amount exceeding Rs 500,000 (US$500) per day or exceeding Rs 
2500,000 in a monthly circle.518 As long as the foregoing conditions are met, 
the service provider does not need to request information to verify the 
customer’s residential address. The South African pragmatic approach in the 
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transposition of CDD demonstrates the practical challenges of harnessing this 
requirement in countries subject to different levels of development. 
 
The experience of South Africa and Uganda corroborate the thesis that 
financial institutions in LDCs are susceptible to sophisticated money 
laundering schemes due to lack of requisite capacity for verifying present and 
prospective bank clients. The absence of centralised data registries on 
potential bank clients means that banks are not able to risk assess their 
clients; or that they are not able to adopt requisite AML counter-measures. 
Owing to the foregoing challenge, banks are not able to generate profiles of 
persons who may wish to access their services or products such as bank 
accounts, guarantees or even loans. It is possible that a person defaulting in 
one bank, can walk across to another bank next door; and borrow money 
without being detected as a high risk person due to lack of mechanisms for 
verifying and sharing data; and to risk assess clients between banks before 
they are sold services.519 
 
 
4.9 Money laundering offences in England and Wales 
 
There are six distinct offences prescribed by the Proceeds of crime Act 
(POCA) 2002 in United Kingdom. The following offences apply in England and 
Wales: 
1. concealing, disguising, converting, transferring or removing from the UK; 
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2. entering into, or becoming concerned with an arrangement which 
facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal property; 
3. acquiring, using or having possession of criminal property; 
4. failing to disclose knowledge or suspicion of money laundering, which 
came to his attention by virtue of his position as the nominated officer in 
the regulated sector; 
5. failing to disclose knowledge or suspicion of money laundering where the 
offender is another nominated officer; and 
6. the disclosure of information prejudicial to an investigation, i.e. ‘tipping off’. 
 
The Proceeds of Crime Act (2002) assimilates the money laundering offences 
introduced by Criminal Justice Act (CJA) 1988 as amended by the CJA 1993. 
Section 93A (1) (a) of the CJA 1988 focused on assistance when the retention 
or control by or on behalf of another (A) of A’s proceeds of criminal conduct is 
facilitated whether by concealment, removal from the jurisdiction or transfer of 
nominees or otherwise. However, in order for the prosecution to secure a 
conviction against a money launderer, it must prove that he/she had a 
requisite mens rea of the alleged money laundering offence. POCA 
consolidates the earlier regimes on money laundering; but it also extends the 
scope of money laundering offences in United Kingdom.  
 
4.9.1 Actus reus of Money Laundering Offences 
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In the context of the EU directive,520 the conduct that describes money 
laundering consists of: the conversion or transfer of property; the concealment 
or disguise of its origin; its acquisition or possession or use; and the 
participation or association to commit, attempt to commit and aiding, abetting, 
facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the acts. This is a well-
established offence in many EU member states,521 except that as money 
laundering it would incur a higher penalty.522 Section 329 of Proceeds of 
Crime Act (2002) 523criminalises the mere possession of criminal property. It 
can rightly be noted that the conduct that constitutes money laundering 
extends beyond the mere handling of stolen goods (as in the UK Theft Act 
1968), because there is a need for action beyond mere possession (for 
example, assisting in retention or removal of property for the benefit of 
another person).524  
 
4.9.2 The Mens rea of Money Laundering Offences 
 
In criminal justice, most notably with regard to the presumption of innocence, 
the prosecution must prove that the launderer knew that the money was 
derived from an unlawful activity. The prosecution must also prove that by 
manipulating the funds, the accused intended to hide its origin, nature, 
                                                          
520
 Council Directive of 10.6.1991 on prevention of the use of financial systems for the 
purposes of money laundering (91/308/EEC), OJL 166, 28.6.1991 at 77. 
521
 Article 1(3) of the Second European Council AML Directive 91/308/EEC. 
522
 Valsamis Mitsilegas, Money Laundering Counter-measures in the European Union: A new 
Paradigm of Security Governance versus Fundamental Legal Principles, (Kluwer Law 
International, 2003), 29. 
523
 This legislation is truly universal in nature, for not only does it encompass universal 
mandatory reporting, it also has the unique effect of drawing all the relevant offences of ML 
under a single, unifying statute. The previous increment system has been replaced, almost in 
its entirety, by a complete legislative framework aimed at reducing the ability of criminals to 
engage the financial system to launder their illicit gains. 
524
 P. Alldridge, Money Laundering Law, (Hart Oxford 2003), 92. 
 194 
location, ownership or any other aspect thereof as described in the definition 
of the offence.525 This burden of proof can be very onerous, especially in view 
of the complexity of money laundering operations and extensive use of shell 
companies and bearer securities.526 To render this burden manageable, there 
is a growing consensus to allow for the reliance on inferential evidence. This 
is also set out in the Vienna Convention framework (1988), which provides 
that “knowledge, intent or purpose” required as an element of the offence set 
forth in paragraph 1 of this article may be inferred from objective factual 
circumstances.527 As noted in Harmer, the defendant’s knowledge may be 
inferred from factual circumstances where that inference is absolutely 
compelling.528 The prosecution needs to prove that the property in question 
constitutes the proceeds of crime or drug trafficking. Under s. 93C (1) of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1988529 and s. 49(1) of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994, 
there is an express reference to dealing with the proceeds of crime and, 
because of that, it is essential for the prosecution to prove the source of 
money so as to satisfy that the alleged property is a proceed of crime.530 It will 
also be incumbent on the prosecution to prove that the defendant knew of the 
foundation facts on which he ought to have formed the suspicion.531 The 
requirement for the “reasonable grounds to suspect” is a subjective test that 
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seems to oblige the prosecution to establish that the defendant himself had 
formed the suspicion and that it was based on reasonable grounds.532  
 
Money laundering is thus established in cases where the defendant either 
knew or reasonably ought to have known that the money in question was the 
proceeds from crime.533 The efforts to adopt a broad anti-money laundering 
framework have led to the additional element of suspicion in the mens rea of a 
number of offences, constituting or related to money laundering. There are 
offences such as assisting another to retain the benefits of criminal conduct 
and tipping off.534  The mens rea requirement of concealing or transferring the 
proceeds of drug trafficking of a third person and of assisting another to retain 
the proceeds of terrorist related activities is more stringent. In both cases the 
knowledge element will have to be accompanied by the defendant having the 
reasonable grounds to suspect the origin of the property from drug trafficking 
in the first case and an engagement in terrorist activities in the second.535 
Section 330(2) of the UK Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2002536 further 
extends the mens rea requirement of the offence of failure to disclose to 
having reasonable ground for knowing or suspecting that the property in 
question constituted “the proceeds of crime”.537 This is particularly important 
for professionals dealing with the regulated sector. The failure to report their 
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suspicions or knowledge of money laundering is punishable in accordance 
with s. 334(2) (b), on indictment by a maximum of five years imprisonment or 
an unlimited fine. It is important to note that the offence of failing to disclose 
knowledge or suspicion of money laundering is strictly limited to knowledge or 
suspicion of money laundering and does not extend to cover “all-crime” 
money laundering.538 The facts or circumstances of the substantive offence 
that must be proved is that the proceeds are criminal as defined in s. 340 (3) 
(a) where the alleged offender must know or suspect that the property is 
criminal. Perhaps also worthy of mention is that Knowledge can also be 
inferred from objective factual circumstances. The scope of money laundering 
offences as set out in articles 5 and 6 of United Nations Convention against 
Organised Transnational Crimes (Palermo 2000) encompasses a wide range 
of activities that generate illicit proceeds of crime. 
 
4.9.3 Acquisition, Use and Possession of Proceeds of Crime 
 
This is a separate offence under section 22 of the Theft Act (1968) for a 
person to handle stolen goods or their proceeds, knowing or believing them to 
be stolen goods or to dishonestly assist in the retention, removal, disposal or 
realisation of such goods by or for the benefit of another person or if he 
arranges to do so.539 Section s329 of the POCA (2002) which replaces s51 of 
the DTA (1994) and s93B of the CJA (1988) creates a unified position on 
those who deal with, or those who come into possession of the proceeds of 
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crime. This section catches all those who help directly or indirectly in the 
removal, disposition or retention of criminal property with requisite subjective 
knowledge or suspicion as provenance. It is therefore a defence for those who 
take possession of the proceeds of crime in the course of their official duties 
such as the police and law enforcement agencies. The onus is upon the 
defendant to prove innocence on this position, as illustrated by their Lordships 
decision in the case of in R v Gibson [2000].540 
 
4.9.4 The offence of concealing, disguising, converting, transferring or 
removing criminal property from the UK 
 
This offence is provided for under s. 327 of the POCA 2002 and will be 
committed by any person who either conceals,541 disguises, converts, 
transfers or removes from the UK criminal property.542  For purposes of this 
provision, the prosecution must prove that the alleged offender knows or 
suspects that property constitutes a person’s benefit from criminal conduct. 
What is noteworthy with regard to this offence is the vastly broad scope of the 
offence covered by the section and indeed the expansive definition of the 
offence.543 The section will catch those engaged in money laundering 
activities, that is, as per its definition but will also extend to standard banking 
practices, such as transfers, conversions and sending funds abroad through 
wire transfers. In effect, this section combines two offences from the earlier 
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legislation—those of concealing or disguising criminal proceeds and 
converting or removing from the jurisdiction criminal proceeds for the 
purposes of avoiding a prosecution for a ML offence or in order to avoid an 
enforcement order, and either concealing or disguising, converting or 
transferring criminal proceeds with the knowledge or reasonable grounds to 
suspect that the funds were criminally derived.544 The POCA (2002) abolishes 
the distinction between laundering the proceeds of drug trafficking activities 
and laundering the proceeds of other criminal activities, which was the chief 
characteristic of the previous regimes under the CJA 1988 and DTA 1994.545 
It also abolishes any requirement that the conduct in question amounts to an 
indictable offence in the UK, as was previously the case under CJA 1988. 
Thus the laundering of any criminally derived property,546 whether or not the 
conduct in question would amount to an indictable offence, is now a criminal 
offence.547  The offence of concealing criminal property is now committed 
solely through concealing, disguising, converting, transferring or removing 
from the UK, criminal property provided that the person cannot avail himself of 
one of the statutory defences. However, to bring a successful prosecution, the 
necessary element of prosecution must be established, in order for the 
property to be criminal by virtue of s. 340 (3) but also the alleged offender 
must know or suspect that the property is criminal. The above section 
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provides that the definition of criminal property, which includes two 
components: that the property constitutes a benefit from criminal conduct 
[s.340 (3) (a)]; and that the alleged offender knows or suspects that it 
constitutes such a benefit [34 (3) (b)]. Interestingly, it is the suspicion element 
in the absence of specific criminality in relation to criminal proceeds allegedly 
laundered that has caused a lot of concern for practitioners in the 
interpretation of money laundering offences.548 The drafters of the Act 
intended to relax the onerous requirement for the prosecution having to prove 
underlying criminality—an issue that had in the past caused problems for 
courts to successfully prosecute alleged money laundering offences. In R v 
Whitham [2008],549 the decision of the court demonstrates that suspicion 
alone could suffice in bringing a prosecution for money laundering against the 
defendant. For example, having a substantial and unexplained substantial 
sum of money or a sudden increase in ones assets could be seen as 
evidence of money laundering. The draconian confiscation of suspected 
assets could then follow. The defendant is then given the opportunity before 
the court to prove his/her innocence. It is an offence under section 327 of 
POCA 2002 for the defendant to conceal, disguise, convert, transfer or even 
remove criminal property from its jurisdiction. 
 
4.9.5 Failure to Disclose in the Regulated Sector 
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Under s. 330 of POCA (2002), a person commits an offence where through 
the course of his business in the regulated sector, he knows or suspects that 
another person is engaged in money laundering, and he fails to make the 
required disclosure as soon as practically possible.550 The failure to report 
suspicion or knowledge of money laundering is punishable in accordance with 
s. 334 (2) (b), on indictment, by a maximum of five years imprisonment or 
unlimited fine.551 Suffice it to say that this offence creates a universal all crime 
duty to disclose knowledge or suspicion of money laundering, something 
which up until now has been limited to the laundering of drug trafficking or 
terrorist funds.552 This offence is structured on a tripartite basis, and all 
requirements must be proved beyond reasonable doubt in order to secure a 
successful prosecution under this section. Firstly, the person must know or 
suspect or have reasonable grounds for knowing or suspecting that another 
person is engaged in money laundering. Secondly, the information upon 
which his knowledge is based, or which gives him reasonable grounds for 
such knowledge or suspicion, must have come to him through the course of 
the business in the regulated sector.  
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The scope of the regulated sector covers a wide range of professional 
businesses including for example bankers, accountants and members of the 
legal profession. These professionals are under a duty to disclose and failure 
to comply with this requirement will result in criminal and heavy penal 
consequences.553 Thirdly, is that he/she must not fail to make the necessary 
disclosure554 as soon as reasonably practicable after the information relating 
to possible money laundering offences has come to his/her attention.555 The 
meaning of ‘required disclosure’ is clarified through s. 330 (5), which defines 
the required disclosure in terms which essentially refer to ‘reporting up the 
line’, that is, the person must make a disclosure to a nominated officer 
(refined through section 330 (9) as referring to the person appointed to 
receive and handle money laundering disclosures in the disclosures company 
or alternatively to any person authorised to receive such disclosures by the 
Director General of SOCA).556  
The jeopardy of the bank is further highlighted in the case of Squirrel v 
National Westminster Bank Plc and HM Customs and Excise [2005].557 
Squirrel held a bank account with NatWest Bank which was £200,000 in 
credit. Without any prior warning or explanation of its supposedly unusual 
actions to its customer, Natwest froze the Account. Squirrel applied to the 
court for an order that NatWest unfreeze the Account immediately and 
disclose the reason for its conduct. Meanwhile, it transpired that Squirrel was 
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under investigation by HM Customs and Excise for VAT-related offences, and 
the bank had suspected that the funds in Squirrel’s account to represent 
criminal property.558 There were two issues raised by this case: (i) unfreezing 
would amount to a breach of section 328 of POCA 2002 (entering into an 
arrangement to facilitate the use of criminal property); and (ii) disclosing to 
Squirrel the reason for its decision to freeze the account would cause the 
bank to breach section 333 (tipping off). The court ruled that the course of 
action adopted by the bank was unimpeachable even though there were no 
material facts before the court to justify that the funds in the respective bank 
account represented criminal property. The court expressed that even if Mr. 
Squirrel was entirely innocent; there was no question of the bank being 
required to compensate Squirrel for damages suffered. But the court found 
itself powerless to impeach the position of the bank, even though there was 
nothing material before the court to justify the conclusion that the funds in the 
bank (as alleged) was criminal property. Squirrel Ltd’s predicament was 
compounded by the fact that it could not afford legal representation without 
being given access to its funds. 
 The analysis of this case (Squirrel) demonstrates that courts require financial 
institutions to comply with AML/CFT legislation, regardless of whether it 
undermines the relationship of the respective financial institution and its 
customers or not. This case also demonstrates that the AML reporting 
regimes are very onerous on banks. If the bank becomes suspicious of 
criminal activity, it should freeze the account instantly and without delay. It is 
so onerous that even if the bank processes a cheque to transfer the money 
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into the account of another person, without making due inquiry where it should 
have, it could be liable for facilitating the use or control of criminal property 
and hence committing an offence under section 328 of POCA 2002.559 With 
regard to professionals advising a client on the matter that might involve the 
legal advisor or the client being implicated in money laundering, steps should 
be taken to make authorised disclosure. This was highlighted by their 
Lordship’s decision in the case of P v P.560  This case is of particular 
importance for legal advisers not to fall foul of section 328 of POCA (2002) in 
relation to having inadvertently participated in an arrangement that could 
potentially facilitate the acquisition, retention, use or control of criminal 
property contrary to section 328 of POCA 2002.  
The case of Bowman v Fel (2005)561 demonstrates how failure implement 
section 328 POCA (2002) could land the respective legal professional in 
problems. In this case, the relationship between the claimant and the 
defendant ended and the claimant asserted a right of a beneficial interest in 
the property that they had occupied together, but which was registered in the 
defendant's sole name. In preparing for trial, the claimant's solicitors 
suspected that the defendant had included in his business Accounts the cost 
of non-business related work carried out at the property, and notified the 
National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS now subsumed by SOCA) as 
required under section s 328.562 The contentious issue to be determined was 
whether s 328 means that, as soon as a lawyer acting for a client in legal 
proceedings discovers or suspects anything in the proceedings that may 
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facilitate the acquisition, retention, use or control (usually by his own client or 
his client's opponent) of 'criminal property', he must immediately notify SOCA 
of his belief if he is to avoid being guilty of the criminal offence of being 
concerned in an arrangement which he knows or suspects facilitates money 
laundering. 
The court decided that the proper interpretation of s 328 was not intended to 
cover or affect the ordinary conduct of litigation by legal professionals. This 
included any steps taken by professionals in litigation, from the issue of 
proceedings and the securing of injunctive relief or a freezing order up to its 
final disposal by judgment. The court did not consider that either the 
European Union law; or the UK Legislation could have envisaged that any of 
these ordinary activities would fall within the concept of 'becoming concerned 
in an arrangement which facilitates the acquisition, retention, use or control of 
criminal property'. 
 The Bank’s duty to report suspicious transactions is further highlighted in the 
recent case of Shah V HSBC Private Bank (2009).563 In this case the High 
Court emphasised the need for HSBC bank or any other bank to observe its 
statutory obligations of reporting suspicious transactions. In this case, there 
was delayed payment of US $ 4 million from the accounts of Mr and Mrs Shah 
to the intended recipient following a suspicious activity report. An intended 
recipient of the Money in Zimbabwe reported the matter to authorities, who 
then froze US $ 300 million of Mr and Mrs Shah. The plaintiff challenged 
HSBC bank contending that it had breached its implied term in the contract to 
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take reasonable care, to comply with the instructions and had breached 
confidentiality. Where there is a conflict between common law and statutory 
law, the latter would always take precedence. The court held that the common 
law duty of confidentiality alleged by the plaintiff (Mr and Mrs Shah) had been 
overridden by the provisions of POCA (2002) and hence the bank had acted 
lawfully within the provisions of section 328 of POCA (2002). For the Bank to 
secure a successful prosecution, it needs to file the suspicious transaction 
activity report (SAR) as soon as practically possible. If the Bank delays in 
filing SAR, it could jeopardise the trial on grounds of Article 6 of Human Rights 
Act (1998). This issue was raised in the case of RCPO v C (2010)564 where a 
solicitor had fraudulently laundered money through the firm’s Accounts. Due 
to delays in bringing prosecution, the defendant was cleared of all six counts 
of money laundering after the Judge ruled that a fair trial would not be 
possible. Had the Judge proceeded with the trial, the court would have been 
in breach of Article 6 of ECHR (1950) regarding the right to a fair trial. 
 
Therefore the bank’s duty to report suspicion transactions as in the case 
Squirrel Ltd, v NatWest Bank Plc. & HM Customs and Excise [2005] 
underscores the vulnerability of the UK to attack through recourse to human 
rights principles and jurisprudence.565 Confidentiality in financial dealings and 
status is an important facet of one’s private life, and as such ought to be 
protected as reasonably as possible by law. Confidentiality is also a matter of 
the bank-customer relationship, and indeed any professional relationship, 
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based on trust, loyalty, fair dealing and not to mention contract law.566 A 
person who fails to disclose may argue that he or she was justified under 
Article 8(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998.567 The only exceptions to the 
public body are set out in Article 8(2) where the following can be established. 
The six legitimate justifications are: where national security is at stake, there 
is the need to protect national safety or the economic well-being of the 
country, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or morals, and 
the protection of freedom of others.568 The traditional principle of banking 
confidentiality created by virtue of the contract between the customer and the 
bank (as a confidant) and Data Protection Act 1998 could be undermined 
under the provisions of Article 8(2). Any common law disclosure of 
confidential information held by a banker in respect of a customer must also 
be proportionate569 to the legitimate aim pursued. The case of Sunderland v 
Barclays Bank Ltd570 highlights the potential challenges regarding the critical 
nature which underpin the principle of proportionality. The doctrine of 
proportionality may require the review of a court decision to assess the 
balance which the court has struck, not merely whether it is within the range 
of rational or reasonable decisions. The proportionality test may go further 
than the traditional grounds of review, in as much as it may require attention 
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to be directed to the relative weight accorded to other interests and 
considerations: R v. Ministry of Defence, ex parte Smith.571  
Recently, a Dutch bank has been fined $619 million by the US Government 
for allegations that it violated US sanctions against Cuba, Iran and other 
Countries. ING is said to have moved $1.6 billion illegally through Banks in 
the US from early 2007 by concealing the nature of the transactions.572 It did 
this by eliminating payment data that would have revealed the involvement of 
sanctioned countries and entities. The bank also advised clients how to evade 
computer filters designed to prevent sanctioned entities from gaining access 
to the US banking system. It provided US finance services to sanctioned 
entities through shell companies and misuse of internal ING account.573 ING 
has become the fourth bank to be imposed on sanctions after Credit Suisse 
agreed to pay $536 in 2009 to settle charges of illegal transactions involving 
Iran, Cuba and Libya. Lloyd Bank TSB also agreed to pay $ 350 million in this 
same year to settle charges of allegedly altering records for clients’ from Iran, 
Sudan and other sanctioned countries. In 2010 Barclays Bank settled charges 
of £298 million for violating US rules in relation to sanctioned countries and 
entities.574 
4.9.6 Tipping Off 
 
The last offence to be created under POCA [2002] is that of tipping off, where 
a professional or those working in the regulated sector, make a disclosure that 
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is likely to prejudice a money laundering investigation being undertaken by 
law enforcement agencies.575 It is in fact worthy of mention that where the 
person does not know or suspect that the disclosure was likely to be 
prejudicial, he does not commit an offence.576 The offence of tipping off is 
highlighted by the case of Governor and Company of the Bank of Scotland v 
A Ltd.577 In this case, the bank made enquiries in respect of a number of 
accounts opened by A Ltd. into which substantial sums of money were 
transferred. The Police advised them that money laundering investigations 
were being carried out into the activities of the company and asked the bank 
not to reveal the information to A Ltd. The bank was fearful that it would risk 
being sued by the company if it failed to pay money held in the accounts or by 
third parties as constructive trustees if it did. The bank was rather in an 
invidious position of ‘damned if you don’t, damned if you do’. The Court of 
Appeal indicated that it was important in such a situation for the bank to file an 
interim declaration under CPR 25.1 (1) (b), naming the Serious Fraud Office 
as the defendant. In these circumstances, the bank would clearly be protected 
against criminal liability of ‘tipping off’. In another case of C v S,578 a bank 
made a disclosure in action of documents, which might have revealed the 
existence of on-going enquiries by the NCIS as it then was.579 The purpose of 
the application was an attempt by the company, C; to trace the sums of 
money that it alleged had been misappropriated by others. A bank had earlier 
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made a disclosure to the NCIS of suspicious transactions and was fearful that 
disclosure of the documents might breach the tipping off provisions of s 93D. 
It was also in an invidious situation where the bank would either be criminally 
liable if it complied with the first instance order for disclosure; or it would be 
liable to contempt of court if it failed to do so. An ex parte application was 
made to the high court in camera in an attempt to resolve the dilemma and 
the original disclosure order was revoked allowing the bank not to disclose 
information to the NCIS (now been replaced by serious organised crimes 
agency (SOCA)) which was created in (2005).580  
 
It is a defence in the UK that a person who should disclose neither knew nor 
suspected that another person was engaged in money laundering and had not 
been provided with the required training by his employer.581 This defence is 
available where the person is charged with the section 330 (2) (b) offence, 
namely the situation whereby the professional has reasonable grounds for 
either knowledge or suspicion of money laundering by virtue of the omission 
of the training possible to detect money laundering vehicles, fails to disclose 
as required.582 This provision serves as a reminder to those institutions within 
the regulated sector that the legislative framework under which they operate 
revolve around the disclosure of information concerning money laundering, 
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and this is something, in turn, dependent on the training that they provide to 
their employees to detect suspect transactions and clients.583 
 
4.10 Conclusion 
 
The challenges of harnessing global AML regimes such as CDD across 
countries vary and cannot be condensed into this chapter alone. While 
financial institutions are obligated under international law to implement robust 
AML measures such as CDD, implementing them is costly in poorly resourced 
banks. Since banking is a business, banks are concerned with controlling 
operational costs to maximise profits and stay in the business. In practice, 
financial institutions are required to assess the risks posed by their customers 
both before initiating a business relationship and continuously thereafter. This 
makes it necessary for banks to operate in a robust regulatory environment to 
counter the potential of being exploited for money laundering purposes. 
However, financial institutions should also ensure that the implementation of 
normative CDD and other core AML measures is done sustainably not to 
debase local economies. For LDCs based banks, it might not be practical to 
apply the robust CDD standards in the absence of a requisite infrastructure, 
even if these measures are necessary. In my view, less capitalised banks 
should apply CDD requirements flexibly as demonstrated in the example of 
South Africa with regard to “exemptions 17 of Financial Intelligence Centre 
Act (FICA) 2002”. Exemptions 17 (above) accorded to SA a special 
dispensation in application of desired CDD measures. The exemption 17, 
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allows South African nationals to dispense with identification requirements in 
opening bank accounts. This dispensation was negotiated and agreed by 
banks in South Africa as a condition of implementing CDD measures. Without 
negotiating exemptions with FATF, the wholesale implementation of the 
AML/CFT framework would have alienated vulnerable groups in South Africa 
from accessing banking services. For instance, many residents in South 
Africa do not have verifiable residential addresses and other requisite 
documents such as driving licence to access banking services. The South 
African approach should be replicated in implementation of the normative 
AML regimes across LDCs. Desired AML regimes should be introduced 
flexibly to suit the varying dynamics of development across regions. In my 
view, for global AML/CFT regimes to work, they should reflect dynamics of 
local development where they are introduced. Normative global AML/CFT 
regimes should always be modified to suit local conditions. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE EFFECT OF CORRUPTION ON AML/CFT 
REGULATIONS 
 
5.1  Introduction 
 
This chapter demonstrates that in an environment of corruption the global 
AML/CFT framework cannot work. Corruption undermines the capacity of 
individual countries to harness normative AML/CFT regimes. Corruption has 
literally eviscerated the capacity of some countries to harness normative AML 
regimes such as CDD.584 CDD is a core AML standard, which requires banks 
to know their customers as a condition of initiating a business relationship with 
them. It needs to be noted that in an inherently corrupt system, the envisaged 
AML/CFT regimes such as CDD cannot be implemented easily.585 This is 
because normative AML/CFT systems will be compromised to perpetuate 
corruption. Corruption and money laundering crimes are embedded in each 
other, and should be accorded the same level of attention at an international 
level. Corruption either constitutes money laundering predicate offences or it 
is used as an instrument to committee money laundering offences. Therefore, 
an effective global AML/CFT framework should include measures against 
corruption since these two crimes are embedded in each other. 
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5.2 The effect of corruption on financial Markets 
 
Corruption undermines markets through its attendant practices of kickbacks, 
commission, representation fees and other forms of financial malpractices 
such as money laundering. Corruption has eviscerated the capacity of 
countries to implement normative AML regulations and policies. Poor salary 
schemes in LDCs has helped to fuel incidences of corruption as people aspire 
to live a high life style of sky-sport TVs, mobiles phones and other innovative 
products without sufficient incomes to sustain it. Corruption has provided an 
alternative to supplementing meagre incomes the reason why it is becoming 
entrenched and a moral hazard in many parts of Africa. In Uganda, corruption 
has manifested itself in form of a resilient shadow economy such as tax 
evasion, goods and currency counterfeits, currency smuggling, security 
trading, property purchase, sale of counterfeit goods, and lack of investment 
safeguards of public funds, and swindling or embezzlement of public funds. 
These challenges have constrained the state in its efforts to deliver economic 
and social services to the public. Corruption therefore undermines 
governments’ development programmes as funds are diverted into private 
accounts of public officials.586 Kickbacks, commissions, or representation fees 
are sought to rig bids and manipulate laws governing the transition to the 
market economy.  Corruption undermines efforts towards the implementation 
of desired market reforms needed to pave way for globalisation of markets.587 
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Therefore, there is a correlation between corruption588 and the growth of 
financial crimes such as money laundering.  This is particularly apparent in 
cases of grand corruption.  Grand corruption involves misuse of power by 
heads of state, ministers and top officials for private pecuniary profit, and even 
noble cause corruption where the instruments of government such as 
intelligence services are used to provide finance and other support for criminal 
activity, such as assisting terrorism, providing secret arms supplies beyond 
the scrutiny of political process and laundering secret funds.589 
 
Corruption has sidelined efforts of states to harness financial markets such as 
the stock exchange in many parts of Africa. The financial services markets 
such as the stock exchange in many countries across Africa are still in the 
nascent stages because investing in shares is misconceived as a preserve of 
the privileged class.590 This misconception is partly precipitated by the nature 
of the laid back society in which financial markets operate in many LDCs; but 
also there is the issue of poor dissemination of information. The interplay 
between corruption and its effects has mutated into an environment for 
financial market abuse. The stock market is still in its infancy in many parts of 
Africa—and efforts towards stabilising financial markets have been derailed 
by corruption perpetuated by public officials. For instance, in Kenya, a country 
that until recently managed to enjoy relative calm since independence, the 
stock market has been ridden by corruption.591 In a society with a developed 
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stock market, there is a likelihood of discipline because regulators are aware 
of the fact that any laxity and poor oversight of financial institutions especially 
in a globalised market environment will trigger systemic failures. 
 
For instance, corruption has been exploited to leverage in establishing their 
presence in the East African economies.592 Either the illicit proceeds of crime 
are generated from corruption committed by state officials; or corruption is 
used as tool to deposit tainted money into the mainstream financial economy. 
In most corrupt countries in Africa, as in other parts of the world such as 
Russia, there is a likelihood of high presence of different criminals groups. 
The most rampant criminal syndicate operative in Africa is the Nigerian 
group—code-named 419. This group has dominated the illicit drugs market in 
Uganda and in other parts of Africa such as South Africa. Organised criminal 
groups have resorted to money laundering in different countries to cleanse the 
proceeds of crime.593 Money laundering techniques include smurfing, 
establishment of front companies, acquisition of commercial and non-
commercial properties, remittance through non-official banking channels and 
foreign remittance. In some countries with tenuous infrastructure and poor 
salary schemes, public officials are easily bribed to turn a blind eye to the 
obvious providing an avenue for criminal exploitations including money 
laundering. Corruption is so ingrained that it would be unwise to reduce it 
being committed in a handful of sector areas. I presume it is because of weak 
laws coupled by a culture of corruption that Uganda has become an attractive 
destination for narcotic drug traffickers from West Africa, South America, Asia 
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and Europe.594 Many national from these regions have been arrested trying to 
traffic drugs via Uganda. Unfortunately, the police whose mandate is to keep 
law and order has been accused of complicity —arresting criminals and 
confiscating drugs but failing to present exhibits in courts of law. This has 
raised suspicions that either confiscated drugs are used by police officers, 
exploiting weak anti-drugs laws or they themselves indulge in drug dealing in 
order to supplement their meagre incomes.595 The unfortunate outcome is that 
unless there is compelling evidence adduced on arrested person the tradition 
in criminal law is that the judge cannot convict them. 
 
5.3 Grand experiences of corruption across countries 
 
Corruption is manifested by the money stolen by public officials and siphoned 
out of the country into private bank accounts abroad.  According to Nyang 
Declaration on recovery and repatriation of African stolen wealth: an 
estimated US $ 20-40 billion has been illegally appropriated from the World’s 
poorest countries, most of them in Africa by politicians, soldiers, and other 
state officials and secured abroad in the form of cash, stocks, bonds, real 
estate and other Assets.596 Suharto and his family are accused of having 
amassed a US$45 billion of wealth during his 32 years in power.597 Ferdinand 
Marcos, while in power for 20 years in the Philippines is believed to have 
stolen an estimated US$ 10 billion. Mubuto Seseko in his 30 years rule as the 
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president of Zaire is believed to have stolen over US$30 billion, much of 
which was either money that had been given to Zaire in development aid or 
accrued from illegal mineral deals with international businesses.598 During the 
period 1995 to 2001, Haiti, Iran, Nigeria, Pakistan and Philippines claimed 
losses ranging from $500 millions to $35 billions due to corruption committed 
by former leaders or senior public officials.599 Much of this illicit money is said 
to have been siphoned out to friendly countries around the World through the 
international banking system. Mobutu was well known by the World Bank and 
the IMF to be appropriating 30-50 percent of funds for capital investment 
every year.600 Some critics have argued the World Bank should have stopped 
lending to the Mubutu regime. It did not stop lending to Mobutu and neither 
did it intervene in any other way until 1993.601 This is because corruption was 
then viewed as a political matter outside the mandate of the World Bank and 
IMF, and deemed to be exclusively dealt with by individual countries.602 To by-
pass obligations under international law, states, such as Switzerland have 
sold off state owned enterprises so that they become non-state entities.  
Investigations by the Swiss Federal Banking Commission (SFBC) found 
US$660 millions belonging to the former president Sani Abacha of Nigeria in 
Swiss banks.603 In 1999, the Swiss government called upon five private banks 
in Switzerland to freeze accounts held in the name of Abacha’s son—
Mohammed, believed to contain millions of dollars plundered from the 
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Nigerian central bank and oil revenue.604 In January 2000, the Swiss bank 
froze £390 million in accounts belonging to Abacha and his associates.605 
Recently, the Swiss central bank has revealed the stash of money allegedly 
stolen by different African politicians and deposited into Switzerland different 
bank accounts.606  
 
                                                      Table 2 
 
  
A further amount of US$540 million belonging to Sani Abacha was located in 
Luxembourg and Liechtenstein. Unspecified amount of money was allegedly 
deposited with Barclays bank and efforts to recover it by the Nigerian 
government, has seemingly faded on technicalities.607The complexities of 
recovering stolen assets are many, not least the need for sustained efforts of 
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experts in forensic accounting, money laundering, civil and criminal laws of 
different countries as well expertise in international law.608 The second hurdle 
is that the process of repatriating assets abroad is highly expensive requiring 
judicial and tax experts, transporting evidence and witnesses, translating 
testimony and carrying our investigations and prosecutions. There is also the 
overlap of civil and criminal law—which involves different procedures, 
safeguards, burdens of proof and remedies.609  The introduction of a global 
AML court would ease the recovery of wealth stolen by political leaders such 
as Sani Abacha of Nigeria by providing a neutral judicial forum to adjudicate 
matters of money laundering, at least in relation to overcoming procedural 
differences between states. By estimate (since no body can impute an exact 
figure), Sani Abacha in his ten years rule as the president of Nigeria is 
believed to have stolen a total of US$5billion.610He is believed to have stolen 
a whooping fortune of somewhere between US $ 2.2 billions to US $ 4 billions 
through a network of foreign banks. It has not proved easy for the Nigerian 
authorities to identify Sani Abacha’s stolen assets and to repatriate them 
because of banking secrecy laws and the clandestine nature of money 
laundering operations. Similarly, no body not even the Nigerian government 
has been able to clearly identify which jurisdictions the assets stolen by 
Abacha are located.611 Implausibly, funds given to some countries in 
development aid; and to assist with the prevention and treatment of diseases 
such Malaria, TB, HIV/AIDS has vanished, courtesy of public officials in 
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corrupt governments.612 The down side of siphoning money out of the country 
is that it undermines the economy by reducing foreign currency reserves, 
reducing foreign Aid, reducing the tax base, harming competition, free trade 
and accelerating poverty. Corruption creates laxity in application of laws, 
systems and procedures which have been enacted to govern markets. The 
foregoing challenge is not helped by lack of harmonisation of anti-corruption 
laws since different countries operate different laws and approaches in 
dealing with the scourge of corruption. 
 
In the jurisprudence of English courts, money accrued in corruption is 
recoverable as it is deemed to be held on a constructive trust in the interest of 
the principal. The issue here is clearly illustrated by their Lordships decision in 
the case of AG of Hong Kong Kong v. Reid.613 The defendant (Mr Reid) had 
already successfully been prosecuted and serving a jail term but that 
notwithstanding, the government of Hong Kong decided to bring a civil law 
claim to recover the properties, which Reid had bought in New Zealand. The 
judgement was delivered in favour of the government of Hong Kong as the 
said properties were bought from the proceeds of crime and deemed to have 
been held on trust for the principal—the government of Hong Kong. According 
to Lord Templeman, “When a bribe is accepted by the fiduciary in breach of 
his duty then he holds that bribe on trust for the person to whom the duty was 
owed.”614  
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In situation where the property has appreciated in value, the defendant cannot 
be entitled to the surplus of the original value since he/she would have 
benefited from his illegal conduct—the breach of duty. If this was to be 
allowed, the defendant would benefit from his illegality contrary to the tenets 
of English law.615 It is therefore vital as part of the wider anti-corruption 
measures that states co-operate in ensuring that assets accrued from stolen 
wealth are recovered by states where the money originally came from. 
However the assets in question will have to be identified before recovery 
proceedings can be initiated, under what in English Law is known as common 
law tracing. Where the asset has been used to purchase other assets then it 
might be advisable to identify the beneficial ownership in those new assets. 
For instance, money originally stolen from the government could have been 
used to purchase a house in England. This “house” would constitute “proceed 
of crime” and subjected to common law tracing. Where the original asset has 
dissipated, equity allows the plaintiff to identify in the hands of the defendant 
what remains of the original asset. If the trust asset has been mixed up, given 
the fact that money accrued from corruption is money deemed to be held on 
constructive trust in the interests of its rightful beneficiaries, the defendant is 
deemed to have used his own money first and whatever remains is deemed to 
be the trust fund.616 Assuming that the defendant uses money, which was 
initially accrued from corruption to buy a house, he then sells the house and 
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uses the proceeds to buy a car and deposits the balance into his account, the 
money in the account would be held on trust (constructive trust) in the interest 
of rightful beneficiaries. In other situations, where in a mixed fund the 
defendant spends all the money previously in the account and then buys 
shares to the value of the trust fund, the second withdrawal is deemed to be 
the trust money and the shares will be trust assets.617 The foregoing analysis 
lays down the law on stolen assets held in various jurisdictions by corrupt 
government individuals. The beneficiary governments should file court 
proceedings in countries where those assets are held to recover them as their 
legitimate assets. 
 
 In my view, assets recovery is a vital component of the global anti-corruption 
strategy because it has the advantage of repatriating them to the rightful 
owners. Public sector corruption is seemingly more rampant in developing 
countries due to lack of robust democratic institutions—which undermines 
accountability of state officials. Secondly, political powers tend to be 
congregated around state officials and individuals, allowing them the latitude 
to commit corruption with impunity. Corrupt leaders have been allowed the 
latitude to literally do whatever they want. Political leaders have used their 
discretion to influence the creation of pernicious laws in parliament, and to 
exercise their enormous discretion in the interpretation of laws created by 
Parliament.618 In many developing countries, corrupt state officials will be 
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easily elected to high political offices democratically. They would have 
accumulated wealth to “splash” on rigging votes and make sure they retain 
majority representation in parliament to push through desired programmes. 
Corrupt governments are sustained by making sure that they have majority 
representation in parliament not only to push through the desired 
programmes; but also to use their positions and protect their economic 
empires from crumbling.619 In East Africa (particularly in Kenya and Uganda), 
honest public officials are resented by their corrupt governments because 
they are perceived as “a thorn in a foot.” On the other hand, in DCs, 
corruption can easily be checked through transparent and democratic national 
institutions. The democratic institutions would have generated democratic 
values and practices’, setting high standards every prospective and present 
leader aspires to live up to. While corruption is committed in both DCs and 
LDCs, the difference is that in DCs, it is rarely perpetuated through state 
institutions.620 In LDCs, corrupt leaders are estimated to steal up to 50 percent 
of the money meant to finance national budgets, but also 70 percent of the 
population is said to live on less than US$1 a day.621  
 
Corruption impoverishes economies by diverting resources from development 
programmes. It undermines democratic institutions and the rule of law; and it 
also creates a palatable environment for those contemplating to commit 
money laundering and its predicate offences. It is worthy of mention that 
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money accrued in corruption constitutes the proceeds of crime within the 
extended definition of money laundering.622 Corruption has also become a 
mechanism to facilitate the process of placing tainted money into the 
mainstream financial system and to get it wired out of the country as 
legitimate.623  As countries embrace the global AML money laundering 
framework, it will reduce the appetite for those contemplating to commit it by 
rendering it a potentially risky business to partake in.624 
 
The rampant corruption across most African countries has precipitated a 
palatable environment for different criminal groups to operate in individual 
countries with ease.625 Organised criminal groups have resorted to money 
laundering to cleanse the proceeds of crime.626 In vulnerable societies with 
poor salary schemes, public officials can easily turn a blind eye to the 
obvious; creating an avenue for criminal exploitations such as money 
laundering. In Uganda, corruption and money laundering have been 
manifested not least by businesses colluding with tax officials to evade their 
levies on goods, to under-declare merchantable goods and swindling 
government funds by those in elevated public offices.627 There are two factors 
which underpin the issue of corruption in Uganda: the first is arbitrary 
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enforcement of engendered laws; the second is an ingrained corruption 
culture at various layers of the society. As regards arbitrary enforcement of 
laws, enforcement agencies should demonstrate a uniform application of laws 
and procedures to ensure that laws are applied and enforced equally across 
the board. Laws should not be rigorously enforced on the powerless but 
should instead have applicability across the board. In any case, a good law 
should aim at protecting the vulnerable in society not the rich—who have 
wherewithal to wriggle themselves out of trouble with the law.   
 
Poor salary schemes of working class coupled by ostentatious lifestyles—
spurred on by advanced technology such as the use of mobile phones, TVs, 
Sky sports, expensive cars are traded across countries. This has fuelled 
corruption whereby public servants aspire to live ostentatious lifestyles on 
poor salary schemes.628 There is also the issue of disparities in incomes 
between the top executives of corporations (who are paid in US dollars); and 
the middle tier group of workers (who are paid dismal salaries or wages in 
Uganda Shillings for the case of Uganda). Corruption has flourished in an 
environment of poverty and ignorance because public goods and services and 
rights are perceived as generosity by the recipients. These are rights to 
citizens and should hold corrupt public officials to account. Even if the delivery 
of projects is shoddy, recipients see themselves as luckier to receive a 
shoddy service than not to have them. There is a need for ethical training of 
public servants to change a culture of corruption at multiple layers of the 
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society.  At a corporate management level, this study proposes the need for 
ethical training of managers and employees to demonstrate a high level of 
commitment to normative moral ethics, leadership and good corporate 
governance. Businesses should be encouraged to engage with employees 
and outside consultants to identify potential corruption areas and deal with 
them properly.629 Laws should not only be passed for purposes of appeasing 
the donor community; but should be enforced to facilitate good practices and 
good governance. There is a need for governments to institute robust 
research focusing on policy and development challenges facing the country; 
but also there is a need for requisite data on a forward looking basis. It is also 
important for LDCs to replicate success stories in developed countries.630  
 
Corruption is manifests itself differently in different societies. For instance, in 
Uganda, besides other typologies of corruption, there is employment related 
corruption whereby sometimes jobs are allocated as a token to loyalists of the 
government.631 It can be argued that job allocation has been sublimated to 
political whims, sidelining the market mechanism of demand and supply for 
labour. In my contention, this factor has generated a counter-productive effect 
on the local markets’ potential to compete favourably in the global market 
economy. Because of corruption, money which has been earmarked for 
development projects such as developing robust institutions is diverted into 
private bank accounts of corrupt public officials.  
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Corruption has helped to derail the concerted efforts of governments in the 
implementation of normative AML/CFT counter-measures globally.632 In a 
corrupt system laws cannot work since they are manipulated to sustain 
corrupt governments. Corruption undermines national economies and is a 
threat to democratic institutions, fostering threats to human society such as 
transnational organised crimes and terrorism.633 Owing to corruption, 80 
percent of privatised enterprises in emerging markets such as Russia are said 
to be controlled by criminals and their syndicates, and of these enterprises 40 
percent are currently owned by the Russian mafia.634 While privatisation was 
initially intended to counter public sector corruption, it also created 
opportunities for corruption that did not exist previously under a state 
controlled system.635 The liberalisation process introduced foreign actors into 
the domestic economy, which was initially preserved for nationals. Thus, it 
can be argued that in an inherently corrupt system, privatisation creates 
avenues for criminal exploitation including money laundering. Criminals are 
known to thrive in an inherently corrupt environment where they can 
manipulate or corrupt the system. Similarly, criminals are always ready to 
exploit any weaknesses in macro-economic policies. They do this to infiltrate 
agencies responsible for prudential supervision of financial institutions.636 It is 
my contention that for AML programmes such as CDD to work effectively, the 
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system must be able to harness the skills of accountants, auditors, lawyers, 
supervisors, prosecutors and engineers. These people are needed to service 
and keep the system afloat with its regulatory and supervisory imperatives.637 
 
Organised criminal groups have resorted to money laundering as a 
mechanism of cleansing illegally acquired assets and integrating them back 
into the mainstream financial economy. Money laundering techniques include 
smurfing, establishment of front companies, acquisition of commercial and 
non-commercial properties, remittance through non-official banking channels 
and foreign remittance. In sum, corruption destroys government institutions 
and renders many economies susceptible to financial abuse such as money 
laundering. 
  
5.4 The effect of corruption on local Institutions 
 
Corruption corrodes national institutions such as the police and the Judiciary. 
In an inherently corrupt system, the police, whose overriding mandate is to 
keep law and order by fighting crimes, becomes complicit to corruption. In 
some countries, fighting corruption has become intractable, either because of 
influence peddling or high profile public officials being implicated in corruption 
scandals. Similarly, in an inherently corrupt system, the cost of undertaking 
transactions is disproportionately high to what would ordinarily be normal 
costs. This undermines the quality of life because of corruption to increase 
high costs of living. To achieve his/her objective, the corrupt official employs 
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and education and whether those skills are requisite in the receiving country. 
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the most sophisticated means to disguise the nature of the transaction. When 
this is coupled by the time lost in prolonged negotiations, restructuring 
transactions, to avoid detection and illicit payment, has consequently put 
financial strains on business, reducing the time spent on official work, and 
reaping employers by being paid fully for doing no work.638 It can therefore be 
inferred that firms which engage or collude in corruption can readily fall 
victims of extortion by people who take bribes—politicians, state officials, 
business managers and many more. Corruption destroys the integrity of 
company managers and employees, if they collude in or keep a blind eye to 
corruption activities and criminality.639  
 
 In UK, money laundering laws have been hamstrung in practice by the 
chronic lack of resources. This has created another challenge of disjointed 
handling of suspicious activities and the low police priority being given to 
money laundering prosecutions.640 In Uganda, corruption is manifested by the 
culture of bribes in public offices641, swindling government funds and the list 
goes on.642 It also has to be noted that corruption is a global issue given that 
many foreign banks would have been involved in transmitting the illicit 
proceeds of corruption for safe custody abroad. There is another dimension 
that rapid privatisation encouraged through the financial sector reforms of the 
world bank was seen as an opportunity for corrupt leaders either to reward 
their cronies or to enrich themselves and members of their families. 
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Privatisation presented opportunities for corrupt governments to own formerly 
owned state assets and to reward their royalists.  The transfer of assets from 
public to private ownership is technically known as privatisation. Since 
privatisation was initially designed to reduce the role of the state in market 
operations such as the use of subsidies, to relieve stretched government 
budgets and to instil discipline and to stimulate the economy, this objective 
was not achieved in some economies.643 It was evident in Kenya that from 
simple to sophisticated commercial contracts, privatisation process was 
abused to reward government cronies or associates of then ruling government 
officials.644In view of this, in 1997, the World Bank imposed lending conditions 
on Kenya. It was asked to introduce reforms in the judiciary and concrete anti-
corruption measures as a condition for borrowing from the IMF resources.645 
This was done as part of the new guidelines issued by the IMF on Corruption 
in 1997.646 The guidelines specifically mention corruption as the cause of 
diversion of public funds through misappropriation, fraud, money laundering, 
cronyism and many more. Therefore fighting corruption was viewed as part 
and parcel of promoting good governance in borrowing countries. The abuse 
of privatisation process as demonstrated in our earlier Kenyan example has 
been replicated in other African countries. In many countries privatisation was 
no longer seen as serving any good purpose since it was exploited as a 
vehicle to divert benefits away from the public, often to the corrupt 
government officials. With the proliferating private sector, services that were 
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initially affordable under the old regime became highly priced beyond the 
reach of the poor. This was demonstrated by privatisation of water in Kenya 
service provisions and hospitals in other parts of Africa putting essential 
services delivery exclusively beyond the reach of the poor and other socially 
disadvantaged groups. On the contrary, privatisation was responsible for 
accelerating high levels of unemployment, high child mortality rates and 
increased death rates from minor curable diseases in many third world 
countries.647 Besides the fact that restructuring of economies across countries 
was abused to perpetuate corruption, it also undermined the stability of some 
countries. In Uganda the haphazard way in which the SAPs reform 
programmes were implemented tilted the political landscape to unpopularity of 
initially venerated political leaders, created disenchantment; resurrected the 
antipathy and despondence reminiscent of the old turbulent past.648 Added to 
this was the demobilisation of civil servants in an attempt to shrink the size of 
the public sector. This created a palatable climate and a pool of resources to 
feed and reinforce many rebel groups in the country where the disengaged 
soldiers were easily enlisted.649 In my view, donors have been more 
interested in markets, exports and political influence than the long-term health 
of beneficiary countries.650 As such, the market economy has undermined the 
tenets of self-determination with regard to the sovereign people’s rights to 
determine their own destiny. It has reduced the power of the individual nation 
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states to shape and determine their destinies through participation in the 
democratic process. The ability of governments to pursue development, full 
employment or other national economic goals has been impaired by the 
power of capital to pick and leave.651 As for the third World Countries, they 
have been caught in a relentless downward spiral due to the SAPs and other 
economic vagaries.652 While corruption is as old as mankind, corruption in 
countries like Uganda was fuelled by the poor sequencing of normative reform 
programmes under SAPs in the early 1980s.653 For those who had been 
sidelined by a liberalised market economy, corruption would be viewed 
literally as “a means to justify the end”; and for those in elevated official 
government positions, privatisation presented an opportunity to own one of 
the formerly government properties. On the positive note, the liberalisation of 
Uganda economy has accrued conspicuous benefits such as easy access to 
foreign currency, a robust private sector and other obvious benefits to the 
economy.654 
 
Even though countries may share the same outlook on how to fight certain 
crimes, it needs to be noted that countries have different vested interests. 
They would embrace global the envisaged regimes if they expected to gain 
some synergies—pecuniary or non-pecuniary. Otherwise, some countries 
tend to always err on the side of caution and exhibit the kind of “I don’t care 
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attitude” towards global regimes.655 As such, the so called ‘global village’ has 
failed to constitute itself fully as a coherent single viable community subjected 
to the single set of rules.656 Besides inter-state alliances, some states would 
not want to be seen acting intrusively, paternalistically, imperialistically. The 
charges are often made whenever one state seeks to impose its discretionary 
values upon another.  
 
The global AML/CFT regimes are by their very nature are inclined to favour 
DCs than LDCs. While I agree that well resourced countries should initiate 
normative regimes and to provide leadership, engendered regimes should be 
preceded by wide consultations in participating states. Corruption has 
stubbornly remained a serious issue for many countries despite the 
proliferation of anti-corruption regimes, both at an individual government and 
international levels. Corruption is the reason why dirty money continues to 
flow into many countries financial centres using the international banking 
system unhindered. Therefore there is need for affirmative action across 
countries to deny corrupt leaders opportunities to secure stolen assets in any 
country.657 Here globalisation can play a significant role by bringing some 
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societies into the fold of prolific progressive societies,658 and leveraging poor 
countries by bringing transactional costs down. 659 
 
5.5 The liability of financial institutions in alleged corruption offences 
 
Financial institutions such as banks which accept deposits realised from 
corruption could be liable for assisting an offender to transmit the proceeds of 
crime. The bank could also be liable for having committed an offence of 
dishonest assistance, if it is proved that the bank acted dishonestly in 
accepting deposits after it had suspected or known that the deposits in 
question is accrued from corruption. However, the prosecution will have to 
prove that the bank by so doing acted dishonestly. Bearing in mind, the Privy 
Council decision in Royal Brunei Airlines v Tan660, acting dishonestly means 
“not acting as an honest person would act in the circumstances.”661 It is an 
objective standard in criminal law for the Jury to demonstrate that by 
accepting deposits accrued from corruption the bank fell below the ordinary 
standard of an ordinary honest man in those circumstances.662 The bank’s 
action would have been dishonest according to the ordinary standards of a 
reasonable honest person. This means that it must realise that its action by 
accepting deposits accrued from corruption had by the standards of an 
ordinary honest person fallen below what was expected of it.663  
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However, banks can only be held liable for knowing receipt where there is 
compelling evidence that it had knowledge of the underlying breach of 
trusteeship. The knowing receipt is not based upon the receipt by the 
defendant of any trustee property but on the participation in the trustee 
fraud.664 For example, where the bank knowingly issues cheques or letters of 
credit or any other financial products, to facilitate a person who is attempting 
to launder money generated from criminal activity, where established, the 
bank will be liable for knowing assistance. Likewise, where the bank accepts 
money knowingly from someone who has stolen government funds, the bank 
could be liable. The foregoing illustration explains how banks could be liable 
in cases of corruption; but it also provokes an important question worthy of 
asking. How is the bank deemed to have knowledge of the surrounding 
circumstances in relation to the money it receives from customers? Since 
banking is a business, one can argue that a bank should not be invidiously 
made to act as a policeman in apprehending criminals. Similarly, it can also 
be argued that while banking is a business and therefore profit driven, the 
bank is bound by regulatory guidelines in its operations.665 Therefore the bank 
should make necessary inquiries and satisfy itself that the money it is 
accepting as deposits is not tainted proceeds of crime. In Development Pty 
Limited v DPC Estate Pty Limited,666knowledge is circumscribed by the 
following elements: (i) Actual Knowledge; (ii) wilfully shutting one’s eyes to the 
obvious; (iii) Wilfully and recklessly failing to make such inquiries as an honest 
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and reasonable person would make; (iv) Knowledge of the circumstances 
would indicate the facts to an honest and reasonable person. What if 
someone, whose account has always had persistent liquidity problems, and 
all of a sudden, just splashes millions of dollars into his/her bank account, the 
bank should follow the required reporting guidelines.667 But what if it takes a 
bribe and ignores the required AML guidelines such as CDD, then the bank 
will be liable for knowing assistance. This offence is committed where the 
bank knowingly assists or facilitates someone to committee a crime. 
 
5.7 Conclusion 
 
Finally, it needs to be reiterated that corruption is both a cause and effect of 
money laundering.  As a cause, it provides an avenue for the commission of 
money laundering crimes by disabling legal systems and national institutions 
in discharging their AML obligations. As an effect, corruption generates a 
palatable environment for money laundering to flourish either within an 
individual country or to facilitate criminals to perpetuating money laundering. 
Corruption undermines democracy and the rule of law, creates an 
environment for violence, violation of human rights, and erodes markets and 
human rights. In the foregoing environment the system is disabled and 
susceptible to abuse by those contemplating to perpetuate money laundering 
and its predicate crimes across regions. Corruption is exploited as a means 
by criminals and their syndicates to establish firmly into some countries. 
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Corruption has precipitated poverty by encouraging diversion of funds from 
development purposes into private bank accounts of its perpetrators. Some 
LDCs have enacted anti-corruption law without success because laws in a 
corruption ridden environment laws cannot work. This is not to mention that 
corruption creates poverty, eviscerating the capacity of individual states to 
fight its potential threats. 
 
Money laundering and corruption are embedded within each other but the 
former supersedes the latter in terms of the damage it afflicts on societies. 
Since money laundering is integral to the underground criminal enterprise, 
one can argue that this typology of money laundering is not as lethal as 
corruption committed by public officials of corrupt governments across Africa. 
In my view, corruption should be elevated as a major human rights issue 
given its devastating impact on the lives of people especially in LDCs. By 
underestimating the negative effect of corruption on development underscores 
why it has been treated with soft hands in many countries. Therefore money 
laundering and corruption as serious financial crimes need to be taken more 
serious and to be accorded the same level of attention at an international 
level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 238 
CHAPTER SIX: STRENGTHENING LOCAL AND GLOBAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter articulates the importance of global and local institutions in the 
domesticating global AML/CFT laws. Law as a set of formal written rules 
cannot be implemented effectively, unless it is internalised through robust 
national institutions. National institutions are critical components of the global 
AML framework and in enhancing the adoption of normative changes across 
countries. States are required to adopt appropriate institutional measures and 
to provide competent authorities such as courts and the police with necessary 
duties, powers and sanctions. The AML national institutions should develop 
measures to enable national governments respond effectively to cross-border 
and other overlapping policy challenges. The European Union has been 
successful in fostering policy changes across its member states through its 
four functional institutions—the Council, the Commission, the parliament and 
the European court of Justice (ECJ). Similarly, states subscribing to the global 
initiatives should do so through institutions of experts (modelled on the 
equivalent of the committee of wise men under Lamfalussy in the integration 
of financial markets in Europe) to filter through the proposed policy measures 
and expedite the implementation of normative reforms across countries. 
National institutional mechanisms should be designed with checks and 
balances to minimize abuse and withstand exigencies of globalization on the 
state. 
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6.2 The IGG as a specialist anti-corruption institution in Uganda 
 
The IGG in Uganda was set up as an independent anti-corruption institution, 
primarily to champion the war against corruption in public offices. The 
institutionalisation of anti-corruption campaign in Uganda has registered some 
success in investigating corruption-related cases, gathering evidence and 
arraigning offenders for prosecution. Specifically the IGG’s mandate was to 
co-ordinate and enforce the anti-corruption norms within the framework of the 
United Nation Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC,2005) and the African 
Union (AU, 2001) anti-corruption instruments in Uganda.  
 
The UNCAC and AU require state parties to establish autonomous agencies 
to monitor and eliminate corruption in public offices.668 For instance, the 
African Union anti-corruption Convention requires state parties to set up 
autonomous national agencies to enforce the prosecution of corruption related 
offences.669 The UNCAC stipulates that where there is a significant increase 
in the Assets of a public official for which no reasonable explanation, in 
relation to his lawful income is given, an offence of illicit enrichment is 
committed.670 Illicit enrichment means that where there is significant increase 
in the assets of a public official or any other person which he or she cannot 
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reasonably explain in relation to his or her declared sources of income, then 
they have committed this offence.671 The UN commitment to fighting 
corruption is underscored by Article 24 of UNCAC, which deals with the 
concealment of the proceeds of corruption.672 Proceeds of corruption are 
defined as “Assets of any kind corporeal or incorporeal, movable or 
immovable, tangible or intangible and any document or legal instrument 
evidencing title to or interests in such assets acquired as a result of an act of 
corruption.”673 The foregoing Article stipulates that where an individual who 
has not participated in corruption conceals or retains property, which he 
knows is a result of an offence of corruption; he or she will be committing an 
offence of concealment.674 The IGG has been applauded for its efforts in 
fighting corruption against public officials in Uganda. For instance, it has 
instituted investigations, generated information and evidence and arraigned 
corrupt public officials for prosecution. However, the IGG has encountered 
some challenges in carrying out investigations against some public officials as 
well. I presume this supposedly due to the manner in which its top officials are 
appointed—handpicked by the president and naturally subservient to the 
government.675 Because of these dynamics, corruption cases are selectively 
prosecuted focusing largely on mavericks in the ruling government. The 
juxtaposition of  success and failure of the IGG as an anti-corruption institution 
in Uganda demonstrates that national institutions in LDCs cannot work 
independently of governments in executing their mandate; and in investigating 
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alleged corruption cases. Like other oversight institutions across LDCs, the 
biggest challenge to the IGG is influence peddling which is partly precipitated 
by the manner of appointment of its top officials.  Similarly, in many LDCs, the 
implementation of desired regimes is derailed by the weak law enforcement 
mechanisms and ignorance of the populace. Ignorance creates a situation 
where people are sidelined due to lack of knowledge and understanding of 
their rights and responsibilities. The issue of wide spread ignorance has been 
exploited as an avenue for political expediency in some societies. Political 
powers are congregated around state officials to afford them the latitude to 
literally do whatever they want. There is evidence that the IGG has been soft 
handed in implementation of its mandate on certain state officials. It has 
absolved some public officials of corruption by seemingly not fully carrying out 
adequate investigations against state officials—an irony because it was 
instituted to hold to account public officials.676    
 
To avoid duplicity, officials who are appointed to lead national AML institutions 
should be vetted by non affiliated independent professional bodies such as 
International auditing firms. The issue of duplicity and conflict of interests have 
undermined national institutions in discharging their responsibilities. It is 
evident that in an environment of structural deficiencies, normative laws are 
often not implemented as expected. Laws which are not implemented cannot 
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deter undesired behaviour; and neither can they be respected in ordering the 
system. It can therefore be inferred that the institutionalisation of AML/CFT 
initiatives is essential to promote checks and balances in harnessing AML 
laws. Independent institutions are indispensable to prevent duplicitous 
situations where the accused is the judge, the jury and the executioner. While 
corruption such as bribery and kicks backs is practiced in developed 
countries, the difference with LDCs is that it is never perpetuated openly in 
public offices. 
 
The IGG in Uganda has helped to raise public awareness against 
corruption—and to focus the fight against it in the right direction.677 The IGG is 
premised on the United Nations Convention against corruption which provides 
that where there is a significant increase in the assets of a public official for 
which no reasonable explanation in relation to his lawful income is provided, 
an offence of illicit enrichment is committed.678The United Nations 
commitment to fighting corruption is further exhibited by article 24, which 
deals with the concealment of the proceeds of corruption. It also states that 
where an individual who has not participated in corruption conceals or retains 
property, which he knows is a result of an offence of corruption; he or she will 
be committing an offence of concealment.679 Thus, the donor community 
should facilitate NGOs in their work (through funding) as they are independent 
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and essential to hold national governments to account on many issues of 
national importance. 
 
International NGOs have contributed enormously to the enunciation of soft 
law instruments to regulate the global exigencies such as money laundering 
and corruption.680 NGOs have helped to fill the void in the regulatory system 
created by the shrinking role of the state.681  
 
Administratively, NGOs have provided a platform for citizenry participation to 
directly in the affairs of national self-interest, promoting issues of governance, 
government accountability, judicial reform, election reform and generally 
improving the institutional framework of governments. With regard to 
facilitating the fight against corruption and money laundering, the work of 
Transparency International (TI) cannot escape being mentioned. It has played 
a vital role, generating data on corruption and disseminating it to various 
stakeholders and often pressurising some governments to reform their 
policies. In United Kingdom for instance, TI published several articles in the 
press, echoing its working groups’ assessment and putting pressure on the 
government to introduce some legislation changes. In France, just before the 
parliamentary election in 2007, Transparency International (TI) pinpointed the 
fact that a provision in the draft legislation expressly excluded ongoing corrupt 
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arrangements. The ensuing public pressure contributed in the deletion of the 
provision.682 
 
While national anti-corruption institutions are created with internal 
mechanisms to investigate corruption cases; their capacity to prevent 
corruption is limited due to lack of independence in the way they are created. 
Technically, NGOs operate under the national law of a place where they are 
registered, and the law of the place where they are actively based. This 
means that they are controlled by national governments in terms of what they 
can and cannot do including some times being subjected to harsh licensing 
regimes. Thus, anti-corruption Institutions tend to be subservient to national 
governments—an issue which renders them either prone to manipulation, or 
inhibited in discharging their mandate independently. The IGG in Uganda has 
been criticised for its selective prosecution of alleged corruption offences. It 
has focused its attention on mavericks, leaving those who steal billions of 
public money either untouched or untouchable.683 There are very few 
prominent public officials who have been investigated or prosecuted by the 
IGG office.684 The discriminatory use of the IGG in Uganda has undermined 
the implementation of normative anti-corruption on “politically exposed 
persons (PEPS)” (such as Ministers, presidents, permanent secretaries, 
judges and many more in this category). The IGG has partly been 
opportunistically exploited to absolve prominent government officials from 
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alleged corruption charges—tactfully by suppressing investigations brought 
against them after lengthy investigative periods.685 In response to public 
outcry, the IGG has hastened to initiate investigations against some corrupt 
public officials but tactfully dropped them after public pressure has subsided.   
 
On many occasions corrupt public officials have used their financial clout to 
evade prosecution after they have been arraigned before Courts. Another 
challenge is that the majority of LDCs are deficient in investigative capacity to 
fully investigate cases and secure a successful prosecution against alleged 
corruption offences.686 Many local institutions in Uganda such as the police 
are inefficient, deficient, understaffed, partisan, unprofessional, corrupt and 
unethical. The absence of requisite human resources capacity such as 
forensic scientists has constrained the efforts of national anti-corruption 
institutions in discharging their mandate efficiently. Within the police criminal 
investigations department in the Ugandan Police, 11.1 percent of the 
prominent corruption cases lodged in 2007 and 2008 were withdrawn; and 
88.9 percent of the cases are ongoing with no determinate date to end; while 
29.4 percent of cases were acquitted.687 
 
The Director of Public Prosecution (DPP) in Uganda—a body responsible for 
ensuring that arraigned criminal cases are fully investigated is also affiliated to 
the ruling government. On many occasions, people appointed to head the 
above institution (DPP) are either affiliated to the ruling government or are the 
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close associates of the President. Therefore, there is a possibility of cases 
being prosecuted selectively or arbitrarily to protect the reputation of public 
officials or the government; and to use persecution as a means of silencing 
perceived opponents of the ruling government.688 These two factors have 
resulted in high rate of cases being dismissed after lengthy and costly 
investigations have been launched.689 It is thus essential that officials who are 
appointed to lead oversight regulatory institutions should be vetted by none 
affiliated independent professional bodies such as international accounting 
firms to avoid duplicity and conflict of interests. The manner in which top 
executives of oversight institutions are appointed in Uganda has potentially 
inhibited them from championing the mandate they were created for. There is 
need for enforcement of the envisaged AML/CFT standards to foster 
normative changes into countries. Otherwise laws which are not enforced 
cannot be taken seriously in fostering anticipated normative behavioural 
changes in the society. Local oversight institutions should be constituted with 
a monitoring mechanism such as on-site visits to ensure they are 
implemented properly as envisaged foster normative changes into the 
society.690 It would seem that some governments just create dysfunctional 
national institutions to appease the international donor community. The 
monitoring process should encourage continuous review assessments and 
civil society participation.691 There should be a clear set of rules and 
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procedures to monitor the responsiveness of the system with regard to 
anticipated normative changes.  
 
6.3 Institutionalisation based on the European Union paradigm 
 
The integration of the European member countries was fostered through its 
four functional institutions—the council, the commission, the court and 
parliament. In my view, the success of Europe as a regional market should 
provide a model for change in other regions. The integration of financial 
markets in Europe provides insights into the challenges inherent in global 
regimes692 and global governance of international finance.693 While the EU is 
without doubt a successful integration model founded on four functional 
institutions to co-ordinate EU policy details nationally, the European single 
market is far from realistic and is still fragmented. Policy guidelines are co-
ordinated through any of the four institutions of the EU: the Parliament, the 
Commission, the Council and the court constituting it as a quasi European 
super state. However, integration of financial markets in Europe is not without 
challenges given that member countries are allowed to maintain their national 
systems alongside the EU ones. Member states are only required to adopt a 
minimum level of harmonisation through the principles of home country 
control and minimum harmonisation.694 Thus the concept of global 
governance without fully-fledged global institutions such as a global 
                                                          
692
 Despite efforts at integration, financial markets are still divided highlighted by minimum 
harmonization initiatives and mutual recognition to achieve some level of convergences of 
markets. 
693
 This contention is further strengthened by the regulatory failure highlighted in the recent 
global financial crisis (2009). 
694
 Council Directive 91/308/EEC 
 248 
parliament through which to govern and pursue envisaged policy details, on 
issues regarding member countries with varying backgrounds, has become a 
pertinent issue in the integration of world markets. This environment is 
capable of being exploited to cultivate conditions for criminality such as 
perpetuating money laundering and market abuse. The national financial 
institutions have played a normative role in fostering the implementation of the 
global AML/CFT standards across countries. However, local institutions 
should be created after wide consultations have been undertaken to ensure 
that the engendered institutional framework is appropriate and adaptable 
locally. The role of NGOs could be crucial in ensuring that public institutions 
such as those charged with fighting corruption and other forms of wider 
financial abuse such as money laundering are brought to book. The 
independence of NGOs gives the leverage to spearhead good governance 
and desired changes into the society. 
 
6.4 The role of NGOs 
 
International NGOs have enormously contributed to the enunciation of soft 
law instruments against money laundering and corruption crimes.695 Non-
governmental organisations have spearheaded measures to plug weaknesses 
in a national regulatory system. This has been done through raising 
awareness and pressure governments to adopt desired laws.  
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 It needs to be noted that NGOs696 are technically accorded the legal 
personality status, which means that they have the status of their own 
independent of their shareholders. They exist under national law of a state 
where they have been registered; and the law of a place where they are 
active, in case of international NGOs. They provide an essential interface for 
development in many respects. With globalisation, the state has either lost or 
ceded its traditional powers to non-state actors by reconstituting at a 
supranational level; or it has ceded its economic power to regional 
institutions.697  NGOs can provide an oversight function to ensure that 
government institutions are held to account. In many LDCs national 
institutions have been characterised by many challenges, not least being 
mismanaged, understaffed, poorly resourced and sometimes used wrongly to 
perpetuate and sustain corrupt governments in power. NGOs have helped to 
plug the weaknesses in some national governments with regard to human 
rights, policy, regulations and other development issues. 
 
NGOs have also provided a platform for citizenry participation in the affairs of 
national self-interest, promoting issues of governance, government 
accountability, judicial reforms, and election reforms and improving the 
institutional framework of governments. With regard to fighting corruption and 
money laundering, TI has been one of the prominent organisations. It 
generates and disseminates data to various stakeholders; and often 
pressurising some governments to reform their policies. In United Kingdom for 
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instance, several articles in the press echoed the Working Groups’ 
assessment and put pressure on the Government to introduce Legislative 
changes. In France, just before the parliamentary election in 2007, TI 
highlighted that a provision in the draft legislation expressly excluded on-going 
corruption arrangements. The ensuing public pressure contributed in the 
deletion of the provision.698 Thus, NGOs have been instrumental in fostering 
normative changes across countries. They have made some organisations to 
change their internal policies, procedures and to adopt compliance 
mechanisms in accordance with OECD Conventions and 
recommendations.699 In addition, Transparency International as well as 
various business associations has assisted Companies with training in 
relation to successful model of codes of conduct and compliance 
programmes.700 NGOs have provided analyses, organised and spearheaded 
debates on corruption and political party funding as a way of fighting private 
sector corruption.701 Therefore civil society organisations have been 
instrumental in enhancing the capacity of societies to fight money laundering 
and corruption. Some have been active in education and training, some in 
advocacy and other in fostering development initiatives. The independence of 
civil society organisations is based on the fact that they are not affiliated to 
governments or its public bodies and will not be inhibited to campaign against 
glaring corrupt practices and pointing out any malpractices. However, it has 
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not been easy for CSOs to function independently because of harsh licensing 
laws. Some governments have used strict licensing laws to undercut the 
influence of CSOs especially those that are viewed to be critical of the 
government.702  
 
6.5 The role of Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) 
 
 Likewise, CSOs have been instrumental in championing desired changes 
across jurisdictions. They have pressured some governments to change their 
laws and internal procedures; and to develop compliance mechanisms in 
accordance with OECD Convention and recommendations.703 In addition, TI, 
as well as various business associations, assists companies that want to learn 
more about successful models or codes of conduct and compliance 
programmes.704 CSOs have provided analyses and organised debates on 
corruption and political party funding as a way of fighting private sector 
corruption.705 Therefore CSOs have played an influential role in enhancing the 
capacity of societies in fighting money laundering and its attendant evils 
including corruption. CSOs are not affiliated to any government and will 
therefore not be inhibited in the campaign against any corrupt practices and 
money laundering for that matter. Some governments have adopted strict 
licensing laws to undercut the work of NGOs especially those organisations 
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that are viewed to be critical of the government.706 All development minded 
societies should embrace and support the work of NGOs since the majority of 
them are constituted to serve national development interests. 
 
 The work of the CSOs such as transparency international (TI) has been 
essential in facilitating states with information gathering and in engaging with 
governments on issues such as corruption and other forms of market abuse. 
There is need for a global court based on the model of the ECJ in the 
European Union. The court through its influence can easily engender a 
change in social attitude to foster a positive development ethos for stability of 
markets. The court would also be used as a forum for dispute settlement (as 
the WTO), elaboration and enforcing compliance on emerging global AML 
norms. Although the majority of AML regimes are imbued with sanctions 
mechanism, the fact that sanctions are invoked in a coercive manner has not 
helped in fostering compliance among member states. What states do instead 
is to express their discontent by circumventing engendered regimes under the 
ratified treaties.707The court through elaboration process would ease 
resentment against emerging AML regimes, thus causing the engendered 
norms to be internalised. Apparently, the issue of prosecuting money 
laundering cases in national courts signifies that the culprit (often well 
resourced) can exploit weaknesses in the national legal system to stay at 
large. The global court would help to fill gaps in the enforcement of AML 
regimes to ensure they are not exploited by the launderers to further his 
                                                          
706
 Some governments have sometimes used threats to interfere with the work of civil society 
organization especially those which are seen to be critical of the government. 
707
 States entered into an arrangement (deals) to sign the treaty subject to certain 
reservations, which may constrain the implementation of the provisions of treaty in the state. 
 253 
criminal enterprise. Short of that, money laundering is likely to remain a 
challenge for the international community for many years to come. 
 
6.6 Judicial Institutions 
 
There is a need for strengthening judicial institutions to foster the fight against 
money laundering and its predicate crimes across countries.708 These 
institutions will ensure that money laundering as a serious international crime 
is not pushed to the fringes of the law, as it seemingly is today.709 Firstly, 
money laundering crimes are not amenable within the realm of national law 
alone. It can be argued that the absence of a global court manifests the 
weakness of the current global AML framework. Secondly, the complexity of 
money laundering offences means that they can be jurisdictional problematic 
and beyond the reach of individual states. The proposed global court could 
potentially play a fundamental complimentary role to domestic courts in 
reinforcing international measures on money laundering. The weakest link in 
the current global AML framework is the absence of clear enforcement 
mechanisms of engendered supervisory or regulatory regimes. Apparently, 
because of the overlapping nature of money laundering offences, it is not 
easy to prosecute them in mainstream domestic courts. The current global 
AML laws though laudable in theory, do not go far enough in practice, with 
regard to forestalling threats posed by money laundering and its predicate 
offences.  
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6.7 The Complexity of Money laundering Offences 
 
The intricate money laundering process can involve sovereign states, state 
institutions, banks, state officials, criminals, criminal syndicates, complex legal 
systems, international treaties, different cultures and traditions and the list 
goes on and on. When the foregoing institutional challenges are compounded 
by differences and fragmentation of national AML legislation, it has facilitated 
the growth of illicit criminal activity around the globe.710 Criminals have 
exploited the discrepancies between different legal systems of countries in 
different parts of the world to gain access in the new markets. The tendency 
of national legal systems is to give priority to the place of commission under 
the territoriality principle but as this situation envisages there may be other 
intricacies beyond the scope of the above principle.  
 
 6.8 The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
 
With the introduction of the ICC in international arena, it has become apparent 
that culprits who commit heinous crimes against humanity as opposed to the 
traditional approach of only holding states accountable, are also brought to 
book, and if found guilty in respect of the alleged crimes, are punished 
accordingly. Article 13 (b) of the Statute, provides for jurisdiction in any case 
where a territory or nationality state has ratified the Statute, in which one or 
more of such crimes appears to have been committed. The ICC has a specific 
jurisdiction over offences committed by a state which has nationality or 
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territorial jurisdiction over the state party to the Statute.711 The ICC was 
created by the Rome Statue in 1998 with a limited specific mandate (which 
limits its capacity) to prosecute all international crimes. It has the mandate on 
crimes such as genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.712 These 
crimes include wide spread or systematic attacks against civilians, such as 
murder, torture and rape.713The inception of the ICC and the formation of a 
body of crimes against humanity, signified a new era in international law 
because individuals and groups as well as states would directly be held 
accountable under international criminal law.714 
 
However, the fact that the ICC was not constituted with a universal mandate 
on all aspects of international crimes, such as money laundering, supports the 
need for an AML court, to close the vacuum in the international criminal 
system. The inception of a global court would fill the void in the law of money 
laundering, apparently which capable of being exploited by money launderers 
to commit money laundering offences and stay at large. In my view, the 
drafters of the Rome Statute (1998) missed an opportune moment to bring 
money laundering within the jurisdiction of the ICC. The fact that the Rome 
Statute (1998) was constituted with a narrow mandate excluding money 
laundering was a cause for concern. It is on this issue that the whole 
argument gets misplaced of constituting wide spread violations of human 
rights without recognizing that money laundering and its predicate offences 
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such as plunder, looting national wealth had an equivalent lethal effect on 
people and societies as other offences prescribed under the statute. This 
provokes the question—what are human rights, if millions of people dying 
from simple curable diseases such as Malaria, TB, HIV/AIDS and the list go 
on courtesy of money launderers through diversion of funds (earmarked for 
treatment of diseases), are not treated within the framework of human rights? 
 
6.9 Time for a global AML court 
 
There is the need for a global court to compliment national judicial institutions 
in fostering the adoption of global AML regimes nationally.715 The proposed 
global court would serve as neutral judicial forum to adjudicate on overlapping 
money laundering cases. The court would help to circumvent the challenges 
posed by multiple jurisdictions, different legal cultures and shifting attitudes 
towards anticipated societal changes. Courts have the potential to change 
local attitudes by cultivating a rule based culture and fostering changes in 
social attitudes within states. Law dictates and articulates the societal future 
direction but law also defines the way of life of a society. The global AML 
court as an institution would engender an ethos based on changing needs of 
the society and in the long run foster a positive anti-money laundering global 
framework.716 Law, including money laundering laws needs to reside in an 
institutional framework to function and it would equally make perfect sense for 
the proliferating AML/CFT to reside within a global institutional framework. 
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With the AML court adjudicating cases and consolidating decisions, it will be 
easy to develop an information portfolio and enhance the envisaged AML 
standards across countries. It needs to be noted that the common law system 
has gradually developed through consolidation of norms by courts and using 
engendered decisions in deciding future cases. Cases adjudicated by judges 
in higher courts are recorded and consolidated for use in future cases but also 
this helps to transmit a rule based ethos within the society easily. While the 
ICC has jurisdiction on crimes against humanity such as genocide, money 
laundering remained subject to national criminal law and is justiable under 
national jurisdictions. Thus, money laundering is prosecuted in a state where 
the alleged offences were committed.  
 
The individual state would only make formal request for the perpetuators of 
the alleged terrorist’s acts to be extradited to the country the said crimes were 
committed. In passing the Rome Statute in 1998 and the subsequent creation 
of the ICC, member states limited its mandate to a list of specific crimes to 
make it robust and resourceful. Besides, it was argued717 that the amount of 
investigations that would be involved in undertaking criminal trials of terrorist’s 
acts coupled with the legal intricacies involved, acts of terrorism would remain 
in the realm of national government’s jurisdiction.718  
 
                                                          
717
 Dapo Akande, ‘The Jurisdiction of International Criminal Court over nationals of non-
parties: Legal Basis and Limits’, (2003), 1 Journal of International criminal Justice, 618-634. 
718
 The 1937 League of Nations Conventions on the Prevention and Punishment of 
Terrorism—which addressed states directly, no any other international treaty had been 
adopted on terrorism until the Rome Convention 1998. It should also be said that even the 
Rome Convention did not primarily address terrorism—choosing instead to leave it within the 
jurisdiction of domestic states. 
 258 
With regard to the mechanics of a global court, it should be based on the 
model some professions are in England and Wales are regulated. 
Professional oversight bodies in England and Wales are constituted with 
internal disciplinary mechanisms of admonishing their members who flout 
internal code of conduct. For example, disciplinary action may be taken 
against auditors who have not complied with regulatory or professional 
requirements.719 In R v. Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales, ex parte Bridle720, Price Water House faced civil action over the 
liability of its auditors of BCCI. The firm brought proceedings over its auditors 
but action was also brought in civil Courts. On appeal, the Court of Appeal 
found it inherently unfair that more than one tribunal could litigate the case at 
the same time. However, the exceptional nature of the case was appreciated 
and the decision reached that only small cases not accompanied by civil 
actions could proceed through the regulatory process.721 The court can help 
to reinforce normative AML regimes by elaborating how norms should be 
domesticated. 
 
The role of courts is interlia to settle disagreements or uncertainties about the 
scope and nature of problematic activity and achieving some semblance of 
order through judicial interpretation of statutory principles.722However, given 
the informality in which many AML regimes have emerged and the 
concomitant fact of being dominated by a handful of a few market players, 
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tensions are likely to creep up and to derail the proliferating AML system. By 
informalism, i mean the manner in which regimes on money laundering are 
created by way of adhoc arrangement often dominated by a handful of a few 
countries. Legal institutions are said to be informal when they are 
nonbureaucratic in structure and relatively undifferentiated from the larger 
society, minimize the use of professionals, and eschew official law in favour of 
substantive and procedural norms that are vague, unwritten, 
commonsensical, flexible, ad hoc and particularistic.723  
 
The proposed global court would diffuse tensions and help to foster 
harmonious interstate relations. It would also apply engendered judicial 
decisions as paradigms to settle contentious future cases. This would 
potentially ease the adoption of global regimes and co-existence of countries 
on issues of global governance. It must be appreciated that the apparent 
weakness in the international legal system today is the weak enforcement 
mechanisms of engendered regimes, which renders the evolved framework 
weak and susceptible to abuse. The court would add clarity on the 
consumption of rules by articulating paradigms on overlapping money 
laundering and related issues.724 In theory, soft law regimes are evolved as 
regulatory guidelines, but in practice states have got to transpose them. It is 
here that the proposed court would enhance the assimilation of AML 
standards by proffering definitions in the broadest terms possible, based on 
the anticipated policy objectives of different policy domains. Where 
rules/norms are arbitrarily applied or at variance with norms of international 
                                                          
723
 Heba Shams, LEGAL GLOBALISATION, Money Laundering law and Other Cases, Sir 
Joseph Memorial series, (British Institute of International and Comparative Law 2004), 244. 
724
Shams, (n 723). 
 260 
law, given the informal nature in which many AML regimes have evolved, the 
court would bring its weight to bear by rendering those anomalies 
incompatible with the law or referring them to the legislative authority for the 
defects to be removed. Courts could foster standards by evaluating informal 
agreements and articulating criteria by which agreements are to be 
internalized; generating information needed to enhance normative AML 
practices.725 In so doing, the court would potentially play a normative role in a 
two-fold way. It would ease relations in the same effective way the WTO 
dispute settlement mechanism has done in relation to member states which 
violate the WTO rules.726 Secondly, the court system would bring about 
enhanced market integrity and integration within and across regions. In my 
view the use of coercion as an instrument of securing compliance of non-co-
operative states has been employed in default of a court to adjudicate matters 
of money laundering globally. There are two cases highlighting tensions 
between sovereign states and FATF in enforcement of anti-money laundering 
regimes. The first case was underscored by FATF and Austria with regard to 
anonymous passbook accounts; and the second, was Seychelles with regard 
to passing the highly condemned legislation EDA—seen to encourage money 
laundering.727 It can be inferred that FATF sanctions against NCCs are 
invoked in default of a fully-fledged global forum to adjudicate money 
laundering and its predicate crimes. It is possible that the introduction of 
judicial forum could create an institutional ethos to foster the internalization of 
engendered regulatory changes. 
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The proposed global AML court would obviate the need for coercive methods 
or dictating policies on sovereign states. States have stubbornly refused to 
transpose International treaties (the case with Iran Colombia, Afghanistan—
major producers of Narcotic drug substances) where they perceive treaties to 
be targeted at them.728 Some countries may transpose treaties but narrow the 
scope of application of the treaty, not to mention that treaties have sometimes 
not been implemented as expected. The global court would add clarity, 
certainty and predictability on how the envisaged AML regimes or norms are 
to be translated, assimilated and harnessed domestically.729  
 
With the court as an arbiter, it would help to add clarity where norms prove 
less certain, requiring entities to justify the conception of a norm, in terms of 
the process used to produce it.730 It has to be noted that courts as institutions 
have always provided mechanisms through which expected standards are 
made more transparent, public and precedential. The requisite transition from 
the local to a robust global system would be achieved through the process of 
elaboration and capacity building, consistent with the fundamentals of judicial 
practices, self-conception and institutional relations. For example, in 
integration of the European member countries, the ECJ has played a 
harmonization role whereby certain entities that are unhappy with the EU 
Directives are allowed to challenge aspects they are not happy with. Member 
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countries can seek the intervention of ECJ on EU matters they have been 
sidelined; and the court will offer its interpretation to articulate the clear 
position of EU law. In so doing it provides governance in the administration of 
EU law, helping to refocus member states to democracy and fundamental 
objectives on which the union is founded.731 
 
 The global AML court should be structured to complements national courts, in 
situations where the latter cannot adjudicate overlapping money laundering 
cases. As such national courts could also use the global court as referral, 
where domestic remedies have been exhausted or have not been enough to 
dispose the case on technicalities. The structure of the global court should 
reflect the need to fully foreclose gaps in the global AML/CFT system. The 
court’s jurisdiction should be exercised whenever domestic courts are 
deemed insufficient to dispose money laundering cases. The proposed global 
court could also be used where domestic courts are not able to prosecute 
money launderers. For instance, in situations where a state has not passed a 
law transposing its AML obligations under international law, prosecuting 
money laundering and its related offences might not be easy. The UN 
Convention on Prevention of Drugs Trafficking and Other Psychotropic 
Substances (1988) mandates member states to create institutions through 
which to deal with the threat of money laundering and its related offences.732 It 
is in this respect that the proposed global AML court can be utilized to 
overcome the foregoing dilemma. 
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The reciprocal relationship of the global and domestic courts should be 
structured to ensure where one court has already initiated proceedings on an 
issue of money laundering, the same matter should be stayed in another court 
to avoid duplicity.733 In the European Union law, where the defendant alleges 
that he/she has a defence and makes a complaint to the commission with 
respect to establishing that breach, English courts may order a stay of the 
English action pending the outcome of the alleged complaint.734It is a 
customary rule of international law that a court may not institute proceedings 
against a person for a crime that is already the object of criminal 
proceedings.735 Therefore, the ECJ and its role in streamlining the application 
of EU law across member states could be used as a model in translating the 
roles of the proposed global court. There is a need for a neutral judicial organ 
to adjudicate money laundering related offences.   
 
The need for a global court is proposed because sanctions mechanism736 
under chapter seven of United Nations Charter (1945) has lately proven 
cumbersome to invoke. It has become all too predictable that Russia and 
China are going to veto any call for sanctions proposed by the other 
permanent member states on the United Nations Security Council.737 The 
creation of the global court presided by competent judges selected across 
states on the basis of their competence would change attitudes and generate 
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support for global regulatory regimes. The court as an arbiter between 
different antagonistic blocs would lessen friction—which has lately polarized 
the United Nations Security Council in discharging its mandate. The UN 
system has been polarised by asymmetries of power—an issue which dictates 
the manner in which decisions are reached. The UN has been rendered 
inefficient on many issues because of this challenge.738 Secondly, the UN 
system is emasculated by the fact that it is manifested through another 
system—the state system. This means that when there is a conflict between 
national and international interests, vested strategic national interests are 
likely to take precedence.  
 
In order to foster an orderly global anti-money laundering system, the role of 
the court in fostering desired changes cannot be dispensed with. In my view, it 
is the missing piece of the jigsaw in configuration of a robust institutional 
framework against money laundering and its predicate threats. Unfortunately, 
in some countries, courts are not independent either because of the way 
judicial officer are appointed or compromised by the dynamics of local 
development such as poverty. The poor relationship between courts and 
governments does not only undermine administration of justice to the 
populace but also the image of respective governments internationally. For 
example, in Uganda the poor relationship between courts and the government 
is sometimes manifested by ‘intermittent clashes’ between the two organs of 
the state. This tends to stifle the courts ability in discharging their duties to the 
public.  
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6.10 The Mechanics of the proposed global court 
 
The contemporary interconnectedness of states has changed the context 
within which regulations are manifested. There is no contemporary state that 
can claim to be immune from or not to be influenced by globalisation. If the 
court system is properly utilized, given its centrality to development, it can 
foster a transnational legal order on money laundering and other proliferating 
global regimes. The court as an institution can help to streamline how 
engendered norms are to be harnessed and internalized into national legal 
jurisdictions. 
 
There are two ways of internalizing international treaties into national legal 
systems—depending on whether a state is monist or dualist. In monist 
countries, international norms take effect nationally immediately after the 
treaties generating those norms have been ratified. This is particularly 
apparent in civil law jurisdictions such as France. In dualist countries, the 
process of domesticating international law will only take effect after treaties 
have been internalized within the national legal system by passing an 
enabling legislation in parliament.739 The more monist a country is, the more 
will international obligations whether arising under a treaty or customary law 
be treated simply as part of the law, to be given effect and directly applied 
within a state. The more dualist a country is, the more difficult it is to apply 
international norms. For example, it is easy to accommodate change in 
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France, which is a monist country than it is in United Kingdom, which is a 
dualist country.740 Article 38 of the Statute of International court of Justice 
refers to the judicial decisions as source of international law. Decisions will 
underscore judgments of the International court of justice and its advisory 
opinion.741 Although judicial decisions have a great influence on national 
courts, there is a need to streamline the envisaged measures so that they 
strengthen states against overlapping global exigencies. Parliament would 
have created guidelines for domesticating international norms and how they 
should be applied nationally.742 
 
As regards prosecution of cross border crimes, the tradition is to prosecute 
them in a state where they were committed. This is predicated on the lotus 
principle, which proffers that a state has jurisdiction to try another states 
national provided the alleged crimes were committed on its territory.743 This 
means that if money laundering offences has been committed on the territory 
of another state, they can be prosecuted by the state on whose territory they 
were committed. This is predicated on the principle that if a crime is 
committed in country A, then the alleged crime is justiciable in country A.744 In 
the case of United States v. Burns745, the Canadian court stated that “an 
individual, who chooses to leave Canada, leaves behind Canadian law and 
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procedures and must generally accept the local law, procedures and 
punishment which the foreign State applies to its citizen.” The above position 
is augmented by Rivard v. United States746, where the court stated that “all 
systems of law recognise the principle that a man who outside of his country 
wilfully puts in motion a force to take effect in it is answerable at the place 
where the evil is done.”  
 
On the other hand, the territorial principle gives legal authority for a state to 
have jurisdiction on the matter, due to location of the crime and also bars 
other states from exercising jurisdiction beyond their borders.747 This principle 
is fronted on the ideological and political reasons: the need to uphold the 
principle of sovereignty which is essential in consolidating the state as an 
entity of international law.748 The principle of national sovereignty has not 
made things easy to prosecute known criminals because of the unwillingness 
of some states to cooperate. This complexity is highlighted by the difficulties 
experienced by United States and United Kingdom in trying to secure 
extradition of the Libyan Citizen, Abdel Basset Ali al-Megrahi and Lamen 
Khalifa Fhimah over the terrorist bombing of Pan Am Flight 103 over 
Lockerbie, Scotland (1988)  due to lack of Libyan cooperation.749 Thus, 
individual state governments can decline extradition of its nationals to a 
requesting state to protect its political and economic self interests. Should the 
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territory of the state be under an occupation, the occupier state is responsible 
for the crimes committed there; but where the crimes are committed on a 
state’s territorial waters or on its ships or aircraft on the high seas are 
considered committed on the territory of the state.750 This is in keeping with 
the fact that since states have different laws, a person should be punished in 
the place where one has infringed the law. Territoriality principle is also 
fronted on the reasoning that a crime which constitutes a violation of social 
contract should be punished in the place where the contract was 
breached.751The motive is to prosecute a crime in a state where it was 
committed as it is easy to collect evidence needed to secure prosecution 
against the defendant, and thus considered as forum conviniens or the 
appropriate place of trial.752 The doctrine of forum non conviniens is 
sometimes pleaded to circumvent trial in foreign jurisdictions.753 Prosecuting 
crimes in a foreign jurisdiction may be deemed inappropriate where the court 
envisages that in the interest of the parties, and administration of justice, that 
such a trial may never properly dispose the case to deliver justice. The above 
principle was highlighted in case of Bhopal to deny the US jurisdiction over 
the Indian victims of the gas leak disaster in December 1984. The Indian 
plaintiff, with the Government of India, in favour of US jurisdiction against 
Union Carbide Company of India that the Indian legal system was inadequate 
to meet the demands associated with such a complex litigation.754It was also 
argued that since the parent Union Carbide Company was registered and 
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controlled in the US that it was the US courts which had jurisdiction over the 
trial of US foreign companies.755 The above contentions were dismissed by 
the court of first instance and upheld in an appeal on the grounds that Bhopal 
case was one of an accident whose locus was in India and therefore was an 
exception to the issues arising out of parent home country control. As such, 
India was deemed to be the preferred forum of the Bhopal case. While this 
case was in relation to the trial of a foreign based company, it is still relevant 
for us in developing a fundamental principle of international criminal law 
because technically speaking, companies as juristical persons can be 
punished in the same way as natural persons. 
 
Prosecuting crimes in a place where they were committed is essential in 
safeguarding the rights of the victims. For instance, the Libyan—Ali al-
Megrahi, allegedly responsible for the bombing of Pan Am Flight 103; and the 
death of all two hundred fifty occupants over Lockerbie in 1988 was sought 
and extradited in Scotland, the place of the commission of the alleged 
offences. If the foreigner is fleetingly residing in a territory, he/she is expected 
to know the law of the territory and the criminal law in force as well as the 
rights of the defendant in criminal trial.756 When a case is tried in a place 
where it was committed, it offers psychological relief to the society that a 
wrong committed against its people is finally disposed. Moreover judges, the 
jury and advocates being members of the same local community where the 
crime was committed are aware of the local sentiments and conscious of the 
public close scrutiny of the administration of justice; and thus accountable to 
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the community to do justice.757 However, the converse is that the pressure 
generated by public sentiments could influence the jury and sway them to 
decide according to public sentiments denying justice to the defendant.758 
Where money laundering has been committed by state officials or with the 
complicity or acquiescence of the state, for example officers in diplomatic 
missions abroad, the state may be reluctant to prosecute offenders because 
of diplomatic immunity, which puts them beyond the jurisdiction of the host 
society (rationale personae). Another challenge relates to locus commissi 
delicti in the complex case crimes. This is demonstrated in a situation where 
money laundering may be planned in one country and committed in another, 
which is not the territory where trial proceedings will be instituted. The last one 
is where the person who committed the alleged wrongs has state amnesty 
preventing other states from instituting legal proceedings against him. 
However this amnesty may not be respected where it appears to conflict with 
the principle of jus cogen, the peremptory norm of international law.759  
 
Some states have passed countervailing laws to interfere in the sovereignty of 
other states—eliciting anger in the affected states. This is underscored by the 
supreme court of America’s decision in Societe Internationale pour 
Participations industrielles et Commerciales v Rodgers (Societe 
Internationale).760 The foregoing case provided a basis for US courts to order 
production of documents from jurisdictions with banking secrecy laws. While 
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Societe Internationale focused on considerations limiting sanctions when they 
conflicted with foreign secrecy laws, it did no erect an inflexible bar against 
such sanctions.761 Likewise, Westing-house Electric Corporation v. Rio 
Algom, Ltd. ruled that where two jurisdictions’ laws conflict, the person 
concerned has two options: to surrender one sovereign or the other the 
privilege received or alternatively a willingness to accept the 
consequences.762 Non-compliance has been exacted with the imposition of 
severe penalties on the person requested (including financial institutions as 
juristic persons), giving priority for US to enforce its domestic laws on other 
jurisdictions.763 Section 319 of the PATRIOT Act exports the forfeiture of 
criminal assets to financial institutions otherwise beyond American control, 
with the intended effect of coercing such financial institutions into 
implementing acceptable anti-money laundering programmes and placing 
institutions against their customers.764 This section presents foreign banks 
with two stark choices: either they have to comply with the American 
investigations and police their customers to ensure that no assets subject to 
forfeiture are ever deposited with them, accept the possibility of disruption and 
loss of termination and forfeiture of correspondent accounts or cease to do 
business directly with domestic financial institutions.765 
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6.11 The Principle of Active Nationality 
 
In some states, national courts have jurisdiction for all criminal offences 
committed by their nationals abroad. This will be the norm even if the alleged 
offences are not criminal under the law of a territorial state of nationality 
where they were committed.766 The underlying motivation is the will of a state 
to ensure that its citizens comply with its law, wherever they are, either at 
home or abroad regardless of the law of the state where the alleged crimes 
would have been committed. This principle is sometimes used to circumvent 
constitution prohibitions where a state might be required to extradite its 
nationals to another state for prosecution in a place where the alleged crimes 
would have been perpetrated. Much as some states are constitutionally 
mandated to extradite their nationals, the principle of active nationality 
ensures that its nationals do not escape justice wherever they are. However, 
where the alleged offences have been committed by the state agent or 
cronies of the government, legal proceedings may not necessary reflect the 
magnitude of the offence committed and in any case they might never be 
prosecuted.  
 
6.12 The Principle of Passive Nationality 
 
The passive personality principle allows states, in limited cases, to claim 
jurisdiction to try a foreign national for offences committed abroad that affects 
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its citizens.767 This principle asserts that states may exercise jurisdiction on 
crimes committed abroad against their nationals. This principle is grounded in: 
(ii) the need to protect nationals living or residing abroad; and (ii) it is 
motivated by a substantial mistrust in the exercise of jurisdiction by foreign 
territorial states.768For this to be the case, the state invoking this ground of 
jurisdiction also provides a broad, “double incrimination”, namely that the 
offence in question be considered as a crime in both states—the state of the 
victim and the state of defendant.769 
 
6.13 The Universality Principle 
 
Under the principle of universality, every state is under an obligation to bring 
to trial persons accused of perpetuating international crimes. By so doing, 
states will be helping to safeguard its interests as well as the interests of other 
states.770 While the purpose of bringing legal proceedings against such 
persons is a joint one, it is also motivated by the need to prosecute and 
punish (on behalf of the international community) persons responsible for 
heinous crimes such as war crimes. There are two types of a universal 
jurisdiction: (i) conditional universal jurisdiction; and (ii) absolute universal 
jurisdiction. In the first form of jurisdiction, asserts that only states where the 
accused is in custody may prosecute him or her, the so called forum 
deprehensions or jurisdiction of the place where the accused is 
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apprehended.771The second form of jurisdiction asserts that a state may 
prosecute persons accused of international crimes regardless of their 
nationality, the place of commission of a crime, the nationality of the victim, 
and or even based on the fourth Geneva Convention on international 
crimes.772 As many legal systems do not accept to present trial in absentia, 
the presence of the accused on the territory constitutes a condition for 
initiation of legal proceedings. 
 
Considering the pernicious effect of money laundering on societies; and on 
those who cannot afford basic necessities of life—food, clean drinking water, 
education and housing perpetuated by those masquerading as political 
leaders, means that money laundering is a human right issue.773 The 
ambivalence of states towards money laundering signifies that money 
laundering has not been accorded the seriousness it deserves. There is 
international consensus that money laundering is a threat to the stability of 
states. However, one wonders why states have not shown the zeal to 
implement AML/CFT regimes as envisaged.774  
 
6.14 International Police Organisation 
 
The international police organisation, augmented by other regional police 
agencies have played a prominent role in fighting money laundering, for 
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example through sharing data on crimes and wanted persons. Interpol has 
ensured that money launderers a well as other cross border crimes are 
pursued wherever they are hiding and brought to book. The fact that Interpol 
operates as a multilateral police organisation has given it the mandate on 
cross border jurisdictional matters and to investigate alleged crimes inside the 
borders of other countries. This would not possible with national police forces 
because of jurisdictional limits.  
 
The idea of international police Institution (Interpol) was first mooted in 1914 
but materialised in 1923 with the composition of 176 member states, of which, 
forty six European member states account for 80 percent of its communication 
traffic.775The move to create a transnational police was prompted by the 
growing concern over internationalisation of certain crimes which could not be 
confined in a single state, such as terrorism, drug trafficking offences and 
money laundering.776 The creation of an international police was also 
prompted by common social influences caused by people in Europe, objecting 
to every day crimes and inadequacies of national criminal justice system.777 
The third reason was the need for common definition of crimes as some of the 
problems were far more understood than either recent criminological 
orthodoxy or as common sense would expect.778 Then there was a fourth 
point underpinned by the scholarship that points to the absence of a reliable 
and valid method of evaluating the scope of transnational crimes. This 
scholarship contends that there was little hard data of recorded cross border 
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crimes in Europe, and the absence of information about the economic cost of 
such activity.779   
 
Interpol operates on three levels: The first is the macro-level, which entails the 
constitutional and international legal agreements and the harmonisation of 
national laws and regulations. The second is the meso-level, which focuses 
on the operation, structure, practices, and procedures of the police and law 
enforcement agencies. Thirdly is the micro-level which entails the 
investigation of specific offences and the control and prevention of particular 
forms of crimes.780 At a macro-level, government ministers take decisions on 
matters relating to rights of entry and exit from sovereign States (agree 
extradition procedures, asylum policies and visa harmonisation mechanisms) 
and on legal issues relating to operational powers across borders in respect of 
arrest, detention, investigation and surveillance.781 
 
Primarily, Interpol was created to perform two fundamental functions: firstly, it 
was to promote and ensure mutual legal assistance between criminal police 
authorities within the legal limits laid down in different countries and in the 
spirit of Universal declaration of human rights. Secondly, Interpol was created 
to promote public policing that is likely to contribute to the prevention and 
suppression of ordinary law crimes.782 Each Interpol member is required to 
nominate an office for communication with Lyon Headquarters (the National 
Central Bureaux (NCBS)) being the mechanism through which Interpol 
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enquiries are channelled. Police information is circulated between NCB’s on 
international notices, which contain photographs, fingerprints and physical 
description of persons and colours coded according to the nature of the 
enquiry.783 The challenge that has recently been pointed out by the director of 
Interpol is that countries are not effectively utilising the Interpol data base in 
cross border profiling of wanted criminals.784 Some countries cannot react 
swiftly to the demands of the fast moving information age. This reinforces the 
premise that the capacity of countries to harness global regimes is dictated by 
the dynamics of development in individual countries.785  
 
Interpol’s role as a communication network restricts it to the exchange of 
information on a case by case basis; and partly because of this, its capacity to 
promote greater police co-operation in Europe and in other regions is 
limited.786 Interpol’s work is also limited in another respect: Article 3 of the 
Convention (1956), mindful of the sensitivities surrounding national 
sovereignty, defined the organisations mission as the efficient expression of 
common law crimes and offences to the exclusion of other matters having 
political, religious and racial character.787 It was largely because of the 
exclusion of political crimes from Interpol’s operational briefs, that following 
terrorist acts 1960s and the early 1970s, the European Council of ministers 
instigated the creation of Trevi.788 Just like Interpol. Trevi operates at three 
levels: the macro-level-the ministerial group meets every six months and a 
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meso-level involves services by senior official group. There is Trevi 1 was set 
up to combat terrorism, but also to address the problem of drug trafficking. 
Trevi 2 is concerned with scientific and technical knowledge, research and 
police training. Lastly, is Trevi 3, which was set up to address the question of 
security such as civilian air travel, a role which was later assumed by Trevi 
1.789  With regard to money laundering, Interpol operates a specialist branch 
(FOPAC) which co-operates with police departments and multilateral 
organizations in gathering and disseminating information on laundering of the 
proceeds of crime.790It has developed model legislation designed to make it 
easier to obtain evidence needed in criminal investigations; and proceedings, 
aimed at confiscation of the proceeds of crime. Interpol works closely with the 
United Nations Agencies to complete an automated compendium of 
information on the status of legislation and law enforcement across different 
Countries.791  
 
In my view, Interpol as an international organisation replicates global 
asymmetries of power in its operations. As a global institution, Interpol has 
been skewed in favour of developed countries—accounting for 80 percent of 
its communication traffic; and LDC’s sharing the remaining 20 percent. The 
work of Interpol is complimented by other regional initiatives such as 
Schengen Agreement (1985) which collects, collates and distributes data on 
potential criminals across its member countries in Europe.792 However, it also 
needs to be noted that international organisations tend to be skewed in favour 
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developed countries as opposed to LDCs because of their financial clout. 
Global institutions are largely dependent on financial contribution made by big 
donors for their sustainability, existence and relevance. This is presumably 
why LDCs do not have a strong influence in international organisations 
regarding the way policy decisions are reached. They contribute a negligible 
proportion towards operation budgets of the respective organisations. This is 
caught by the adage that ‘influence is a commodity paid for by those who can 
afford to do it.’ There is need for the institutionalisation of the normative 
AML/CFT standards based on a clear framework to reflect the varying levels 
of development between countries.  
 
6.15 Conclusion 
 
Enforcement institutions such as courts and Interpol are indispensable in the 
fight against money laundering and its predicate offences. Courts have always 
provided mechanisms to prosecute traditional offences. However, in my view 
domestic courts cannot be suitable forums to prosecute money laundering 
due to the possibility of political meddling, corruption and its effect on their 
efficacy. This challenge has been exacerbated by the fact that in many 
countries those arraigned for prosecution could be powerful government 
officials or their associates and untouchable.  
 
Much as I propose the global court, I need to admit that stubborn states might 
be less inclined to support it, if they know that they will be caught out. This is a 
tough catch 22 situation.  While the ICC has jurisdiction over a list of specific 
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crimes against humanity, it excludes money laundering from its mandate. 
Considering the pernicious effect of money laundering and corruption on 
those who cannot afford the basic necessities of life especially in LDCs, if 
money laundering cannot qualify as a human rights issue, it then leaves me 
baffled as to what human rights mean! Since it is not possible in some 
countries to prosecute money laundering offences in mainstream domestic 
courts, creating a global AML court is not only necessary but an imperative. 
However nobody should be carried away by the prospect of the global court 
because it cannot provide all answers to overlapping money laundering 
offences. The court can be derailed difficulties in gathering evidence from 
NCCs, hiring international lawyers and technicalities relating prosecuting 
transnational crimes and extra.  Governments can refuse to submit to its 
jurisdiction of the global court because of the principle of sovereignty in IL. In 
the long run however, courts as institutions have the potential to change local 
attitudes and traditions. The role of enforcement institutions such as Interpol is 
very crucial in enhancing the fight against money laundering crimes. However 
Interpol is oriented to European countries, reinforcing the charge that global 
institutions replicate global asymmetries of power in both approach and 
reality. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN: PROPOSED RECOMMENDATION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
In view of the findings of the study, this chapter proposes desired reforms 
which governments and oversight institutions, either collectively or individually 
need to harness in domesticating the global AML/CFT framework. The 
implementation of these recommendations can create a platform for 
harmonisation of different laws, systems, procedures, customs to enhance 
inter-state cooperation on the threat of money laundering and its predicate 
crimes.  These recommendations are proposed specifically based on the 
findings of this study. 
 
7.2 Recommendations at a global institutional level 
 
At a global financial institutional level, the World Bank and the IMF are as 
essential interfaces for development as they were when they were first 
introduced. These institutions have played a normative fundamental role in 
fostering desired reform programmes across countries. However, in view of 
their limited mandate on things like corruption, their mandate needs to be 
reconstituted to reflect the contemporary global changes and challenges. 
These institutions mandate which was first adopted after the Second World 
War has in my view been superseded by drastic changes in the current global 
economy. They need to be given a revised mandate incorporating corruption 
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and changes in the financial markets regulation such as providing lender of 
the last resort on issues that were not addressed in these institutions initial 
mandate. It is not possible to divorce the issue of financial crimes from 
regulation of the wider financial markets. For instance, money laundering is 
embedded within the web and complexity of the wider financial regulatory 
system. 
 
7.3 The need for global wide consultations 
 
The adoption of global regulatory regimes, no matter at what level they are 
envisaged should be preceded by undertaking global-wide consultations so 
that they are evolved with sufficient acceptability and legitimacy. 
Consultations should be undertaken in an individual country or regional 
markets, where the proposed regimes are to be implemented. Member 
countries should be consulted and possibly co-opted on specific platforms 
where individual regimes are evolved so that they have an ethos of 
representativity and legitimacy across jurisdictions. Lack of adequate 
representation of constituent member countries in evolution of regulatory 
regimes undermines cooperation of some member countries in implementing 
engendered regimes. The constitution of AML/CFT Committees should be 
broad enough to represent participating countries. This can potentially ensure 
that engendered AML norms are elevated to the status of customary 
international law in the long run. While the study acknowledges the need for a 
few developed countries such as the G-12 to provide leadership in evolution 
of prudential regulatory regimes, one cannot be oblivious that some of 
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engendered regimes have proved incompatible to regulatory environments in 
some countries. For instance, the inability of Uganda and South Africa to 
harness the global AML/CFT framework is testamentary either of its 
incompatibility or the inability of individual member countries to implement it. 
The Ugandan government, succumbing to pressure from the donor 
community enacted an AML bill in 1999 (not yet operationalized it into law); 
and it was also one of the first signatories of Palermo Convention in 
December 2000. However, it has since then not transposed this same treaty 
into law through its national parliament.793 
 
7.4 Integrating multiple legal systems within a global system 
 
There is a need for states to realign their diverse laws, procedures and legal 
systems to expected global AML/CFT standards. States are different and 
characterised with different development challenges and legal 
backgrounds.794 In my view prescribing regulatory AML/CFT regulatory 
models does not mean that countries are going to adopt them. This 
presupposes that countries will have to use comparative law to determine how 
their systems would assimilate the envisaged AML provisions. Comparative 
law enables governments of fledgling states to determine how they would 
adjudicate matters, what laws they would follow in different areas, and which 
court systems they would use and which laws to reject. Countries should use 
comparative law especially by looking at countries within their regions where 
AML laws have been implemented and how they have been assimilated. 
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However model laws should be adapted to suited local conditions because 
when one talks of law, he/she is not just talking about the abstract. I presume 
he/she would be talking about culture, customs, traditions and different 
societies. Law is simply presents the means to foster desired virtues in the 
society. Thus, the global AML/CFT framework based on global standards 
should be pragmatically implemented and where possible some aspects of it 
deferred in some countries until they have developed a requisite infrastructure 
to implement them. While integration of economies is not easily achievable as 
highlighted in the integration of financial markets in Europe, there should be a 
mechanism for harmonisation of different legal systems.795 Countries need to 
see themselves, and be seen by others, as influencing the global effort to 
define, protect and promote engendered global standards rather than be 
expected to adopt a concept by other societies out of their own circumstances 
and traditions.796  
 
7.5 The need for requisite legal reforms 
 
Legal reforms are necessary so that the envisaged global AML/CFT laws are 
easily adapted to domestic legal systems across countries. The normative 
reform programmes should be implemented pragmatically to suit the 
prevailing local conditions in a country. Where necessary, it is important for 
states to replicate models in other countries where similar reforms have been 
undertaken. There are many examples of using comparative law in fostering 
                                                          
795
 European Member countries are required to implement national measures through their 
home Parliament to transpose EU law but this does not mean that they are integrated. 
Economies are allowed to undertake a level of minimum harmonisation and home country 
control which in a way creates a dual regulatory system. 
796
Mugarura, (n 794). 
 285 
legal reforms across countries. Driven both by internal considerations and the 
international influence that has arisen from globalization, Uganda and Kenya 
have used comparative law to achieve legal reforms.797 One relevant example 
is anti-corruption laws. Nigeria has explored numerous avenues to eradicate 
corruption through consultations, public hearings, and visits to other countries 
such as Ethiopia, Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Hong Kong.798 This effort has 
resulted in countries having to identify defects in anti-corruption legislation 
and introducing necessary changes such as unifying their anti-corruption 
laws. In 1997, the IMF and various Nordic countries suspended aid to Kenya 
because of corruption violations.799 These donors required requisite reforms 
to be undertaken before they would resume their aid programs.800 This 
necessitated Kenya’s review of their laws in areas of de-monopolization, 
deregulation, privatization, prosecution and governance of enhanced human 
rights, accountability, and clarification of rules.801 Since some of the reforms 
failed to correct the problems, it was also necessary to review why a law may 
work in one country, but not in another.802 This is another important goal of 
comparative law that is useful in the African context. Much as we do not 
support that regimes such AML/CFT standards should be imposed on 
economies, donor countries should to some limited extent put pressure on 
countries to ensure they implement desired reform programmes.  
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7.6 Mechanism for harmonization of laws 
 
Due to increasing globalization of trade, on both a regional and international 
scale, harmonization of trade laws has become a necessary evil in many 
countries. For example, in evaluating the desirability of joining a treaty, 
countries should compare what works for them and what does not work and 
make the necessary trade off803 While entry into a treaty creates business 
opportunities, the requirements of law modernization, such as accepting 
arbitration rather than court adjudication for business law disputes, need to be 
evaluated taking into account the local legal context.804 Kenya, as part of 
the East African Community (“EAC”), consisting of Kenya, Uganda, and 
Tanzania, used Comparative Law to enhance trading and economic 
development amongst its members.805 The EAC was originally established in 
1967 and dissolved temporarily in 1977.806 The regional economic 
development treaty required harmonization of laws between countries with 
differing historical backgrounds since Tanzania was a former German 
colony.807 A renewed EAC treaty went into force in 2000, and the original 
three countries have been joined by Rwanda and Burundi.808 Another area 
where comparative law is useful in these countries is when regional 
cooperation is not only necessary but an imperative. It is an imperative for 
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countries to harmonize applicable laws so that there is a common regulatory 
framework for them to co-exist. 
  
7.7 Financial Sector Reforms 
 
The susceptibility of financial institutions to sophisticated money laundering 
schemes clearly highlights the need for the proper regulation of the financial 
market industry. This is because there is a correlation between market failure 
and financial sector abuse. Thus, the global AML/CFT regulatory framework is 
not only essential but an imperative for states to ease international 
cooperation against overlapping money laundering exigencies. Interstate 
cooperation is essential to safeguard against regulatory arbitrage; but also to 
prevent criminal organizations from abusing the financial system.809 States 
which remain to the fringes of global regulatory regimes face the risk of being 
sidelined or alienated. Secondly, since some LDCs are deficient in robust 
laws and systems, they need to embrace the global AML/CFT framework. 
Fledging countries would also be able to tap into the resources of other 
countries such as Intelligence information sharing. The global AML/CFT 
framework can enhance these countries ability to foster desired changes 
nationally. This would caution economies with tenuous legal systems from 
being exploited to transmit crises through the global system.  
 
Lack of requisite laws and policies can potentially be exploited by scoundrels 
to undermine the stability of the global financial system. To safeguard against 
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regulatory failure, there is need for states to create a single regulatory 
authority based on the model of home country control. In this model, the 
parent authority has an oversight responsibility for the activities of both the 
branch and the subsidiary. This approach is necessary to ensure that where 
there is failure of law and policy in a host country it doesn’t get transmitted to 
infest other economies using the global system. However, home country 
control paradigm can only prevent market abuse at an institutional level, but it 
cannot be used to freeze and confiscate assets in the absence of a domestic 
law. Therefore, if municipal and foreign laws are not harmonized by way of 
enabling legislation, markets can be undermined because of unfair 
competition, regulatory arbitrage and free riding of weak economies.810 
Financial globalisation manifested by the movement of financial institutions 
such as banks, investment houses, insurance companies, and securities firms 
across the border is necessary for economic development.811 As already 
noted global regulatory regimes are evolved by institutions such as the Bank 
of International Settlement working through its specialist committees such the 
Basle Committee on banking supervision; the FATF and the IMF and World 
Bank. To make sure states get to grips on their challenges, the World 
Bank/IMF have imposed supported reform programmes especially on 
fledgling economies. These economies are required to implement normative 
reforms as a condition for borrowing from the World Bank and IMF. The 
current credit crisis across Europe demonstrates that DCs are not immune 
from financial sector regimes prescribed by IMF and World Bank. However, it 
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needs to be noted that the governments of sovereign nations — especially the 
powerful ones can not be made to act in the global interest if they do not want 
to do so. The IMF and World Bank have used lending and technical 
assistance to LDCs as a means of keeping their influence on vulnerable 
borrowing economies. The role of the World Bank and IMF, in delivering 
technical and financial assistance to fledging countries has never been pivotal 
particularly in LDCs. These economies are still in need of both financial and 
technical assistance to develop requisite expertise in many policy areas 
where they are deficient. The desired reform programmes should be tailored 
to reflect the dynamics of development in individual countries. In my view the 
World Bank and IMF should be given a revised robust mandate to reflect the 
contemporary economic and political climate in which they operate. The post 
Second World War political and economic climate in which the World Bank 
and IMF were created has drastically changed. While the prevailing 
circumstances could have then necessitated the need for major powers to 
dominate the economic and political landscape, the contemporary 
circumstances are different—an issue that should be reflected in these 
institutions mandate. In this regard, it might be important in the interest of 
good leadership and democracy for the role of managing director of IMF and 
the presidency of the World Bank to be rotated between constituent member 
countries. It would seem that preserving the presidency of the World 
Bank/IMF permanently and exclusively to the Europeans and Americans 
respectively reinforces the charge of political posturing of major economic 
powers. The headquarters of the IMF and World Bank should be rotated 
between regions or relocated to countries where these institutions undertake 
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most of their work in countries like Africa and Asia. At an individual state level, 
the adoption of global regimes such as AML/CFT standards should be 
preceded undertaking comprehensive reforms in education, the judiciary, 
legal systems and other institutions so that they are able to translate the 
desired regulatory changes locally. 
 
In my view, the role of global financial institutions will continue to be sidelined, 
unless they devise a way of fostering a good working relationship with 
sovereign governments. There must be a way to minimize tension because 
they constrain relations. Secondly, international financial institutions such as 
the IMF have little say over major countries, or even minor ones, other than 
those to whom they are lending money. If anything, these institutions are often 
obliged to indulge the wishes of, and avoid offending, their biggest 
shareholders. In my view, by widely consulting in LDCs before desired 
regimes are adopted, would enhance the influence of global financial 
institutions globally. With the US global influence on the wane, partly due to 
the emergence of China, leadership in the international system is much more 
diffuse than ever before. This has commensurately complicated the task of 
reaching agreements on many global governance issues such as regulation of 
money laundering crimes. Unless countries come to their senses and stop the 
politics of posturing, acting in concert on global issues will continue to get 
harder than ever before. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT: CONCLUSION 
 
In the final analysis, the importance of the global AML framework in the fight 
against money laundering and its predicate crimes cannot be underestimated. 
The thesis has articulated that the global AML/CFT framework cannot be 
implemented without internalising the prevailing regulatory environment 
across jurisdictions. There are enormous challenges inherent in the global 
AML/CFT framework because it depends on compliance of states. As the 
study has demonstrated in chapter, interstate cooperation is not as easy to 
achieve as it initially sounds. 
 
The findings of the study have corroborated the thesis that the global AML 
framework in its present form, is not yet compatible with the prevailing 
regulatory environment in the majority of LDCs. States should do more than 
just prescribing regulatory regimes because rules which cannot be enforced to 
deter undesired behaviour locally are meaningless.  While ‘a-one-size fits all 
approach’ in regulation of financial markets--subject to the varying dynamics 
of development cannot work, Countries should nevertheless participate in the 
global AML initiatives so that they are not alienated on important issues of 
national interests. There is also the need for a common legal grid to deal with 
overlapping jurisdictions and; (ii) and to share resources such as intelligence 
information. At banking regulatory level, this study can be utilised to 
implement desired policy and regulations of national and cross-border 
financial institutions. In my view, one cannot successfully undertake a study 
on money laundering and its regulation globally without examining the 
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dynamic nature of the global market system. To fully analyze the limitations of 
the global AML/CFT framework, the study has also examined the precarious 
regulatory environment in some countries which predisposes them capacity 
deprivation. This was done bearing in mind the fact that harnessing any global 
regime in relation to any regulatory exigencies depends on the individual 
state’s capability to harness it.  
 
The global AML/CFT framework is necessary to foster international 
cooperation and how engendered regimes are to be internalised into domestic 
jurisdictions. However, interstate cooperation should be fostered through the 
adoption of United Nations model treaties and soft law instruments.  
International soft law instruments are particularly useful because they have 
created a wide range of legal norms, principles, codes of conduct and 
transactional rules of state practice that are recognised either in formal or 
informal multilateral agreements.  
 
As noted earlier, the study has articulated the various dimensions of the 
global AML framework in the context of the FATF; the bank for international 
settlement in Basle Switzerland; the International Securities Commission 
Organisation (IOSCO) based in Madrid (Spain); and the World Bank and IMF 
normative reforms programmes and UN AML treaties. These bodies have 
pioneered normative regimes to regulate financial markets on various 
interstate issues such as money laundering and its predicate crimes. The use 
of soft law instruments in multilateral agreements generally underscores the 
consent of states to apply engendered norms but there is no opinion juris to 
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make them legally binding as rules of customary international law.  It needs to 
be noted that soft law instruments are not legally binding on member 
states812they only create regulatory guidelines on desired interstate issues. 
Thus, soft law instruments have contributed enormously towards development 
of international rules, standards and legal principles, which are later 
crystallised into hard law. It needs to be noted that countries have a lot to gain 
by adopting and internalising soft law instruments such as the Basle 
Committee’s guidelines on banking supervision, and the FATF 40+9 
recommendations. While the failure of a state to transpose soft law 
instruments does not constitute a breach of international law; in practice non-
compliance with these instruments is likely to generate tensions between 
countries. For instance, jurisdictions which refuse to comply with the 
recommendations of the FATF are publically blacklisted (“naming and 
shaming”) by FATF. Economic sanctions may also be imposed on non-
complying countries by invoking recommendation 21 of FATF (1996). When 
the non cooperative jurisdiction is a dependency territory, then the blacklisting 
apply to that territory. Due to the importance of FATF regulatory regimes, the 
World Bank and the IMF have integrated them into its monitoring framework 
of national economies.  
 
The UN, AML treaties just like any other treaties are technically internalised 
into a state subject to ratification—before they can be legally binding on that 
state. If a state has not ratified a treaty, its application nationally will be 
limited. After the treaty has been ratified, it is then be transposed through 
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national parliament with the exception of monist states. In monist states, 
ratified treaties become part of national law; and they become effective 
without recourse to further measures in national parliament. In the same way, 
AML/CFT treaties will have to be ratified and internalised through national 
parliaments, if they are to be effectively applied in a country. The limitation 
inherent in treaties as instruments of international law is that they are 
implemented courtesy of the individual state’s consent. The practice of 
implementing treaties has varied from state to state. Some states may refuse 
to adopt the global AML treaties as demonstrated in the case of Iran’s refusal 
to ratify the United Nations Anti-Narcotic Convention in 1988. This practice is 
usually common with countries which may either disapprove of the treaty and 
its objectives or which may view the treaty as capable of undermining their 
economic self-interests. States can also decide to take this course of action, if 
they perceive that a particular treaty is targeted at them either individually or 
as a group.  States may also resent global regimes (if they have not actively 
been involved in their evolution) because as sovereign entities, they would 
resent being dictated upon by other states. This was underscored by the 
United Kingdom’s refusal to adopt the United Nations Convention for 
International Sale of Goods (CISG) in December 1980. The UK decided to 
stick to its Sale of Goods Act 1979 and went further to give jurisdiction to UK 
courts on matters of contract law in relation to parties resident in United 
Kingdom.  Thus, the compromise should always be to adopt model laws but to 
localise them to suit national interests. 
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Model laws are necessary in fostering the adoption of desired policy changes 
nationally. The advantage is that states would have willingly embraced 
international instruments to ease cooperation on overlapping exigencies. 
However, if model laws are not properly localised, they can potentially debase 
or sideline local economies. The adoption of model laws should be preceded 
by wide consultations and studies; and possibly also co-opting constituent 
parties in the process of creating them. It is important for different 
stakeholders to see themselves as having contributed towards the 
enunciation of regimes that govern them. There is no doubt that the global 
AML regimes are necessary to provide predictability and clarity on how states 
should respond to overlapping issues. With this regulatory framework in place, 
stakeholder countries can easily plan their response to overlapping 
exigencies; and courts can also use it to easily settle disputes as they emerge 
between the parties from time to time.  
 
While appreciating the fact that treaties as legal instruments have their own 
shortcomings, it would still be better for the desired global AML regimes to 
evolve through the adoption of international treaties than informally as club 
rules. The challenge with international treaties is that they tend to be 
implemented depending on the prevailing political climate in a state. For 
instance, some states have ratified international treaties but procrastinated in 
transposing them into their national legal system. This issue has already been 
illuminated in relation to Uganda’s failure to transpose the United Nations 
Convention on Transnational Organised Crimes in Palermo (2000). While 
acknowledging that Uganda will eventually transpose its AML obligations, this 
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has taken longer than necessary. Uganda adopted the principles of 
International Security Commission Organisation (IOSCO) in (1998) to protect 
investors by fighting financial crimes such as money laundering; and to create 
a palatable investment climate for investors is under an obligation to 
transpose its international AML/CFT obligations. However due to the raging 
poverty across LDCs, they might not view protecting depositor’s assets or 
investor’s as a priority when they themselves are exposed to net out flows of 
income to service national debts and other economic vagaries. 
 
In view of the foregoing analysis, it can be argued that for the global AML 
framework to operate across jurisdictions, money laundering offences should 
be prosecuted in a neutral judicial forum.813Global regulatory regimes cannot 
work across the board, unless they are enforced through robust local and 
global institutions. The picture portrayed by courts in the core LDCs is that 
they are not only politicised but are also inefficient, inaccessible due to the 
culture of corruption, expensive to use, characterised by unreasonable delays, 
overwhelmed by the sheer numbers of offenders languishing in prisons 
waiting for trial and lack requisite investigation capacity.  Accordingly, it is a 
daunting task for LDCs to domesticate the envisaged global AML regimes into 
their substantive national law. The proposed global court to adjudicate money 
laundering and its underlying predicate offices is not only necessary but an 
imperative to promote harmonious interstate relations. 
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It is ironical that countries like Iran, Afghanistan, Colombia, (prominent 
participants in the production of narcotic drugs) have refused to ratify 
international Anti-narcotic Convention in Vienna, 1988. One of the reasons 
why states may refuse to adopt desired AML laws is because they would do 
not want to be caught out by the same rules. International law is generally 
riddled with gaps because it depends on the goodwill of states; and yet the 
state is sometimes the problem underpinning why treaties are adopted. 
Arguably, even if all states were to ratify the UN, AML/CFT treaties, there 
would still be disparities and gaps in their implementation across jurisdictions. 
Interstate initiatives are nevertheless essential because globalisation of 
markets cannot work in the absence of common regulatory initiatives. For 
instance, the United Nations AML treaties and other soft law instruments have 
created mechanisms for mutual legal assistance, investigations, prosecutions 
and judicial proceedings on money laundering offences. However because of 
some State’s intransigence including posturing for political reasons, 
extradition proceedings have become cumbersome to invoke in international 
law. 
  
In our contention, countries have very little choice but to develop a requisite 
infrastructure if they are interested in harnessing the global AML/CFT 
framework. Countries are faced with two stark choices: to either develop a 
requisite infrastructure first, if they are seriously interested in harnessing 
global AML standards; or to do nothing and lag behind other countries in 
terms of development. The requisite infrastructure is not only a prerequisite 
for assimilating normative AML standards; but it is also essential to level the 
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playing field, creating symmetric conditions for competition. The assumption 
that global laws can operate in different countries irrespective of the 
particularities of development in those countries is a deceptive and an 
unrealistic premise. For the proliferating regimes such as the proposed Basle 
III banking regulatory standards to work, they need to reflect global market 
conditions and political legitimacy of all stakeholder countries. While countries 
are under an obligation to give a schedule of concessions of service areas 
under GATS (1994) for them to receive similar market access, opening 
financial markets should be cautiously approached in LDCs. The foregoing 
issue has been highlighted in our earlier example of counterfeit currency in 
Uganda.  Countries will continue to be sidelined by the perverse nature of 
global exigencies unless they first create a robust infrastructure on which to 
harness the system. This should include developing data processing centers 
to gather and to supply data to AML agencies. These centers have the 
potential to enhance law enforcement agencies in detecting crimes; and in 
strengthening the capacity of domestic banks in gathering information on 
customers. In this regard, this study welcomes the introduction of the Criminal 
Reference Bureau (CRB)814 in Uganda where information on bank clients will 
be consolidated for use in identifying present and prospective customers.815 
Land ownership (including properties) should be mandatorily registered. This 
is essential to enhance identification of criminal profiles and use it to facilitate 
the work of regulatory and law enforcement agencies in preventing crimes. It 
is possible for registration to be implemented using the post code system as is 
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done in DCs. Much as this proposal might be costly for cash strapped 
countries to implement, it is nevertheless desirable for streamlining 
information gathering and dissemination across agencies. It is also an 
imperative for LDCs to create a robust database of cases where information 
on markets can be consolidated and accessed to ease regulation of markets. 
The consolidated database of cases can potentially ensure that criminals are 
easily detected, monitored and dealt with swiftly by law enforcement 
agencies. It needs to be noted that unilateral state measures cannot go far in 
cautioning economies against overlapping global exigencies. There is a need 
for Inter-state co-operation in areas of information exchange to ease potential 
information flow between countries. For instance Interpol has a central 
database of cases where information on wanted persons can be exchanged 
and accessed throughout its 135 member states. The Schengen Agreement 
(1985) provides a platform for harmonization of visa regulations in all EU 
member countries. It allows a person holding a visa issued by a member 
country to travel in all European Union member states (with exception of UK) 
without being subjected to visa restrictions.816 Thus, success stories where 
normative regimes have been introduced and succeeded should be replicated 
as model laws in fledging countries.  Model laws are essential in creating a 
framework of robust laws, particularly in LDCs which are deficient in a 
consolidated database of cases (precedence) on important policy and 
regulatory issues. However, model laws should first be modified to suit local 
conditions before they are implemented. As i said earlier in the outset, 
Barclays Bank (Uganda) has established policy measures to alleviate 
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regulatory failure of financial markets in Uganda. The use of model laws has 
created a platform to fill the void in the law against money laundering. 
 
If there is any lesson learnt from the recent global financial crisis (2008-2010), 
it is that markets and governments have no choice but to work in tandem in 
ensuring proper regulation of financial markets. Early government intervention 
is essential to prevent potential crises from spiraling out of hand. While 
government intervention could be seen as covert protectionism contrary to the 
rules of WTO, governments should negotiate derogations (exit clauses) where 
there is a possibility for countries being adversely affected by the premature 
restructuring of their economies—either due to ill-advised liberalization 
policies or otherwise. Thus, the global AML/CFT framework should be 
implemented pragmatically to reflect the varying levels of development 
between jurisdictions. For instance, if one takes a robust regime and 
introduces it in country like Somali; it will not work because of the prevailing 
precarious political, economic and social climate in that country today. 
The study has delineated the complexity of, gaps and weaknesses inherent in 
the current global AML/CFT framework. The challenge to the global system 
generally is that it manifests itself through sovereign states—which makes it 
prone to the failures of individual states. The global AML regulatory framework 
is inclined to favour DCs as opposed to LDCs because the former are 
endowed with a palatable regulatory environment to harness it. In my view, 
the constitution of the global AML committees and other global policy 
platforms should reflect the heterogeneity of all participating member states. 
In my view, neither the G-12 countries nor any other countries can afford to 
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posture because as the global crises have demonstrated, crises do not 
posture, they are real with the potential to affect every country—big or small.  
 
It is important for governments to spearhead research studies, (either 
collectively or individually) on the typologies of money laundering, cross-
border jurisdictional issues in order to respond appropriately to their novel 
regulatory challenges. The global AML regimes should be constituted with a 
monitoring mechanism, not only to ensure they are easily enforceable but are 
also implemented across countries. In my view, the European Union as a 
regional market proffers a graphic model for harmonisation of diverse 
regulatory regimes globally. The global AML framework is essential for 
interstate cooperation on many aspects of money laundering and its predicate 
threats.  On the negative note, the global system has failed to manifest itself 
as a viable framework bound by common objectives and purpose. The threat 
of money laundering will not be defeated through prescribing normative 
regimes alone but being accorded the good will of countries where 
engendered regimes are to be implemented. As far as LDCs are concerned, 
the priority should be to address corruption, lack of robust education, bad 
political leadership and the threat posed by HIV/AIDS. Countries should first 
undertake desired reform programmes as a prerequisite for harnessing the 
global AML/CFT regimes. Similarly, for global AML regimes to operate 
effectively, banks should be facilitated by governments to ensure they do 
more in spearheading the fight against money laundering. Apparently, money 
stolen in corruption and other predicate crimes has been able to navigate the 
globe through the international banking system. This has been so despite a 
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proliferation of regulatory rules to prevent money laundering and its predicate 
offences globally.  In no uncertain terms, this confirms the fact that prescribed 
rules/regimes at a global level cannot work at a local level in abstract. The 
findings of the study have confirmed that the global AML framework has 
complicated dynamics and cannot easily be harnessed across varying 
jurisdictions. 
 
The global AML framework is an imperative for interstate cooperation on 
overlapping issues but also to prevent free riding the reputation of other 
countries. While this is important, desired AML safeguards should not be 
adopted for the sake of it. The current global AML framework is fraught with 
gaps at many levels and it is devoid of a global applicability. The global 
system generally is emasculated by the fact that it manifests itself within 
another system—the state system.  States have different vested interests and 
they cannot be assumed to have the same outlook. For example, tax evasion 
is an offence in United States but it is encouraged in Switzerland to boost 
shareholders equity. It has to be noted that when there is a conflict between 
national self-interests and its international obligations (as manifested by Iran’s 
refusal to sign UN AML treaties), states tend to give primacy to their own 
interests. Therefore the efficacy of global prohibition regimes (not only money 
laundering) depends on many factors not least the national self-interests of 
different stakeholder countries. As if this is not enough, global regimes tend to 
lack a clear enforcement mechanism at a global level. With exception of 
Interpol, global regulatory regimes are emasculated by the fact that they are 
not easy to enforce inside the boarders of participating member states. I am 
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aware that the FATF regimes are imbued with the mechanism such as on-site 
visits to evaluate the member states compliance with their AML/CFT 
obligations. In anticipation of the forthcoming FATF on-site visits, non-
cooperative countries can conjure ways to hoodwink evaluators and 
assessors. First the FATF has a small membership of 36 countries, 4 affiliate 
organizations in Africa, Asia, South America and Caribbean and some 
organizations such as the World Bank and IMF having the observer status. 
However, it is still a daunting task for foreign based oversight institutions such 
as the FATF to police the implementation of desired AML/CFT regimes inside 
the borders of sovereign countries. Secondly, some of the FATF regimes such 
as KYC have proved incompatible with the dynamics of development across 
the majority of LDCs. Some states have been ambivalent, hastening to sign 
up to international treaties but declining their full support in transposing them 
nationally. In view of all these glaring failures as I have already elucidated, it is 
high time a global court has been introduced. The proposed global court has 
the potential to proffer guidelines for states to streamline the implementation 
of desired AML regimes globally. This can be achieved through the 
interpretative role of the court but also proffering and consolidating decisions 
as precedents on money laundering and its predicate crimes. The court as an 
institution can also engender a rule based ethos to foster the implementation 
of desired AML regimes across countries. The proposed global AML court 
should be fostered on the model of the ECJ in Europe and its decisions 
binding on member states. The decisions of the court should be made 
mandatory such that failure to delinquent states are subjected to sanctions in 
form of fines and other punitive measures as may be deemed fit. The 
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preponderance of the fine should depend on how long an individual state has 
stubbornly refused to implement its global AML/CFT obligations. Most 
importantly also the engendered decisions of the court can ease the 
internalization of normative AML/CFT regimes as norms of customary 
international law. A custom cannot be imposed on a community; it grows 
gradually from state practice and opinion juris (opinion of lawyers) which 
communities have embraced as normative for a long time. The global AML 
regimes are not likely to crystallize into norms of customary international law 
in circumstances where states do one thing in theory and another in practice. 
Let me point out one of the many examples, Switzerland which is the seat of 
the Bank of International Settlement (BIS) with a specialist committee—the 
Basle Committee which has an oversight responsibility to ensure that banks 
operate according to high ethical international standards, is the same country 
where the looted wealth from Africa and other countries is siphoned to for safe 
custody. I presume the foregoing contention explains why some states may 
decide to take a step back and say let us look at how the prescribed global 
AML norms are being implemented elsewhere and follow their experiences. 
 
The World Bank and IMF should use their mandate and the leverage of 
financial sector reform programmes to impose robust anti-corruption 
measures on borrowing states. But also the World Bank and IMF should 
extend concessions (soft loans on soft terms) to facilitate the much needed 
development. While lending conditions are negotiated and agreed between 
the IMF and a respective member state, the manner in which negotiations are 
conducted is inclined to favour the lender. The World Bank and IMF have 
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leverage in the loan negotiations process because they are well resourced; 
but there is also the vulnerability of the borrower. LDCs are deficient in 
requisite negotiation capacity either regarding loan agreements or any other 
issue of global importance such as trade policy negotiations in the WTO.  
It therefore goes without saying that lack of requisite technical capacity in 
many developing countries has not helped them to develop the necessary 
infrastructure to foster the stability of markets. LDCs have been sidelined on 
many issues of global relations, eviscerating their capacity to harness robust 
AML measures. Because of this, the majority of LDCs are prone to global 
exigencies such as money laundering, piracy, terrorism and other forms of 
criminal exploitation. In view of these shortcomings, the negotiation of loans in 
the IMF and in the World Bank cannot provide a level playing field for 
countries to gain proportionately from engendered regulatory initiatives. The 
marginalisation of LDCS is also manifested by the fact that they have 
sometimes signed up to agreements which are by their very standards unfair 
and likely to sideline them for many years. Individual governments only start 
to react to the effect of lopsided agreements after their pernicious effects have 
become apparent.817 Thus, the shortage of technical experts on financial and 
trade policy issues has sidelined LDCs in their efforts to harness normative 
global AML regimes. While acknowledging the importance of the World Bank 
                                                          
817
 This is highlighted by the tensions between pharmaceutical companies and the 
government of South Africa over South Africa’s bid to produce a cheap version of AIDS/HIV 
vaccine. South Africa was already bound by Intellectual property Rights Agreement, it signed 
up in the WTO. By virtue of that Agreement, pharmaceutical companies would have monopoly 
for the production and distribution of medicine in the country for ten years, when it realised it 
was facing a catastrophe over lack of affordable AIDs/HIV vaccine. The Pharmaceutical 
Company version of the drug was very expensive and could not be afforded by the majority of 
South African’s AIDS/HIV sufferers. On other hand, the government could not produce a 
cheap affordable version because it would be in breach of its WTO obligations and it would 
suffer a heft fine for breach of its obligations. The situation was only saved by the civil society 
criticism of Pharmaceuticals Company which was coupled by demonstrations both in South 
Africa and wide in the Continent. 
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and IMF in facilitating economies with requisite technical capacity, the scope 
of technical assistance is still narrow and should be extended to other areas 
where LDCs are deficient. The World Bank and IMF are working closely with 
the ministries of finance and central banks in many economies to implement 
desired financial sector reforms. However, it would also be better for the 
World Bank and IMF to facilitate education and research initiatives in member 
countries as these are essential for economic development. At the moment 
the mandate of the IMF and the World Bank in developing countries is limited 
to the economic sector—exports, imports, explorations and funding other 
development projects. It is imperative to revise the mandate of these 
institutions to incorporate human rights so that they foster an environment of 
peace and long term stability in all member countries. LDCs are deficient in 
requisite human resources potential to competently negotiate technical 
agreements with well resourced institutions such as the World Bank and IMF. 
In this respect, the lender will always have an upper hand and the terms 
governing loan contracts might never have been freely agreed. In English 
contract law, contracts which have been agreed through exertion of pressure 
or coercion are voidable and would be rescinded if they are deemed to have 
put one of the parties to the contract at a disadvantage. This reinforces the 
need for the introduction of a neutral judicial organ to adjudicate with the view 
to proffer guidance on the state’s approach to contentious global issues.  
 
While, it is the responsibility of the IMF to monitor the health of economies in 
accordance with its mandate (part IV of Articles Agreement); in my view this 
power should be exercised pragmatically in the interest of all stakeholder 
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countries. Through its surveillance mandate the IMF should have provided 
early warning to the US about the impending financial crisis. As such the IMF 
has an overarching mandate to regulate global financial markets including 
prevention of financial crises and money laundering. As an institution, the IMF 
should exercise its mandate without discrimination to ensure that where there 
are signs of financial mismanagement it intervenes in time to stop the 
situation from spiralling out of hands. Given the foregoing analysis, the IMF 
should have advised the US government to get to grips with its reckless 
lending behaviour in the interests of the wider financial markets. The IMF has 
been accused of double standards—more inclined to the interests of 
developed countries than LDCs. The World Bank and the IMF normative 
reform programmes have not helped much in alleviating the plight of people in 
less developed countries.818 Privatisation as I have already elucidated has 
undermined the ability of many governments in Africa from delivering 
essential health services such as health care, leaving it in the hands of 
unscrupulous private sector. As health services such as hospital care, 
ambulance services, care of the elderly (non-existent in countries like 
Uganda) are privatised, they are exclusively put beyond the reach of the poor. 
It also needs to be noted that privatisation has increased the cost of 
                                                          
818
 This preposition is underpinned by two factors: (a) some of the above policies are adopted 
based on the countries performance by way of its Gross Domestic Product (GDP). According 
to Samir Amin, the highly paid Bank or Fund officials have never been on the ground to 
corroborate how this information is arrived at. In any case, their point of interface as far as 
gathering this information goes, are the highly placed government officials, for example 
Ministers of Finance, the same officials presiding over the ailing and mismanaged 
governments. (b) Another apparent reason for conditionalities is the need to stimulate the 
national economy by undertaking public sector reforms—so that respective economies are 
made vibrant and able to sustain their payments on borrowed loans, which seems okay from 
the lenders point of view. But conditionalities have wrecked governments, precipitated 
conditions for wars and genocide, for example, Yugoslavia where SAPs induced nationwide 
unemployment and also in the Uganda example with regard to the restructuring of the army in 
early 1990s.  
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accessing basic health services. In developing countries where people either 
have low or no viable sources of income, trade liberalisation and its attendant 
privatisation processes has rendered access to essential health services 
beyond the reach of the poor. Law rests on central premise of non-
discrimination and it can be inferred that a law which encourages 
discrimination is a bad law. The rule of law is founded on three central pillars: 
(i) the absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to 
arbitrary power and excludes the existence of arbitrariness of the prerogative 
wider discretionary powers of the government; (ii) equality before the law, 
which means that nobody is exempt from it, and equally subjects of all citizens 
to the ordinary law of the land administered by courts of law; and (iii) that rules 
which in foreign countries form part of the constitutional codes, are not the 
source, but the consequence of law and order within a community. 
 
The IMF is supposed to operate as a neutral global financial institution but it 
has become dominated by European elites. Since its inception in the 
aftermath of Second World War, the managing director of IMF has been a 
European; and the President of World Bank has been an American. It has 
shown an inclination to assist European Economies tackle the debt and 
financial crises; while demonstrating a slightly different attitude towards LDCs. 
This can be wrongly construed as favouritism manifested by IMF’s 
authorization of expansion of bail outs to prop peripheral European debt 
gripped economies of Greece, Iceland, Portugal and Ireland.819 While 
                                                          
819
 In other regions especially developing economies in Africa, the IMF would have slammed 
austerity measures on troubled economies straight away. I am wondering whether the 
IMF/World Bank supported lending helps to stimulate development of economies, given that 
economies have received loans from these institutions without achieving much development. 
 309 
prevention of financial crises is aligned to the Fund’s mandate of preventing 
financial crisis, the prescribed policy measures such as cutting the size of the 
public sector, in the environment of economic down turns have been 
contradictory. Accordingly, the intervention of member countries in form of bail 
outs was deemed essential to prevent a contagion spreading from the 
southern to healthier Northern European economies. The 27 European 
member states have agreed to set up a European Financial Stability Fund 
(EFSF), aimed at preserving financial stability in Europe and providing 
financial assistance to Euro zone states suffering financial hardships. This 
facility is coordinated by the European central bank and it is authorised to 
issue bonds or other debt instruments on the market with the support of 
German debt management office to raise the funds needed for propping up 
troubled economies, recapitalise banks or even to buy sovereign debts. In the 
climate of financial crisis, the IMF has been quick to slam lending 
conditionalties or austerity measures on less developed economies. Since 
conditionalities are authorised by the Articles of Agreement under stand-by 
arrangements, they should be applied uniformly on all states experiencing 
financial crises globally. If European member countries are given concessions 
in form of bail outs and grants, similar concessions should be extended to 
other economies outside Europe which are also suffering financial hardships.. 
The rationale for this proposition is to prevent discrimination contrary to the 
principle of liberalisation on which the WTO is founded. Drawing on this 
principle, it can be argued that if IMF decides to approve concessions to 
peripheral European member countries of Greece, Ireland and Portugal, 
similar concessions should be extended to all other countries facing financial 
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crises. Short of that it could be perceived as favourable treatment of a 
selection of states at the expense of others, contrary to the liberal market 
philosophy and the law of WTO. However, there are certain exceptions where 
discrimination can be justified. This exception justifies for European member 
countries to extend assistance to southern European countries to stave off 
financial crises from spreading to healthier countries in Northern Europe. 
While special treatment accorded to southern European countries could 
signify double standards contrary to the law of WTO, it could have been 
justified by the need to stem a crisis from spreading to healthier economies. 
Similarly, the European Union enjoys favourable treatment over LDCs 
because of its combined Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and voting powers in 
the IMF. The foregoing position gives the EU a strong voice not only in the 
IMF but also on other issues pertaining to global governance. The influence of 
a member country in the IMF depends on its contributions and attendant 
voting rights of a particular member.  The accusation of double standards 
does not reflect well on the IMF as a global institution. The IMF has the 
mandate to monitor economies on financial and monetary issues within its 
member countries.  Adherents of the law as a system of rules would expect 
oversight institutions such as the IMF and World Bank to administer rules 
without favour or disfavour of countries. A good law should ensure that 
engendered rules/norms are applied in an even handed manner to regulate 
undesired conduct in the society. The principle of ‘equality before the law’ 
should be internalised into the practice of states and given primacy in all 
oversight institutions to demonstrate that the system is properly working. 
There is evidence confirming that LDCs do not have the requisite capacity to 
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harness the global system efficiently. This is partly because LDCs are 
exposed to a catalogue of challenges which eviscerate their bargaining 
powers. The majority of LDCs are deficient in physical and human resources 
and cannot have leverage in multilateral negotiations. The foregoing 
environment has predisposed LDCs to an enduring life of suffering, misery 
and capacity deprivation to fight money laundering and its predicate threats.  
 
Finally, the global system is fraught with gaps and challenges at many levels. 
It has failed to manifest itself as a coherent system with a viable set of rules 
capable of being enforced globally. In my view, the global system is a myth 
and it is this mythology that has undermined the efficacy of the global AML 
framework in fighting money laundering across different jurisdictions. With the 
exception of a few exigencies such as climate change, the majority of global 
exigencies are prevailing local conditions in certain localities designated as 
global to foster the interests of certain market domains. The putative global 
AML/CFT framework cannot be harnessed globally because it is based on the 
false premise of presupposing that all countries have the potential to harness 
it. So, against all these odds, do countries like Uganda or any other country 
for that matter need to adopt a global AML framework? The answer is 
absolutely yes because countries which are deficient in robust AML/CFT 
systems are capable of being exploited by criminals to perpetuate money 
laundering globally. The global AML framework should be adopted in a 
pragmatic manner to reflect the dynamics of development across jurisdictions. 
Looking forward, the conceptual framework developed in this study will 
continue to be tested in our future empirical research studies (working closely 
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with AML oversight institutions) on money laundering and its predicate crimes 
across Africa and in some DCs. However, we hope to make sure that any 
future research studies are undertaken on a large sample of countries to test 
the viability of the model on which this study has been undertaken. 
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Appendix 1 
 
THE FINANCIAL ACTION TASK FORCE (FATF) 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The Financial action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF) is an Inter-
government body whose purpose is the development and promotion of 
policies to combat money laundering—the process of criminal proceeds in 
order to disguise their illegal origin.  
 
The Forty Recommendations set out the basic framework for anti-money 
laundering efforts and they are designed to be of universal application. They 
cover the criminal justice system and law enforcement, financial system and 
regulation, and international co-operation. 
 
 
GENERAL FRAMEWORK OF RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Recommendation 1 
 
Each country should take immediate steps to ratify and to implement fully, the 
1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit traffic in Narcotic Drug and 
Psychotropic Substances (hereinafter the Vienna Convention). 
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Recommendation 2 
 
Financial institution secrecy laws should be conceived as not to inhibit 
implementation of these recommendations. 
 
Recommendation 3 
 
Effective money laundering enforcement program should include increased 
multilateral co-operation and mutual legal assistance in money laundering 
investigations and prosecutions and extradition in money laundering cases, 
where possible. 
 
 
ROLE OF NATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEMS IN COMBATING MONEY 
LAUNDERING 
 
Recommendation 4 
 
Each country should take such measures as may be necessary, including 
legislative ones, to enable it to criminalise money laundering as set forth in the 
Vienna Convention. Each country should extend the offence of drug money 
laundering to one based on serious offences. Each country would determine 
which serious crimes would be designated money laundering (see 
interpretative Note). 
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Recommendation 5 
 
As provided in Vienna Convention, the offence of money laundering should 
apply at least to knowingly participating in money laundering activities, 
including the concept that knowledge maybe inferred from objective factual 
circumstances. 
 
 
Recommendation 6 
Where possible, corporation themselves—not only their employees-should be 
subject to criminal liability. 
 
Provisional Measures and Confiscation 
 
 
Recommendation 7 
 
Countries should adopt measures similar to those set forth in the Vienna 
Convention, as may be necessary, including legislative ones to enable their 
competent authorities to confiscate property laundered, proceeds from, 
instrumentalities used in or intended for use in the commission of any money 
laundering offence, or property of corresponding value, without prejudicing the 
rights of bonafide third parties. 
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Such measures should include the authority to: (i) identify, trace and evaluate 
property which is subject to confiscation, (ii) carry out provisional measures, 
such as freezing and seizing, to prevent any dealing, transfer or disposal of 
such property; and (iii) take any appropriate investigative measures. 
  
ROLE OF THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM IN COMABTING MONEY 
LAUNDERING 
 
Recommendation 8 
 
Recommendations 10 to 29 should apply not only to banks, but also to non-
bank financial institutions. Even those non-bank financial institutions which 
are not subject to a formal prudential supervisory regime in all countries, for 
example, bureaux de change, governments should ensure that these 
institutions are subject to the same anti-money laundering laws or regulations 
as all other financial institutions and that these laws or regulations are 
implemented effectively. (See Interpretative Notes: recommendation 8 and 
recommendation 8 & 9) 
 
Recommendation 9 
 
The appropriate national authorities should consider applying 
Recommendations 10 to 21 and 23 to the conduct of financial activities as 
commercial undertaking by business or professions, which are not financial 
institutions, where such conduct is allowed or not prohibited. Financial 
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activities include include, but are not limited to, those listed in the attached 
annex. It is left to each country to decide whether special situations should be 
defined where the application of anti-money laundering measures is not 
necessary, for example, when a financial activity is carried out on an 
occasional or limited basis. 
 
Recommendation 10 
 
Customer Identification and Record Keeping Rules 
 
Financial institutions should not keep anonymous accounts or accounts in 
obviously fictitious names: they should be required (by law, by regulations, by 
agreements between supervisory authorities and financial institutions or by 
self regulatory agreements among financial institutions) to identify, on the 
basis an official or other reliable identifying documents, and record the identity 
of their clients, either occasional or usual, when establishing business 
relations or conducting transactions (in particular opening accounts or 
passbooks, entering into fiduciary transactions, renting of safe deposit boxes, 
performing large cash transactions). 
 
Recommendation 11 
 
Financial institutions should take reasonable measures to obtain information 
about the true identity of the persons on whose behalf an account is opened 
or a transaction conducted if there are any doubts as to whether these clients 
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or customers are acting on their own behalf, for example, in case of 
domicilliary companies (i.e. institutions, corporations, foundations, trusts, etc. 
that do not conduct any commercial or manufacturing business or any other 
form of commercial operation in the country where their registered office is 
located). (See Interpretative Note: Recommendations 11 and 
Recommendation 11 & 15 through 18) 
 
Recommendation 12 
 
Financial institutions should maintain, for at least five years, all necessary 
records on transactions, both domestic and international, to enable them to 
comply swiftly with information requests from the competent authorities. Such 
records must be sufficient to permit reconstruction of individual transactions 
(including amounts and types of currency involved if any) so as to provide, if 
necessary evidence for prosecution of criminal behavior. 
 
Financial institutions should keep records on customer’s identification (e.g. 
copies or records of official identification documents like passport, identity 
cards, driving licence or similar documents), accounts files and business 
correspondence for at least five years after the account is closed. 
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Recommendation 13 
 
Countries should pay special attention to money laundering threats inherent in 
new or developing technologies that might favour anonymity, and take 
measures, if needed, to prevent their use in money laundering schemes. 
 
 
1 Increased Due Diligence of Financial Institutions 
 
 
Recommendation 14 
 
 
Financial institutions should pay special attention to all complex, unusual large 
transactions, and all unusual patterns of transactions, which have no apparent 
economic or visible lawful purpose. The background and purpose of such 
transactions should, as far as possible, be examined, the findings established 
in writing, and be available to help supervisors, auditors and law enforcement 
agencies. (See Interpretative Note) 
 
2 Recommendation 15 
 
If financial institutions suspect that funds stem from a criminal activity, they 
should be required to report promptly their suspicions to the competent 
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authorities (See Interpretative Note: Recommendations 15 and 
Recommendations 11 & 15 through 18) 
 
Recommendation 16 
 
Financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees should be 
protected by legal provisions from criminal or civil liability for breach of any 
restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by any 
legislative, regulatory or administrative provisions, if they report their 
suspicions in good faith to the competent authorities, if they did not know 
precisely what the underlying criminal activity was, and regardless of whether 
illegal activity actually occurred. (See Interepatative Note 16) 
 
 
Recommendation 17 
 
Financial institutions, their directors, officers and employees, should not, or, 
where appropriate, should not be allowed to, warn their customers when 
information relating to them is being reported to the competent authorities. 
(See Interpretative Note) 
 
2.1 Recommendation 18 
 
Financial Institutions reporting their suspicions should comply with instructions 
from the competent authorities. (See Interpretative Note) 
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2.2 Recommendation 19 
 
Financial Institutions should develop programs against money laundering. 
These programs should include, as a minimum: 
 
 The development of internal policies, procedures and controls, including 
the designation of compliance officers at management level, and adequate 
screening procedures to ensure high standards when hiring employees; 
 An ongoing employee training programme; 
 An audit function to test the system. 
 
Measures to Cope with the Problem of Countries with No or Insufficient Anti-
Money Laundering Measures 
 
Recommendation 20 
 
Financial institutions should ensure that the principles mentioned above are 
also applied to branches and majority owned subsidiaries located abroad, 
especially in countries, which do not or insufficiently apply these 
recommendations, to the extent that local applicable laws and regulations 
permit. When local applicable laws and regulations prohibit implementation, 
competent authorities in the country of mother institutions should be informed 
by the financial institutions that they couldn’t apply these recommendations. 
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Recommendation 21 
 
Financial institutions should give special attention to business relations and 
transactions with persons, including companies and financial institutions, from 
countries, which do not or insufficiently apply these recommendations. 
Whenever these transactions have no apparent economic or visible lawful 
purpose, their background and purpose should, as far as possible, be 
examined, their findings established in writing, and be available to help 
supervisors, auditors and law enforcement agencies. 
 
Other Measures to avoid Money Laundering 
 
Recommendations 22 
 
Countries should consider implementing feasible measures to detect or 
monitor the physical cross-border transportation of cash and bearer 
negotiable instruments, subject to strict safeguards to ensure proper use of 
information and without impeding in any way the freedom of capital; 
movement. (See Interpretative Note) 
 
2.3 Recommendation 23 
 
Countries should consider the feasibility and utility of a system where banks 
and other financial institutions and intermediaries would report all domestic 
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and international currency transactions above a fixed amount, to national 
central agency with a computerized data base, available to competent 
authorities for use in money laundering cases, subject to strict safeguards to 
ensure proper use of information. 
 
Recommendation 24 
 
Countries should further encourage in general the development of modern 
and secure techniques of money management, including increased use of 
checks, payment cards, direct deposit of salary checks, and book entry 
recording of securities, as a means to encourage the replacement of cash 
transfers. 
 
Recommendation 25 
 
Countries should take notice of the potential for abuse of shell corporations by 
money launderers and should consider whether traditional measures are 
required to prevent unlawful use of such entities. 
 
  
Implementation and the Role of Regulatory and Other Administrative 
Authorities 
 
Recommendation 26 
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The competent authorities supervising banks of other financial institutions or 
intermediaries should ensure that the supervised institutions have adequate 
programmes to guard against money laundering. These authorities should co-
operate and lend expertise spotentenously or on request with other domestic 
judicial or law enforcement authorities in money laundering investigation and 
prosecutions. (See Interpretative Note) 
 
Recommendation 27 
 
Competent authorities should be designed to ensure that an effective 
implementation of all these recommendations, through administrative 
supervision and regulation, in other professions dealing with cash as defined 
by each country. 
 
Recommendation 28 
 
The competent authorities should establish guidelines, which assist financial 
institutions in detecting suspicious patterns of behaviour by their customers. It 
is understood that such guidelines will primarily serve as an educational tool 
for financial institutions personnel. 
 
Recommendation 29 
 
The competent authorities regulating or supervising financial should take the 
necessary legal or regulatory measures to guard against control or acquisition 
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of a significant participation by criminal or their confederates. (See 
Interpretative Note). 
 
STRENGTHENING OF INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 
 
Exchange of general information 
 
Recommendation 30 
 
National administration should consider recording, at least in the aggregate, 
international flows of cash in whatever currency, so that estimates can be 
made of cash flows and reflows from various sources abroad, when this is 
combined with central bank information.  
 
Recommendation 31 
 
International competent authorities, perhaps Interpol and the World Customs 
Organisation, should be given responsibility for gathering and disseminating 
information to competent authorities about the latest development in money 
laundering and money laundering technique. Central banks and bank 
regulators could do the same on their network. National authorities in various 
spheres, in consultation with trade association, could disseminate this to 
financial institutions in individual countries. 
 
Exchange of information relating to suspicious transactions 
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Recommendation 32 
 
Each country should make efforts to improve spontaneous or upon request 
international information exchange relating to suspicious transactions, 
persons and co-operation involved in those transactions between competent 
authorities. Strict safeguards should be established to ensure that this 
exchange of information is consistent with national and international 
provisions on privacy and data protection. 
 
Other forms of Co-operation 
 
Basis and Means of Co-operation in Confiscation, Mutual Legal Assistance 
and Extradition 
 
Recommendation 33 
 
Countries should try to ensure, on a bilateral or multilateral basis, that 
different knowledge standards in national definitions-i.e. different standards 
concerning intentional element of the infraction-do not affect the ability or 
willingness of countries to provide each other with mutual legal assistance. 
 
Recommendation 34 
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International Co-operation should be supported by a network of bilateral and 
multilateral agreements and arrangements based on generally shared legal 
concepts with the aim of providing practical measures to affect the widest 
possible range of mutual assistance. 
 
Recommendation 35       
 
Countries should be encouraged to ratify and implement relevant international 
conventions on money laundering such as the 1990 Council of Europe 
Convention on Money Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
proceeds from Crime. 
 
Recommendation 36 
 
Co-operative investigations among countries appropriate competent 
authorities should be encouraged. One valid and effective investigative 
technique in this respect is controlled delivery related to assets known or 
suspected to be the proceeds of crime. Countries are encouraged to support 
this technique, where possible. (See the Interpretative Note.) 
 
Recommendation 37 
 
There should be procedures for mutual legal assistance in criminal matters 
regarding the use of compulsory measures including the production of records 
by financial institutions and other persons, the search of persons and 
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premises, seizure and obtaining of evidence for use in money laundering 
investigations and prosecutions and in related actions in foreign jurisdictions. 
 
Recommendation 38 
 
There should be authority to take expeditious action in response to request by 
foreign countries to identify, freeze, seize and confiscate proceeds or other 
property of corresponding value to such proceeds, based on money 
laundering or crimes underlying money laundering activity. (See Interpretative 
Note) 
 
Recommendation 39 
 
To avoid conflicts of jurisdiction, consideration should be given to the devising 
and applying mechanisms for determining the best value for prosecution of 
defendants in the interest of justice in cases that are subject to prosecution in 
more than one country.  
 
Recommendation 40 
 
Countries should have procedures in place to extradite, where possible, 
individuals charged with money laundering offence or related offences. With 
respect to its national legal system, each country should recognise money 
laundering as extraditable offence. Subject to these legal frameworks, 
countries may consider simplifying extradition by allowing direct transmission 
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of extradition request between appropriate ministries, extraditing persons 
based only on warrants of arrests or judgements, extraditing their national, 
and/or introducing a simplified extradition of consenting persons who waive 
formal extradition proceedings. 
 
Annex to Recommendation 9: List of Financial Activities Undertaken by 
Business or professions, which are not Financial Institutions. 
 
(a) Acceptance of deposits and other repayable funds from the public 
(b) Lending.820 
(c) Financial leasing. 
(d) Money transmission services. 
(e) Issuing and managing means of payment (e.g. credit and debit cards, 
cheques, traveller’s cheques and bankers’ draft). 
(f) Financial guarantees and commitments. 
(g) Trading for account of customers (spot, forward, swaps, futures, 
options…) in: (i) Money Market instruments; 
 
(i) Foreign Exchange; 
(ii) Exchange, interest rate and index instruments; 
(iii) Commodity future trading. 
 
(h) Participation in securities issues and provision of financial services related 
to such issues. 
                                                          
820
 This includes consumer credit, mortgage credit, factoring, with or without recourse, finance 
of commercial transactions including forfaiting. 
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(i) Individuals and Collective portfolio management. 
(j) Safekeeping and administration of cash or liquid securities on behalf of 
clients. 
(k) Life insurance and other investment related insurance. 
(l) Money changing. 
 
 
Nine Special recommendations in (2001) 
 
Recognizing the vital importance of taking action to combat the financing of 
terrorism, the FATF has agreed these Recommendations, which, when 
combined with the FATF Forty Recommendations on money laundering, set 
out the basic framework to detect, prevent and suppress the financing of 
terrorism and terrorist acts. 
 
Each Country should take immediate steps to ratify and to implement fully the 
1999 United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of the 
Financing of Terrorism. Countries should also immediately implement the 
United Nations resolutions relating to the prevention and suppression of the 
financing of terrorist acts, particularly United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1373. 
 
Each Country should criminalize the financing of terrorism, terrorist acts and 
terrorist. 
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Countries should ensure that such offences are designated as money 
laundering predicate offences. 
 
Each Country should implement measures to freeze without delay funds or 
other assets of terrorists, those who finance terrorism and terrorist 
organisations in accordance with the United Nations resolutions relating to the 
prevention and suppression of the financing of terrorist acts. Each Country 
should also adopt and implement measures, including legislative ones, which 
would enable the competent authorities to seize and confiscate property that 
is the proceeds of, or used in, or intended or allocated for use in, the financing 
of terrorism, terrorist acts or terrorist organisations. 
 
If financial institutions, or other businesses or entities subject to anti-money 
laundering obligations, suspect or have reasonable grounds to suspect that 
funds are linked or related to, or are to be used for terrorism, terrorist acts or 
by terrorist organisations, they should be required to report promptly their 
suspicions to the competent authorities. Each country should afford another 
country, on the basis of a treaty, arrangement or other mechanism for mutual 
legal assistance or information exchange, the greatest possible measure of 
assistance in connection with criminal, civil enforcement, and administrative 
investigations, inquiries and proceedings relating to the financing of terrorism, 
terrorist acts and terrorist organisations. 
 
Countries should also take all possible measures to ensure that they do not 
provide safe havens for individuals charged with the financing of terrorism, 
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terrorist acts or terrorist organisations, and should have procedures in place to 
extradite, where possible, such individuals. Each country should take 
measures to ensure that persons or legal entities, including agents, that 
provide a service for the transmission of money or value, including 
transmission through an informal money or value transfer system or network, 
should be licensed or registered and subject to all the FATF 
Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial institutions. 
Each country should ensure that persons or legal entities that carry out this 
service illegally are subject to administrative, civil or criminal sanctions. 
 
Countries should take measures to require financial institutions, including 
money remitters, to include accurate and meaningful originator information 
(name, address and account number) on funds transfers and related 
messages that are sent, and the information should remain with the transfer 
or related message through the payment chain. Countries should take 
measures to ensure that financial institutions, including money remitters, 
conduct enhanced scrutiny of and monitor for suspicious activity funds 
transfers which do not contain complete originator information (name, address 
and account number). Countries should review the adequacy of laws and 
regulations that relate to entities that can be abused for the financing of 
terrorism. Non-profit organisations are particularly vulnerable, and countries 
should ensure that they cannot be misused: 
(i) By terrorist organisations posing as legitimate entities; 
(ii) to exploit legitimate entities as conduits for terrorist financing, including for 
the purpose of escaping asset freezing measures; and 
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(iii) To conceal or obscure the clandestine diversion of funds intended for 
legitimate 
purposes to terrorist organisations. 
 
VII. Cash Couriers 
 
Countries should have measures in place to detect the physical cross-border 
transportation of currency and bearer negotiable instruments, including a 
declaration system or other disclosure obligation. Countries should ensure 
that their competent authorities have the legal authority to stop or restrain 
currency or bearer negotiable instruments that are suspected to be related to 
terrorist financing or money laundering, or that are falsely declared or 
disclosed. Countries should ensure that effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive sanctions are available to deal with persons who make false 
declaration(s) or disclosure(s). In cases where the currency or bearer 
negotiable instruments are related to terrorist financing or money laundering, 
countries should also adopt measures, including legislative ones consistent 
with 
 
Recommendation 3 and Special Recommendation III, which would enable the 
confiscation of such currency or instruments. 
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APPENDIX 2  
 
UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION AGAINST TRANSNATIONAL 
ORGANIZED CRIME  
Adopted by the General Assembly on 15 November 2000 (excerpts)  
Article 2  
Use of terms  
For the purposes of this Convention:  
(a) “Organized criminal group” shall mean a structured group of three or more 
persons, existing for a period of time and acting in concert with the aim of 
committing one or more serious crimes or offences established in accordance 
with this Convention, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or 
other material benefit;  
(b) “Serious crime” shall mean conduct constituting an offence punishable by 
a maximum deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious 
penalty;  
(c) “Structured group” shall mean a group that is not randomly formed for the 
immediate commission of an offence and that does not need to have formally 
defined roles for its members, continuity of its membership or a developed 
structure;  
(d) “Property” shall mean assets of every kind, whether corporeal or 
incorporeal, movable or immovable, tangible or intangible, and legal 
documents or instruments evidencing title to, or interest in, such assets;  
(e) “Proceeds of crime” shall mean any property derived from or obtained, 
directly or indirectly, through the commission of an offence;  
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(f) “Freezing” or “seizure” shall mean temporarily prohibiting the transfer, 
conversion, disposition or movement of property or temporarily assuming 
custody or control of property on the basis of an order issued by a court or 
other competent authority;  
(g) “Confiscation”, which includes forfeiture where applicable, shall mean the 
permanent deprivation of property by order of a court or other competent 
authority;  
(h) “Predicate offence” shall mean any offence as a result of which proceeds 
have been generated that may become the subject of an offence as defined in 
article 6 of this Convention;  
(i) “Controlled delivery” shall mean the technique of allowing illicit or suspect 
consignments to pass out of, through or into the territory of one or more 
States, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent 
authorities, with a view to the investigation of an offence and the identification 
of persons involved in the commission of the offence;  
(j) “Regional economic integration organization” shall mean an organization 
constituted by sovereign States of a given region, to which its member States 
have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this 
Convention and which has been duly authorised, in accordance with its 
internal procedures, to sign, ratify, accept, approve or accede to it; references 
to “States Parties” under this Convention shall apply to such organizations 
within the limits of their competence.  
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Article 6  
Criminalisation of the laundering of proceeds of crime  
 
1. Each State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental 
principles of its domestic law, such legislative and other measures as may be 
necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally:  
 
(a) (i) The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is the 
proceeds of crime, for the purpose of concealing or disguising the illicit origin 
of the property or of helping any person who is involved in the commission of 
the predicate offence to evade the legal consequences of his or her action;  
(ii) The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement or ownership of or rights with respect to property, 
knowing that such property is the proceeds of crime;  
(B) Subject to the basic concepts of its legal system:  
(i) The acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of 
receipt, that such property is the proceeds of crime;  
(ii) Participation in, association with or conspiracy to commit, attempts to 
commit and aiding, abetting, facilitating and counseling the commission of any 
of the offences established in accordance with this article.  
2. For purposes of implementing or applying paragraph 1 of this article:  
(a) Each State Party shall seek to apply paragraph 1 of this article to the 
widest range of predicate offences;  
(b) Each State Party shall include as predicate offences all serious crime as 
defined in article 2 of this Convention and the offences established in 
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accordance with articles 5, 8 and 23 of this Convention. In the case of States 
Parties whose legislation sets out a list of specific predicate offences, they 
shall, at a minimum, include in such list a comprehensive range of offences 
associated with organized criminal groups;  
(c) For the purposes of subparagraph (b), predicate offences shall include 
offences committed both within and outside the jurisdiction of the State Party 
in question. However, offences committed outside the jurisdiction of a State 
Party shall constitute predicate offences only when the relevant conduct is a 
criminal offence under the domestic law of the State where it is committed and 
would be a criminal offence under the domestic law of the State Party 
implementing or applying this article had it been committed there;  
(d) Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws that give effect to this 
article and of any subsequent changes to such laws or a description thereof to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations;  
(e) If required by fundamental principles of the domestic law of a State Party, 
it may be provided that the offences set forth in paragraph 1 of this article do 
not apply to the persons who committed the predicate offence;  
 
(f) Knowledge, intent or purpose required as an element of an offence 
set forth in paragraph 1 of this article may be inferred from 
objective factual circumstances.  
 
Article 7 Measures to combat money laundering  
1. Each State Party:  
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(a) Shall institute a comprehensive domestic regulatory and supervisory 
regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions and, where appropriate, 
other bodies particularly susceptible to money-laundering, within its 
competence, in order to deter and detect all forms of  
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Money-laundering, which regime shall emphasise requirements for customer 
identification, record-keeping and the reporting of suspicious transactions;  
(b) Shall, without prejudice to articles 18 and 27 of this Convention, ensure 
that administrative, regulatory, law enforcement and other authorities 
dedicated to combating money-laundering (including, where appropriate 
under domestic law, judicial authorities) have the ability to cooperate and 
exchange information at the national and international levels within the 
conditions prescribed by its domestic law and, to that end, shall consider the 
establishment of a financial intelligence unit to serve as a national centre for 
the collection, analysis and dissemination of information regarding potential 
money-laundering.  
2. States Parties shall consider implementing feasible measures to detect and 
monitor the movement of cash and appropriate negotiable instruments across 
their borders, subject to safeguards to ensure proper use of information and 
without impeding in any way the movement of legitimate capital. Such 
measures may include a requirement that individuals and businesses report 
the cross-border transfer of substantial quantities of cash and appropriate 
negotiable instruments.  
3. In establishing a domestic regulatory and supervisory regime under the 
terms of this article, and without prejudice to any other article of this 
Convention, States Parties are called upon to use as a guideline the relevant 
initiatives of regional, interregional and multilateral organizations against 
money-laundering.  
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4. States Parties shall endeavour to develop and promote global, regional, 
sub regional and bilateral cooperation among judicial, law enforcement and 
financial regulatory authorities in order to combat money-laundering.  
Article 10 Liability of legal persons  
 
1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary, 
consistent with its legal principles, to establish the liability of legal persons for 
participation in serious crimes involving an organized criminal group and for 
the offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this 
Convention.  
2. Subject to the legal principles of the State Party, the liability of legal 
persons may be criminal, civil or administrative.  
3. Such liability shall be without prejudice to the criminal liability of the natural 
persons who have committed the offences.  
4. Each State Party shall, in particular, ensure that legal persons held liable in 
accordance with this article are subject to effective, proportionate and 
dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanctions, including monetary sanctions.  
 
Article11 Prosecution, adjudication and sanctions 
  
1. Each State Party shall make the commission of an offence established in 
accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention liable to sanctions 
that take into account the gravity of that offence.  
2. Each State Party shall endeavour to ensure that any discretionary legal 
powers under its domestic law relating to the prosecution of persons for 
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offences covered by this Convention are exercised to maximise the 
effectiveness of law enforcement measures in respect of those offences and 
with due regard to the need to deter the commission of such offences.  
3. In the case of offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 
23 of this Convention, each State Party shall take appropriate measures, in 
accordance with its domestic law and with due regard to the rights of the 
defence, to seek to ensure that conditions imposed in connection with 
decisions on release pending trial or appeal take into consideration the need 
to ensure the presence of the defendant at subsequent criminal proceedings.  
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4. Each State Party shall ensure that its courts or other competent authorities 
bear in mind the grave nature of the offences covered by this Convention 
when considering the eventuality of early release or parole of persons 
convicted of such offences.  
5. Each State Party shall, where appropriate, establish under its domestic law 
a long statute of limitations period in which to commence proceedings for any 
offence covered by this Convention and a longer period where the alleged 
offender has evaded the administration of justice.  
6. Nothing contained in this Convention shall affect the principle that the 
description of the offences established in accordance with this Convention 
and of the applicable legal defences or other legal principles controlling the 
lawfulness of conduct is reserved to the domestic law of a State Party and 
that such offences shall be prosecuted and punished in accordance with that 
law.  
 
Article 12  
Confiscation and seizure 
  
1. States Parties shall adopt, to the greatest extent possible within their 
domestic legal systems, such measures as may be necessary to enable 
confiscation of:  
(a) Proceeds of crime derived from offences covered by this Convention or 
property the value of which corresponds to that of such proceeds;  
(b) Property, equipment or other instrumentalities used in or destined for use 
in offences covered by this Convention.  
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2. States Parties shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to enable 
the identification, tracing, freezing or seizure of any item referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this article for the purpose of eventual confiscation.  
3. If proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted, in part or in full, 
into other property, such property shall be liable to the measures referred to in 
this article instead of the proceeds.  
4. If proceeds of crime have been intermingled with property acquired from 
legitimate sources, such property shall, without prejudice to any powers 
relating to freezing or seizure, be liable to confiscation up to the assessed 
value of the intermingled proceeds.  
5. Income or other benefits derived from proceeds of crime, from property into 
which proceeds of crime have been transformed or converted or from property 
with which proceeds of crime have been intermingled shall also be liable to 
the measures referred to in this article, in the same manner and to the same 
extent as proceeds of crime.  
6. For the purposes of this article and article 13 of this Convention, each State 
Party shall empower its courts or other competent authorities to order that 
bank, financial or commercial records be made available or be seized. States 
Parties shall not decline to act under the provisions of this paragraph on the 
ground of bank secrecy.  
7. States Parties may consider the possibility of requiring that an offender 
demonstrate the lawful origin of alleged proceeds of crime or other property 
liable to confiscation, to the extent that such a requirement is consistent with 
the principles of their domestic law and with the nature of the judicial and 
other proceedings.  
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8. The provisions of this article shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of 
bona fide third parties.  
9. Nothing contained in this article shall affect the principle that the measures 
to which it refers shall be defined and implemented in accordance with and 
subject to the provisions of the domestic law of a State Party.  
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Article 13  
International cooperation for purposes of confiscation 
  
1. A State Party that has received a request from another State Party having 
jurisdiction over an offence covered by this Convention for confiscation of 
proceeds of crime, property, equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in 
article 12, paragraph 1, of this Convention situated in its territory shall, to the 
greatest extent possible within its domestic legal system:  
(a) Submit the request to its competent authorities for the purpose of obtaining 
an order of confiscation and, if such an order is granted, give effect to it; or  
(b) Submit to its competent authorities, with a view to giving effect to it to the 
extent requested, an order of confiscation issued by a court in the territory of 
the requesting State Party in accordance with article 12, paragraph 1, of this 
Convention insofar as it relates to proceeds of crime, property, equipment or 
other instrumentalities referred to in article 12, paragraph 1, situated in the 
territory of the requested State Party.  
2. Following a request made by another State Party having jurisdiction over 
an offence covered by this Convention, the requested State Party shall take 
measures to identify, trace and freeze or seize proceeds of crime, property, 
equipment or other instrumentalities referred to in article 12, paragraph 1, of 
this Convention for the purpose of eventual confiscation to be ordered either 
by the requesting State Party or, pursuant to a request under paragraph 1 of 
this article, by the requested State Party.  
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3. The provisions of article 18 of this Convention are applicable, mutatis 
mutandis, to this article. In addition to the information specified in article 18, 
paragraph 15, requests made pursuant to this article shall contain:  
(a) In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph 1 (a) of this article, a 
description of the property to be confiscated and a statement of the facts 
relied upon by the requesting State Party sufficient to enable the requested 
State Party to seek the order under its domestic law;  
(b) In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph 1 (b) of this article, a 
legally admissible copy of an order of confiscation upon which the request is 
based issued by the requesting State Party, a statement of the facts and 
information as to the extent to which execution of the order is requested;  
(c) In the case of a request pertaining to paragraph 2 of this article, a 
statement of the facts relied upon by the requesting State Party and a 
description of the actions requested.  
4. The decisions or actions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article 
shall be taken by the requested State Party in accordance with and subject to 
the provisions of its domestic law and its procedural rules or any bilateral or 
multilateral treaty, agreement or arrangement to which it may be bound in 
relation to the requesting State Party.  
5. Each State Party shall furnish copies of its laws and regulations that give 
effect to this article and of any subsequent changes to such laws and 
regulations or a description thereof to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations.  
6. If a State Party elects to make the taking of the measures referred to in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of this article conditional on the existence of a relevant 
 347 
treaty, that State Party shall consider this Convention the necessary and 
sufficient treaty basis.  
7. Cooperation under this article may be refused by a State Party if the 
offence to which the request relates is not an offence covered by this 
Convention.  
8. The provisions of this article shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of 
bona fide third parties.  
9. States Parties shall consider concluding bilateral or multilateral treaties, 
agreements or arrangements to enhance the effectiveness of international 
cooperation undertaken pursuant to this article.  
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Article 14 Disposal of confiscated proceeds of crime or property  
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1. Proceeds of crime or property confiscated by a State Party pursuant to 
articles 12 or 13, paragraph 1, of this Convention shall be disposed of by that 
State Party in accordance with its domestic law and administrative 
procedures.  
2. When acting on the request made by another State Party in accordance 
with article 13 of this Convention, States Parties shall, to the extent permitted 
by domestic law and if so requested, give priority consideration to returning 
the confiscated proceeds of crime or property to the requesting State Party so 
that it can give compensation to the victims of the crime or return such 
proceeds of crime or property to their legitimate owners.  
3. When acting on the request made by another State Party in accordance 
with articles 12 and 13 of this Convention, a State Party may give special 
consideration to concluding agreements or arrangements on:  
(a) Contributing the value of such proceeds of crime or property or funds 
derived from the sale of such proceeds of crime or property or a part thereof 
to the account designated in accordance with article 30, paragraph 2 (c), of 
this Convention and to intergovernmental bodies  
specialising in the fight against organized crime;  
 
(b) Sharing with other States Parties, on a regular or case-by-case 
basis, such proceeds of crime or property, or funds derived from 
the sale of such proceeds of crime or property, in accordance 
with its domestic law or administrative procedures.  
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Article 15 Jurisdiction 
  
1. Each State Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offences established in accordance with 
articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this Convention when:  
(a) The offence is committed in the territory of that State Party; or  
(b) The offence is committed on board a vessel that is flying the flag of that 
State Party or an aircraft that is registered under the laws of that State Party 
at the time that the offence is committed.  
2. Subject to article 4 of this Convention, a State Party may also establish its 
jurisdiction over any such offence when:  
(a) The offence is committed against a national of that State Party;  
 
(b) The offence is committed by a national of that State Party or a 
stateless person who has his or her habitual residence in its 
territory; or  
 
(c) The offence is:  
(i) One of those established in accordance with article 5, paragraph 1, of this 
Convention and is committed outside its territory with a view to the 
commission of a serious crime within its territory;  
(ii) One of those established in accordance with article 6, paragraph 1 (b) (ii), 
of this Convention and is committed outside its territory with a view to the 
commission of an offence established in accordance with article 6, paragraph 
1 (a) (i) or (ii) or (b) (i), of this Convention within its territory.  
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3. For the purposes of article 16, paragraph 10, of this Convention, each State 
Party shall adopt such measures as may be necessary to establish its 
jurisdiction over the offences covered by this Convention when the alleged 
offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite such person solely 
on the ground that he or she is one of its nationals.  
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Each State Party may also adopt such measures as may be necessary to 
establish its jurisdiction over the offences covered by this Convention when 
the alleged offender is present in its territory and it does not extradite him or 
her.  
5. If a State Party exercising its jurisdiction under paragraph 1 or 2 of this 
article has been notified, or has otherwise learned, that one or more other 
States Parties are conducting an investigation, prosecution or judicial 
proceeding in respect of the same conduct, the competent authorities of those 
States Parties shall, as appropriate, consult one another with a view to 
coordinating their actions.  
 
6. Without prejudice to norms of general international law, this 
Convention does not exclude the exercise of any criminal jurisdiction 
established by a State Party in accordance with its domestic law.  
 
Article 27 Law enforcement cooperation  
 
1. States Parties shall cooperate closely with one another, consistent with 
their respective domestic legal and administrative systems, to enhance the 
effectiveness of law enforcement action to combat the offences covered by 
this Convention. Each State Party shall, in particular, adopt effective 
measures:  
(a) To enhance and, where necessary, to establish channels of 
communication between their competent authorities, agencies and services in 
order to facilitate the secure and rapid exchange of information concerning all 
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aspects of the offences covered by this Convention, including, if the States 
Parties concerned deem it appropriate, links with other criminal activities;  
(b) To cooperate with other States Parties in conducting inquiries with respect 
to offences covered by this Convention concerning:  
(i) The identity, whereabouts and activities of persons suspected of 
involvement in such offences or the location of other persons concerned;  
(ii) The movement of proceeds of crime or property derived from the 
commission of such offences;  
(iii) The movement of property, equipment or other instrumentalities used or 
intended for use in the commission of such offences;  
(c) To provide, when appropriate, necessary items or quantities of substances 
for analytical or investigative purposes;  
(d) To facilitate effective coordination between their competent authorities, 
agencies and services and to promote the exchange of personnel and other 
experts, including, subject to bilateral agreements or arrangements between 
the States Parties concerned, the posting of liaison officers;  
(e) To exchange information with other States Parties on specific means and 
methods used by organized criminal groups, including, where applicable, 
routes and conveyances and the use of false identities, altered or false 
documents or other means of concealing their activities;  
(f) To exchange information and coordinate administrative and other 
measures taken as appropriate for the purpose of early identification of the 
offences covered by this Convention.  
2. With a view to giving effect to this Convention, States Parties shall consider 
entering into bilateral or multilateral agreements or arrangements on direct 
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cooperation between their law enforcement agencies and, where such 
agreements or arrangements already exist, amending them. In the absence of 
such agreements or arrangements between the States Parties concerned, the 
Parties may consider this Convention as the basis for mutual law enforcement 
cooperation in respect of the offences covered by this Convention. Whenever 
appropriate, States Parties shall make full use of agreements or 
arrangements, including international or regional organizations, to enhance 
the cooperation between their law enforcement agencies.  
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3. States Parties shall endeavour to cooperate within their means to respond 
to transnational organized crime committed through the use of modern 
technology.  
 
Article 29  
 
Training and technical assistance 
  
1. Each State Party shall, to the extent necessary, initiate, develop or improve 
specific training programmes for its law enforcement personnel, including 
prosecutors, investigating magistrates and customs personnel, and other 
personnel charged with the prevention, detection and control of the offences 
covered by this Convention. Such programmes may include secondments and 
exchanges of staff. Such programmes shall deal, in particular and to the 
extent permitted by domestic law, with the following:  
(a) Methods used in the prevention, detection and control of the offences 
covered by this Convention;  
(b) Routes and techniques used by persons suspected of involvement in 
offences covered by this Convention, including in transit States, and 
appropriate countermeasures;  
(c) Monitoring of the movement of contraband;  
(d) Detection and monitoring of the movements of proceeds of crime, 
property, equipment or other instrumentalities and methods used for the 
transfer, concealment or disguise of such proceeds, property, equipment or 
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other instrumentalities, as well as methods used in combating money-
laundering and other financial crimes;  
(e) Collection of evidence;  
(f) Control techniques in free trade zones and free ports;  
(g) Modern law enforcement equipment and techniques, including electronic 
surveillance, controlled deliveries and undercover operations;  
(h) Methods used in combating transnational organized crime committed 
through the use of computers, telecommunications networks or other forms of 
modern technology; and  
(i) Methods used in the protection of victims and witnesses.  
2. States Parties shall assist one another in planning and implementing 
research and training programmes designed to share expertise in the areas 
referred to in paragraph 1 of this article and to that end shall also, when 
appropriate, use regional and international conferences and seminars to 
promote cooperation and to stimulate discussion on problems of mutual 
concern, including the special problems and needs of transit States.  
3. States Parties shall promote training and technical assistance that will 
facilitate extradition and mutual legal assistance. Such training and technical 
assistance may include language training, secondments and exchanges 
between personnel in central authorities or agencies with relevant 
responsibilities.  
4. In the case of existing bilateral and multilateral agreements or 
arrangements, States Parties shall strengthen, to the extent necessary, efforts 
to maximise operational and training activities within international and regional 
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organizations and within other relevant bilateral and multilateral agreements 
or arrangements.  
 
Article 30 
  
Other measures: implementation of the Convention through economic 
development and technical assistance  
 
1. States Parties shall take measures conducive to the optimal 
implementation of this Convention to the extent possible, through international 
cooperation, taking into account the negative effects of organized crime on 
society in general, in particular on sustainable development.  
2. States Parties shall make concrete efforts to the extent possible and in 
coordination with each other, as well as with international and regional 
organizations:  
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(a) To enhance their cooperation at various levels with developing countries, 
with a view to strengthening the capacity of the latter to prevent and combat 
transnational organized crime;  
(b) To enhance financial and material assistance to support the efforts of 
developing countries to fight transnational organized crime effectively and to 
help them implement this Convention successfully;  
(c) To provide technical assistance to developing countries and countries with 
economies in transition to assist them in meeting their needs for the 
implementation of this Convention. To that end, States Parties shall 
endeavour to make adequate and regular voluntary contributions to an 
account specifically designated for that purpose in a United Nations funding 
mechanism. States Parties may also give special consideration, in 
accordance with their domestic law and the provisions of this Convention, to 
contributing to the aforementioned account a percentage of the money or of 
the corresponding value of proceeds of crime or property confiscated in 
accordance with the provisions of this Convention;  
(d) To encourage and persuade other States and financial institutions as 
appropriate to join them in efforts in accordance with this article, in particular 
by providing more training programmes and modern equipment to developing 
countries in order to assist them in achieving the objectives of this 
Convention.  
3. To the extent possible, these measures shall be without prejudice to 
existing foreign assistance commitments or to other financial cooperation 
arrangements at the bilateral, regional or international level.  
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4. States Parties may conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements or 
arrangements on material and logistical assistance, taking into consideration 
the financial arrangements necessary for the means of international 
cooperation provided for by this Convention to be effective and for the 
prevention, detection and control of transnational organized crime.  
 
Article 32  
Conference of the Parties to the Convention  
 
1. A Conference of the Parties to the Convention is hereby established to 
improve the capacity of States Parties to combat transnational organized 
crime and to promote and review the implementation of this Convention.  
2. The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall convene the Conference 
of the Parties not later than one year following the entry into force of this 
Convention. The Conference of the Parties shall adopt rules of procedure and 
rules governing the activities set forth in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this article 
(including rules concerning payment of expenses incurred in carrying out 
those activities).  
3. The Conference of the Parties shall agree upon mechanisms for achieving 
the objectives mentioned in paragraph 1 of this article, including:  
(a) Facilitating activities by States Parties under articles 29, 30 and 31 of this 
Convention, including by encouraging the mobilization of voluntary 
contributions;  
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(b) Facilitating the exchange of information among States Parties on patterns 
and trends in transnational organized crime and on successful practices for 
combating it;  
(c) Cooperating with relevant international and regional organizations and 
non-governmental organizations;  
(d) Reviewing periodically the implementation of this Convention;  
(e) Making recommendations to improve this Convention and its 
implementation.  
4. For the purpose of paragraphs 3 (d) and (e) of this article, the Conference 
of the Parties shall acquire the necessary knowledge of the measures taken 
by States Parties in implementing this Convention and the difficulties 
encountered by them in doing so through information provided by them and 
through such supplemental review mechanisms as may be established by the 
Conference of the Parties.  
5. Each State Party shall provide the Conference of the Parties with 
information on its programmes, plans and practices, as well as legislative and 
administrative measures to implement this Convention, as required by the 
Conference of the Parties.  
 
 
Article 34 
  
Implementation of the Convention  
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1. Each State Party shall take the necessary measures, including legislative 
and administrative measures, in accordance with fundamental principles of its 
domestic law, to ensure the implementation of its obligations under this 
Convention.  
2. The offences established in accordance with articles 5, 6, 8 and 23 of this 
Convention shall be established in the domestic law of each State Party 
independently of the transnational nature or the involvement of an organized 
criminal group as described in article 3, paragraph 1, of this Convention, 
except to the extent that article 5 of this Convention would require the 
involvement of an organized criminal group.  
 
3. Each State Party may adopt more strict or severe measures than 
those provided for by this Convention for preventing and combating 
transnational organized crime.  
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APPENDIX 3: QUESTIONNAIRE 
 
C/O The School of Law and Social Sciences 
University of East London 
Hight Street, Duncan House 
Stratford, London 
E15 2 JB 
10 December 2011 
 
 
Dear Sir/Madam: 
 
     RE: RESEARCH QUESTIONAIRRE 
 
I am a PhD research student at the School of law and Social Sciences, 
University of East London, writing my thesis on the title: the global anti-money 
laundering framework and its jurisdictional limits. Meanwhile, I have prepared 
a few questions in form of a questionnaire on the subject of money laundering 
regulations in Uganda and United Kingdom; I would like to solicit responses 
on from participants. Thus, I would kindly like to ask you for your participation 
in this survey, answering questions as they may appropriately relate to you/r 
organization.  
 
The survey is anonymous, and the participant does not have to disclose their 
details such as his/her name, residential address, email, date of birth etc. We 
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would also like to assure participants that we operate a rigorous data 
protection and ethical policies regarding data collected from participants. 
Lastly, please answer those questions in the survey that only relate to you/r 
organisation. 
 
Very many thanks. 
Yours sincerely 
 
Norman Mugarura 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interview Guide for Participating Individuals/Organizations 
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Name of the participant                                                                                                        
Date of participation                                                               
Organisation                                 
Capacity                                                
Signature                                                
• If you do not like the researcher to collect your name, or you would like your 
comments to remain anonymous, please cut the questionnaire on the dotted 
line. 
• Staple or clip the two parts of your answer to the questionnaire together, if 
you have written on many sheets of papers. 
 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
1. Money laundering is a financial crime which undermines the stability of 
financial Markets. What is your view on the state of money laundering in 
your organization? Does your organization have an anti-money laundering 
policy framework? What are the key policy areas of your organization’s 
anti-money laundering policy?  
2. What is your opinion about the threat of money laundering in United 
Kingdom/Uganda?  
3. Have you experienced incidences of money laundering/financing of 
terrorism in your organization?  
4. What policy measures are operated by your organisation to counter the 
threat of money laundering/or financing of terrorism? 
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5. Are some of the AML/CFT measures aimed at enhancing inter-bank 
cooperation?  
6. Does your organisation have any designated officer in charge of 
administering an anti-money laundering policy? What is the possibility of 
an interview with him or her? 
7. Does your organization consolidate data on reported money laundering 
cases?  
8. How does your organization monitor and evaluate clients/institutions 
compliance with their anti-money laundering or countering financing of 
terrorism obligations? How do you assess the prevalence of money 
laundering on the United Kingdom/Uganda economy? 
9. Are there any benefits accrued from operating robust anti-money 
laundering policy in your organisation? What are they?  
10. What are the challenges faced by your organization in implementing an 
effective anti-money laundering policy? How do you evaluate the effect of 
the above policy on your organisation? 
11. What are the challenges of administering an effective anti-money 
laundering policy in your organisation?  
12. What other agencies do you work with to foster an effective anti-money 
laundering environment in your organization? 
13. What is your organization’s staff training policy on money laundering and 
financing of terrorism? Is it regular or adhoc? 
14. Does your organization receive any support to facilitate staff training from 
the government? What sort of support is it, if any? 
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15. Does your organisation need business development support services from 
outside to achieve its regulatory goals?  
16. What are the externalities of your organisation’s anti-money laundering 
regulatory policy? 
17. Do you think existing laws are sufficient to caution your organization or the 
society against the threat of money laundering? What are these laws?  
18. Have you in the past experienced limitations with the law or do you have 
any propositions you wish that the law should address? What are they?  
19. What factors do you think can explain the gap between policy and its 
implementation in your organization?  
20. What measures has your organization instituted to foreclose the 
discrepancy between policies and their implementation?   
21. Can you tell us the policy guidelines your organisation has instituted to 
harness the following regimes? 
   (a) Basle Committee banking supervision guidelines; and (b) the financial 
action task force forty plus nine recommendations. Do you evaluate the 
compatibility of these regimes with the environment your organization 
operates in? In other words, what are the potential challenges to your 
organization in implementing anti-money laundering regulatory regimes such 
as customer due diligence (CDD)? What other supplementary anti-money 
laundering measures does your organisation operate as a caution against 
money laundering/financing of terrorism? 
22. Does your organization operate a research department to generate data? 
What is the possibility of gaining access to your organization’s data base on 
these questions?  
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23. How do you think the newly created credit reference bureau in Uganda 
can facilitate the fight against financial crimes? What in your view do you think 
is the effect of the upsurge of global markets on crime prevention or on 
spreading of crimes in Uganda? 
24. Is there any designated person/money laundering officer (MILO) in your 
organization who can be contacted for a future follow up on this survey? 
25. In the absence of a specific anti-money laundering law in Uganda, how do 
courts prosecute alleged money laundering offences such as “Bicupuli?”  
26. Are there any recorded prosecutions in your organisation? 
27 How do you comment on the effectiveness of the police in fighting money 
laundering and other crimes? 
28. How do you comment on corruption in Uganda? How does corruption 
undermine the effective anti-money laundering policy measures in your 
organization? 
29. What is the possibility of a follow up interview with MILO or any person in 
charge of administering an anti-money laundering policy in your organization? 
30. What in view is the connection between globalization and money 
laundering? What do you think is the way forward? 
 
Thank you for your participation. 
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